A Report on Exercise Hornbeam –

A Series of Linked Exercises

Testing Government’s Foot and

Mouth Disease Emergency

Preparedness

January – June 2004

State Veterinary Service

Contingency Planning Division

December 2004

CONTENTS

Page

1. Executive Summary 2

2. Introduction 8

3. Exercise Methodology 12

4. Summary of Issues Identified to improve readiness 15

- Table top exercises 15

- Final Exercise 18

- Strategic Issues 18

- Tactical Issues 22

- Operational Issues 26

- Issues in Local Disease Control Centres 28

5. Issues Identified for Exercise Planning 33

6. Future Action 36

7. Conclusions 39

Annexes

Annex A - Issues Identified in Exercises 40

Annex B - The Developing Scenario 52

Annex C - Exercise Methodology 78

Annex D - Exercise Players 84

Annex E - Exercise Documentation – Situation Report 85

Annex F - Visitor/Observer Programme 92

Annex G - Glossary

Annex H - Maps (Defraweb only) 96

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This report contains the details of Exercise Hornbeam, a national foot &

mouth disease (FMD) exercise, organised by the Department for Environment

Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) with external contractors, which took place

between January and June 2004. It records the issues identified for further

action.

2. A series of tabletop exercises focussing on particular stages of disease

progression was held prior to a real-time two-day national exercise that

specifically considered decisions to be taken at days 7 and 8 of an outbreak. The

final exercise built on decisions taken at the earlier exercises which looked at the

initial disease phases of suspicion, confirmation and regional spread of FMD.

3. The primary purpose of Exercise Hornbeam was to test Defra’s current

Contingency Plans for an outbreak of FMD. The aim was

To review and update the Government’s current contingency plans for a

national outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease and thereby establish

readiness for such an outbreak.

The objectives were to:

• focus on the procedures of the National Disease Control Centre

(NDCC) and the Defra Emergency Management Board;

• validate and confirm the current version of the FMD Contingency

Plan as supported by the detailed Operational Instructions;

• exercise the strategic and tactical decision-making process for

disease eradication and in particular for adopting an emergency

vaccination strategy;

• test communication links within Defra and between Defra and

central government departments, particularly with the Civil

Contingencies Secretariat of Cabinet Office (CCS).

4. This meant that the Exercise addressed the links between the strategic,

tactical and operational spheres of the response and the invocation of a full-scale

National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) at Defra HQ. Other aspects of the

response included the deployment of Regional Operations Directors (RODs) and

Divisional Operations Managers (DOMs) to the Local Disease Control Centres

and the further development of emergency vaccination policy and operational

procedures.

5. Over 500 staff based at Defra London Headquarters and five Animal

Health Divisional Offices, (Stafford, Truro, Caernarfon, Lincoln and Inverness),

were involved in the final exercise. This allowed for some regional and crossborder

issues to be raised alongside national issues raised at HQ, although

relationships with Government Office Regional Resilience Teams were not

tested. The exercise series involved operational partners from other Government

departments, local authorities and the police. Interested parties such as the

RSPCA and the NFU also attended the final exercise and provided valuable input

and feedback. The final exercise gave Defra and the Civil Contingencies

Secretariat of the Cabinet Office an opportunity to test liaison procedures,

information flow and dissemination of decisions taken at Cabinet Office and Defra

Headquarters.

6. At each stage of the series issues were noted for consideration, review

and development. The main points identified related to:-

• the roles, responsibilities and organisational structures at senior levels;

• the clarity and presentation of the plan and instructions;

• the value of policy readiness and of identifying in advance trigger points

for policy decisions during an outbreak;

• communications in terms both of systems and procedures;

• Information collection, sharing and dissemination;

7. At the first phase – suspicion of disease - the main issue identified was

the importance of notifying immediately all who would need to take action if

disease were confirmed. It was apparent that leaving such action until

confirmation meant a slower overall response. This in turn emphasised the value

of establishing good links with all operational partners. At confirmation of disease

the main issues noted were the importance of speed in engaging all concerned

both centrally and locally, the need to build on established arrangements to

identify policy options and resource plans, to communicate proactively and

effectively with the public and to bring local authorities fully into enforcement

activity.

8. At the phase dealing with regional spread of disease and during the real

time exercise the main issues at strategic level were:-

• the importance of having available policy options that had been previously

developed using predictive modelling and scenarios so enabling a more

proactive approach to developing disease control strategies;

• the need to ensure that the established structures provided for the

integration of veterinary, scientific and operational input into the

development of policies;

• the need for better management information to enable predictions of

resource use to be made;

• the need for a more streamlined and sustainable structure for running an

operation which would reduce the burden on senior staff imposed by too

many meetings, media briefings, preparation of policy papers and

dissemination of decisions; and

• the need to clarify roles and responsibilities so that all concerned could

focus on their own area, assured that necessary decisions and actions

were taking place elsewhere.

9. At the tactical level questions were identified about:-

• the structure and purpose of the NDCC;

• the structure and purpose of the “Birdtable” meetings;

• how best to coordinate other Government departments and devolved

administrations effectively;

• the demands on key staff made by the Contingency Plan’s battle rhythm of

daily meetings; and

• human resources and the difficulties of providing structures and systems

to recruit, train and support the numbers of people required in a real

outbreak.

10. At the operational level, and at the Animal Health Divisional Offices, the

emphasis was on:-

• providing good IT systems;

• clarity of instructions;

• effective communication: and

• the confirmation of the need in future exercises to test arrangements

which were not part of this exercise such as increasing accommodation,

bringing into effect contingency contracts and engaging staff.

11. Overall, the exercise demonstrated Government’s substantial advances in

FMD contingency planning since 2001. The six month exercise series itself has

already delivered significant improvements in emergency preparedness,

cooperation with operational partners and in developing expertise within Defra. It

has provided a benchmark for achievement to date, the spur for addressing and

resolving policy and organisational issues and identified many ways in which

current plans and instructions can be improved. It provided a valuable learning

experience for all concerned.

12. Exercise Hornbeam demonstrated that using the Contingency Plan and

instructions Government would be able to mount a more rapid, efficient and

effectively coordinated response to an outbreak of foot and mouth disease; work

now needs to focus on developing policies and strategies that provide for the

management of all stages of an outbreak.

13. Since Exercise Hornbeam, work has been initiated to build on the issues

identified:-

• on the policy side the Animal Disease Policy Group is meeting regularly to

refine policies and the structures and processes necessary to provide

scientific input to policy decisions;

• working groups with operational partners are developing instructions for

the implementation of policies;

• communications issues are being addressed; and

• emergency IT systems are being examined.

The Contingency Plan will capture the new structures, organisations and

processes that are developed from the lessons learned from the Exercise before

it is again laid before Parliament in summer 2005.

2. INTRODUCTION

1. This report describes the development, planning and execution of a series

of linked exercises, called Exercise Hornbeam, designed to review the

Government’s contingency plans for an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease

(FMD) in Great Britain which can be found at:-

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/fmd/contingency/contplan.pdf

Scotland -

http://www.scotland.gov.uk/agri/documents/cp26Feb.pdf

Wales -

www.footandmouth.wales.gov.uk

2. It summarises the issues identified for further work to increase readiness

and assesses the overall benefits of the exercise. The exercise series

culminated in a real-time national scale exercise involving operational partners

and the devolved administrations of Scotland and Wales. It was the largest FMD

exercise ever undertaken in Europe.

3. As a result of the outbreak of foot and mouth disease in the United

Kingdom during 2001, the Government’s contingency plans were reviewed and

significantly updated to include lessons learned from the outbreak and to

incorporate established best practice in crisis management. They reflected the

need for the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) to

improve the integration of their operational partners in the response to an

outbreak of disease and also to involve them in exercising that response.

Additionally, the official Inquiries into that outbreak recommended regular

exercises. The new European Union FMD Directive also requires contingency

plans to be exercised regularly.

4. Since 2001 a very significant effort has been put into involving operational

partners, improving plans and updating policies. Contingency Plans and

operational instructions are now much more developed than during the last

outbreak and whilst there are many areas identified within this report that require

further work, it should be recognised that Great Britain now has a better state of

preparedness than was the case in 2001. In many respects Exercise Hornbeam

confirmed this.

5. The State Veterinary Service (SVS) has the lead operational responsibility

within Defra as lead department, for responding to an outbreak of exotic animal

disease such as FMD. It is responsible for developing and maintaining England’s

contingency plans for such diseases, but it is also a GB-wide organisation and is

accountable to Scottish and Welsh Ministers. The Contingency Planning Division

of the SVS established a small team to plan, project manage and deliver the

exercise series. After a competitive tender, additional consultancy expertise was

brought in from QinetiQ Ltd to assist the project team in developing and running

the exercises and to enable skills transfer into Defra.

6. After discussions with Defra’s veterinarians and senior policy officials, it

was decided that the key criteria for testing during the exercise should be:

• the decision-making process behind major disease control policy

decisions, including the use of emergency vaccination;

• the role of science in these decisions;

• the operational impact of these decisions;

• communication between and within the strategic, tactical and operational

levels;

• external communications including media handling;

• the identification of resource issues and bottlenecks, including the staffing

of the local and national disease control centres;

• the examination of the revised financial management framework, including

the procurement of goods and services.

7. It was agreed that it would be too ambitious to exercise the complete

response to an outbreak of foot and mouth disease because of the complexity

that would be involved. Certain elements of the contingency plan were therefore

not included in the exercise planning. It was agreed that there should be no onfarm

activity, that the additional staff who would be necessary in a real outbreak

would not be engaged and that none of the contingency contracts for goods and

services would be invoked. Additionally, it was decided that the following areas

were outside this scope of the exercise:

• the role and capacity of the analytical laboratories;

• full activation at Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) level;

• full activation of the Wales and Scotland foot and mouth disease

contingency plans (which complement the Defra plan). (NB: Some

elements of these plans were tested during this exercise);

• the Regional Resilience machinery of the Government Offices in the

Regions;

• full engagement with stakeholders at Defra Ministerial and senior official

level;

• full preparation of background briefings on policy and operations.

There remains a need to exercise these elements of the contingency plans in

future exercises.

8. As the particular emphasis of the exercise programme was to examine

Defra’s own plans for the initial stages of an outbreak, it was also agreed that the

wider consequence management issues would only be touched upon during the

exercise. However, other Government departments and particularly the Scotland

and Wales devolved administrations, would be invited to attend the strategic level

meetings to consider the immediate issues and the impact on government

responsibilities as a whole.

9. The Aim of the exercise was therefore:

“to review and update the Government’s current contingency plans for a

national outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease and thereby establish

readiness for such an outbreak”.

The Objectives were to:

• Focus on the procedures of the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)

and the Defra Emergency Management Board;

• Validate and confirm the current version of the FMD contingency plan as

supported by the detailed operational Instructions (VIPER Chapter 3);

• Exercise the strategic and tactical decision-making process for disease

eradication and in particular for adopting an emergency vaccination

strategy;

• Test communication links within Defra and between Defra and central

government departments, and particularly with the Civil Contingencies

Secretariat of Cabinet Office (CCS).

10. SVS Animal Health Divisional Offices (AHDOs) exercise their local

contingency plans regularly. However, Defra had never engaged in a full-scale

exercise linking most of the elements of the strategic, tactical and operational

commands. The exercise series was therefore designed to examine the three

initial stages of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease, namely: suspicion of a

case of disease, confirmation of disease and then the subsequent spread of the

disease around the country, at first within England and then throughout Great

Britain. Each of these stages was exercised at each command level and the data

produced at each stage was fed into the subsequent stages. A tabletop exercise

format was used for each part of the series with key personnel attending from

Defra and operational partners. The initial scenario developed through the

tabletop exercise series and resulted in a final real-time exercise dealing with

outbreaks of disease in England, Scotland and Wales at Day 7 after confirmation

of disease. The final exercise was conducted over a period of 17 working hours

at Days 7 and 8 of the exercise scenario although there was no overnight

exercise play.

11. The exercise series created considerable interest from stakeholders and

organisations responsible for the control of disease outbreaks in other countries

and a number of their representatives attended the final two day exercise. The

European Commission and the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) were

both formally notified of the exercise.

12. The exercise series created considerable interest from many areas of the

print and broadcast media. Defra Communications Directorate recognised the

need to provide briefing prior to and during the exercise in order to satisfy both

specialist and generalist concerns. The media were not invited to attend the

table top exercises, but a full briefing was held in the week prior to the final

exercise.

13. During the final exercise several live media briefings were held at Defra

HQ in accordance with the battle rhythm laid out in the Contingency Plan. These

were attended by the Animal Health Minister, the Chief Veterinary Officer, Defra’s

Permanent Secretary and Chief Scientific Adviser and Director of

Communications. Similar briefings occurred in local disease control centres.

The Press were invited to ask questions about the exercise programme and also,

in effect acting as exercise players, to ask questions about the developing

scenario and the control measures being implemented. These briefings were

supplemented by written briefs, some pre-prepared and some prepared by

Defra’s Briefing Unit in response to issues arising in the Exercise.

14. The central News Coordination Centre (NCC) was set up in Defra’s HQ,

staffed by volunteers from other government departments and working closely

with the Defra Press Office team. LDCCs were supported by Government News

Network Press Officers who coordinated bids from the local media, produced

briefing on local issues and helped to ensure that a consistent message was

being sent out from both HQ and the local offices.

3. EXERCISE METHODOLOGY

15. Exercise Hornbeam was the product of a project spanning a period of one

year. A small in-house team was established to develop the project with

additional specialist expertise provided by consultants from QinetiQ Ltd.

16. A Project Board was established comprising representatives from the

State Veterinary Service Contingency Planning Division, QinetiQ Ltd consultants,

Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division (VEXDD) and Animal Movements and Exotic

Diseases Division (AMED). They met on a monthly basis and helped to secure

the involvement of other parts of the Department, which was seen as a critical

element to the success of the project. QinetiQ Ltd also provided a Project

Manager to co-ordinate the specialist inputs provided by their consultants.

17. The events involved in an FMD outbreak can be divided into distinct

phases:

• Suspicion of the first case of disease

• Confirmation of disease

• Regional spread of the disease

• National spread of the disease

• The recovery phase

18. These phases were taken as useful dividers of activity for the project,

although the final recovery phase was not dealt with in this programme in order to

avoid the scenario becoming overly complex. It was decided that the most

effective way of testing the contingency plans for the initial stages of a disease

outbreak was to combine both tabletop exercises and a real-time command post

exercise. A table top exercise involves organisations at a meeting talking

through their response to a scenario to check their understanding and actions

and how they interact. In a command post exercise, participants are based in

their own control room and communication systems and flows are tested.

19. A series of tabletop exercises was organised to deal with suspicion,

confirmation and regional spread of disease with the final real-time exercise

dealing with the spread of disease around Great Britain. The aim was to develop

an exercise series that built on data from previous events so that the national

spread of the disease could be exercised realistically. An introductory tabletop

exercise was held in order to outline the initial scenario and to secure

commitment from the key players. Separate tabletop exercises covering

strategic, tactical and operational issues were then held for each of the phases at

suspicion, confirmation and regional spread of disease. The real time exercise

was centred on Days 7 and 8 of the outbreak which provided a suitable scenario

for decisions on the use of emergency vaccination.

20. The dates of the exercises were: -

Date Level Event

10/12/2003 Introduction Introductory Table-Top Exercise

22/01/2004 Strategic Suspicion of disease

29/01/2004 Operational Suspicion of disease

05/02/2004 Tactical Suspicion of disease

12/02/2004 Science/Policy Table Top Exercise examining how science

informed policy

12/03/2004 Strategic/Tactical Confirmation of disease

25/03/2004 Operational Confirmation of disease

15/04/2004 Strategic Regional Spread of disease

29/04/2004 Operational Regional Spread of disease

13/05/2004 Tactical Regional Spread of disease

29-30/06/04 All levels Final real-time exercise – National (GB

wide) spread of disease

The Scenario

21. The scenario was initially developed through discussion and was based on

veterinary knowledge of the spread of disease and the likely impact of current

policies. It incorporated a number of key criteria, namely:

• to allow a decision to be made on emergency vaccination at the time of

the live exercise;

• to include an outbreak in a close European Union member state so as

potentially to place a double bid on the Vaccine Banks;

• that there should be a number of Infected Areas, including one in

Wales and one in Scotland;

• that not all the epidemiological links would be known;

• that a sheep market would be involved in the spread of disease;

(Disease spread within sheep was a significant factor in the 2001 FMD

outbreak);

• that any airborne spread of disease would be limited to the 10km

surveillance zone around infected premises. (This was to limit the

complexity of the initial modelling and the subsequent decisions on

emergency vaccination strategy. There was a clear need to test the

vaccination strategy but without being over-complicated in the first

exercise. Future exercises will need to employ more complex models).

22. The scenario was developed throughout the programme of tabletop

exercises generating sufficient information to facilitate each further exercise.

23. The basic scenario was:

The outbreak resulted from an infected sheep being imported to a farm in

Cheshire from a close European country. At the time that the first case was

confirmed in the UK there were no other confirmed cases of FMD in any

countries that trade with the UK in live ruminants and pigs. The farm in Cheshire

that imported the sheep was not the first premises in GB in which Foot and

Mouth Disease was confirmed in this scenario. The link to the first case identified

was through indirect contact (either from a person or vehicle), which resulted

from infected sheep being sold through a livestock market. This led to regional

spread of disease. By Days 7 and 8 there were outbreaks in Cheshire (both the

first case to be identified and the index case (the importing farm), in Cornwall,

Clwyd, Lincolnshire and the highlands of Scotland, as well as reports of

suspected cases in other areas and tracings from the livestock market.

24. During the final exercise the scenario was supported with data from the

computer-based Disease Control System (DCS) and mocked-up daily situation

reports (sitreps) which outlined the epidemic’s spread and the status of the

control effort at the end of each day. Additionally, Defra’s Foot and Mouth

website was populated with information that would have been communicated to

the public in a real outbreak. Publicity material was also mocked up including

fact sheets for public information on ‘How to spot the disease’, ‘Biosecurity –

stopping the spread of the disease’ and ‘What will happen when Foot and Mouth

Disease is suspected’. The Defra FMD Helpline was also established with

recorded messages giving information about the exercise.

Further detail on methodology can be found at Annex C

The detailed scenario can be found at Annex B.

4. SUMMARY OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED TO

IMPROVE READINESS

25. This section summarises the issues identified at the table top exercises

and at the final exercise both in London and the individual Animal Health

Divisional Offices. The issues are presented as they emerged in the series of

table top exercises and final real-time exercise and conclusions are not drawn

from the points made. Overall, hundreds of issues were identified, ranging from

the operation of the Civil Contingencies Committee to the way in which

communications to the field were undertaken. The Report reflects both a

summation of these issues in order to provide themes for further work and also

individual observations, which in some cases may have been made without a full

understanding of the wider context. However, the Report does not attempt to

interpret the issues highlighted but only seeks to capture them. Action being

taken to consider and review the issues and develop the plans and instructions is

explained in Section 6. Annex A sets out in more detail the issues identified.

4.1 TABLE TOP EXERCISES

SUSPICION PHASE

Communications

26. The overriding theme was that greater clarity was needed in the detail of

communication lines throughout the Contingency Plan.

Notification of Interested Parties

27. The most significant point identified was the need to notify and alert all

concerned immediately on suspicion and not to wait for the first case of disease

to be confirmed, even though this might mean false alarms. These false alarms

should however be viewed as valuable training.

28. Operational Partners stressed their need to be informed at suspicion of

disease to allow them to put their contingency arrangements on stand by. The

Veterinary Guidance on levels of suspicion as set out at Annex B of the FMD

Contingency Plan needed to be clarified for Operational Partners. The whole

notification procedure for local authorities via their central bodies - LGA &

LACORS - including the timing, needed clarification.

29. It was considered that the participants, purpose and output of the

telephone conference set out in the Contingency Plan should be more clearly

defined as should the inputs required from the Divisional Veterinary Managers

and policy officials from the Devolved Administrations. There were also requests

that there should be a separate teleconference focussed on veterinary and

disease control issues.

30. Clarity was needed on how Regional Operations Directors, Divisional

Operations Managers and Finance Managers would be notified and on the speed

at which they were required to respond and report for duty.

Establishing the NDCC

31. The process and responsibility for, and timing of, calling up staff for the

NDCC and named staff for particular posts needed to be clarified, as did the use

of the Emergency First Response Team, and the Volunteers’ Register.

Logging actions and recording decisions

32. Responsibility for ensuring initial actions and decisions were recorded

needed to be clarified; the period after a suspect case was declared was an

important phase, but teams and structures would not be in place and detailed

arrangements needed to be included in the plans and instructions so that staff felt

reassured about their roles.

Notification of Form C Restricted Area

33. There was discussion on the most effective and immediate ways for

AHDOs to inform farmers and operational partners of the restrictions which were

being introduced within the 8km radius area of a suspect case. It was noted that

this could include hundreds of premises possibly needing to be notified over one

night. Technological solutions should be investigated as should better use of call

centres.

Data Protection Issues

34. Issues were noted about the identification on the Defra website of suspect

premises as the centre of a restricted area and it was considered that clear

guidance should be in the plan or instructions, particularly in the light of the

Freedom of Information Act 2000.

CONFIRMATION PHASE

35. The ‘confirmation’ phase tabletop exercises focussed on actions and

issues that would arise once FMD had been confirmed.

Communication

36. It was considered, as in the suspicion phase, that there needed to be

greater clarity on communication lines and particularly on how decisions and

actions would be communicated to the front line. In order to clarify roles,

responsibilities and actions required, both within HQ and LDCCs, an activation

process map in the Plan should be considered.

Livestock Movement Ban

37. Operational Partners and the Devolved Administrations all noted the

importance of having clear policies, particularly on the detail of the national

movement ban that would be introduced immediately following confirmation of

disease, how they would be notified, what enforcement role operational partners

would be expected to take and the arrangements by which such additional work

would be funded. All this information should be predetermined and clear to all

parties. Much of this was already covered by the contingency plans, but it was

felt that more detail was needed.

Emergency Vaccination and LDCC Liaison

38. The vaccination teams would be run by the contractor and be totally

separate from the Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) line of command. There

was a need to set out clearly how liaison and communication between LDCCs,

the Welsh Coordination Centre (WCC) as appropriate, and the vaccination teams

would be managed to ensure that duplication of visits, biosecurity risks and

confusion over roles did not occur.

REGIONAL SPREAD PHASE

Communication

39. The way in which major developments in policy would be communicated to

LDCCs needed attention, particularly in relation to vaccination, as this was the

first time this had been exercised and the organisation and structure were

separate from other disease control measures.

Livestock Movement Ban

40. Operational Partners sought clarification and guidance on policy on the

implementation and maintenance of the national livestock movement ban and

how and by whom animal movements would be licensed. This information

needed to be made available, as far as possible, in peacetime so that they could

develop contingency plans for deploying staff. The role of the Highways Agency

and Highways Departments needed to be explored in assisting Local Authorities

with their enforcement duties.

SCIENCE/POLICY TABLETOP EXERCISE

41. The Science/Policy exercise focussed on the interaction between Defra’s

Science Advisory Council and policy officials and in particular the structures and

interrelationships that were necessary for science-based policy to be developed

quickly and efficiently during an outbreak of disease. The processes through

which scientific advice was developed and communicated to the Emergency

Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee were unclear and the

relationship between Defra’s Science Advisory Council (SAC) and the

Government’s Science Advisory Policy for Emergency Response (SAPER)

required clarification in terms of crisis triggers, responsibility and primacy. The

commissioning of predictive models, the data required and its access and

management also needed clarifying. An outline protocol was agreed as a result

of this tabletop exercise and was recorded in the FMD Contingency Plan Version

4, published in March 2004.

4.2 FINAL EXERCISE – NATIONAL SPREAD

STRATEGIC ISSUES

Policy & Strategy

42. The Science Advisory Council suggested that the Contingency Plan

focussed on operational aspects of delivery and how decisions would be

implemented efficiently, but now needed to be balanced by more consideration of

strategy, indicating the basis on which decisions would be made and how these

would address specific objectives. The Government’s policy priorities needed to

be set out clearly in the framework of different outbreak scenarios.

43. The Exercise showed that policies needed now to be developed in greater

detail in relation to different phases of an epidemic, where appropriate using

predictive modelling. This would help to identify trigger points in the development

of an outbreak for bringing new policies into effect. This proactive approach

would then serve to inform the management of the outbreak and deployment of

resources. It would be valuable, in addition, in planning CCC meetings, and

identifying when other Government Departments needed to be engaged.

44. Policy development needed better data capture and information flow and

improvements in technology should be sought to enable rapid and efficient

transfer of data. The data required during an outbreak should be agreed with the

modelling, veterinary and epidemiological communities in advance and should be

reviewed regularly. Information flows should be enhanced by the use of modern

technology to enable rapid real time transfer of data from the field to all analysts

and modellers, both within the department and externally.

45. Policy development on emergency vaccination raised many issues which

were relevant to all areas of policy. These included in particular the information

that would be sought to enable a decision to be taken, how advice from different

groups should be brought together, how policy should be advised to CCC and

how decisions should be communicated rapidly and accurately to the tactical and

operational levels. All these needed to be addressed within the relevant parts of

the Contingency Plan – structures and interrelationships, processes and

communications. Also noted was the further work needed on vaccination

scenarios to guide policy development in an outbreak.

Strategic Planning

46. The current Contingency Plan provides for the swift, effective and efficient

delivery of a response to an outbreak. What was now needed was policies,

structures and routines to be provided for all the elements of an outbreak from

suspicion, through rural and economic impact to recovery. The exercise

highlighted the importance of being able to approach the response to an

outbreak more proactively in terms of tighter planning for the introduction and

adaptation of control policies such as vaccination, the establishment of LDCCs in

new locations and deployment of staff and other resources.

47. Developments in predictive modelling of epidemics and the resources

needed to contain them, which could be used during an outbreak to inform

planning and logistic decisions, were emphasised.

Legal

48. All those involved in decision making needed to have an understanding of

the current legal position, particularly changes since 2001. In addition there

needed to be greater understanding in the centre of the powers that are

exercisable for Wales and the legislation in Scotland and the way in which orders

were made in all the legislatures.

Structures And Organisation

General

49. The Exercise demonstrated the importance for all concerned of following

the structures in the Plan, at least at the outset, if the response were to work

effectively. However, it was recognised that some of the structures, relationships

and responsibilities were not wholly effective and needed further clarification.

Battle Rhythm

50. Overall it was apparent that the Contingency Plan’s battle rhythm

consisted of too many meetings attended by too many key players. This created

the risk that senior officials were never fully up to speed with information on the

disease or the previous actions taken. A more deliberate pace and fewer

meetings would help officials absorb the information more fully to provide a

sound basis for decisions. It was also important to take account of the cycle of

meetings held in the Devolved Administrations.

Committees

51. (a) Civil Contingencies Committees

The relationship between CCC with Ministerial membership and

CCC(O) with officials as members was over complex and it became

clear that while CCC(O) should meet daily, CCC should probably

meet less often with the frequency mainly determined by whether

emerging issues required strategic and collective decisions. It was

recognised that Cabinet Office could also convene smaller ad-hoc

meetings of Ministers to deal with specific issues.

CCC should include Ministers from the Devolved Administrations by

video link. The CCC’s remit should be clear in terms of those

issues which required a consistent GB/UK line and those which

would be dealt with separately in the different Administrations.

Organisational points on CCC included the number of seats to be

allocated to Defra to cover its wide range of responsibilities – rural

and environment - as well as animal disease; and the way in which

agendas and records of decisions should be prepared, recorded,

checked for accuracy and disseminated.

(b) Defra Emergency Management Board

The role, structure and purpose needed review to ensure that it

provided a forum for bringing rural and environmental issues to

bear on disease control proposals, while also managing Defra, and

deploying resources in the light of the disease outbreak. This had

to be achieved without overloading senior officials with meetings or

delaying pressing policy development.

The role, membership, structure and purpose needed further

development before it could be fully effective. The Group’s

relationship with the Science Advisory Council and use of scientific

advice during an outbreak needed clarification, although the

protocol developed in the table top exercise would be helpful.

Exercise Hornbeam reinforced the realisation that the greater the

clarity of policy before an outbreak and identification of triggers for

policy change, the more focussed and effective the ADPG could be.

Its relationship with the FMD Expert Group and the National

Emergency Epidemiology Group needed further development.

(d) Science Advisory Council

The precise role of the SAC in an outbreak needed more work,

particularly in relation to commissioning research and modelling

and the way in which it should contribute to and challenge policy

development within Defra. Prior familiarity with the issues likely to

emerge was beneficial and the SAC subgroup’s work on the FMD

Contingency Plan prior to the final exercise was shown to have

been valuable. It was noted that it had a role in modelling,

epidemiology, ensuring data collection was sufficient, identifying

technological developments and also in assessing the rural and

environmental impact of the disease control options.

Interrelationships with ADPG in particular needed greater clarity.

Devolved Administrations

52. The Exercise proved a success in terms of involvement of the devolved

administrations, but emphasised the importance of effective communication flow,

the need for IT systems to be complementary; and, most importantly, the need

for clarity on how different policy decisions, within the context of EU law, could

best be approached and managed at official and Ministerial levels.

53. Problems were identified over the burden placed on DA representatives in

London in terms of meetings they needed to attend while also liaising with their

home administration.

Roles & Responsibilities

54. All senior officials involved were overloaded during the Exercise. Greater

use should be made of deputies or alternates who would need to be fully

empowered to take decisions wherever possible. This issue also points to the

importance of developing greater clarity of roles, better communication channels,

more preparation in terms of policies and implementation strategies and a battle

rhythm with fewer meetings.

55. The management of the wider impact of the disease control operation in

Defra needs to be clarified in terms of bringing the rural and environment policy

responsibilities fully into the arrangements for developing disease control policy

and in terms of ensuring that Defra resources are deployed effectively in support

of the operation. Reallocation of Ministerial portfolios for the duration of the

outbreak to cope with demands from Parliament and Europe might be

appropriate.

56. Greater clarity of roles and responsibilities and greater understanding of

the whole operation and the broad context was necessary for effective senior

management of an outbreak. Information on disease control and on the

management operation needed to be provided quickly and accurately.

57. The role of the CVO as the main media spokesperson was shown to pose

a very heavy load in terms of time taken. Consideration needs to be given to

which officials should brief the media, aiming to ensure that where possible policy

issues were addressed centrally and operational issues at a local or regional

level.

58. The involvement of the Devolved Administration representatives in London

in developing GB wide policy during an outbreak and how the liaison could best

work between London and the Devolved Administrations needed more clarity.

Communications

59. Communication within the strategic element of the national Exercise took a

number of forms:- media briefing, preparation of papers to assist in policy

development, records of meetings and the dissemination of decisions to the

tactical and operational level. The Exercise intentionally did not include major

stakeholder engagement at policy level, although it did involve them at tactical

and operational level.

60. A significant quantity of briefing material already existed, together with

Communication Strategies, for handling a disease outbreak. This was only

tested in part during the final exercise as much of the briefing would have been

released in the earlier days of an outbreak. However, the Exercise confirmed the

importance of developing briefing that provided transparency of the disease

control strategy as a means of informing the public since they needed to

understand both how the disease was to be controlled and why. Also important

was the coordination across Whitehall of briefing to ensure coherent crossdepartmental

messages for the public and media covering all aspects of disease

control and its impact on rural policy and communities, on tourism, and on health

issues. In addition there was a need to establish a

Strategic/Policy/Operations/Communications (SPOC) Group to meet weekly to

set the larger context; while there should be engagement with the Strategic

Communications Advisers to devise communication strategies on all aspects of

the outbreak and so be able to present papers to CCC at short notice.

61. In the policy context, the task of preparing policy papers and reports for

discussion and decision by the Emergency Management Board and CCC

demonstrated the importance of clarifying the scope and purpose of those bodies

so that the papers could be tightly drawn, where possible working to agreed

templates. It also demonstrated the importance of ensuring that senior policy

staff had access to additional staff resources very quickly in an outbreak and that

affected divisions must have clear plans to deal with necessary restructuring and

business continuity issues.

62. Records of meetings as a means of communicating decisions were often

too late to be effective – although issued within a few hours - and the use of

electronic reporting systems would help to ensure speed and accuracy.

Communication lines for major decisions needed to be better developed and set

out in the plans and instructions.

TACTICAL ISSUES

Structures And Organisation

General

63. The importance of using the Contingency Plan and instructions as the

basis for actions and not depending on memories of activity in 2001 was

particularly noted, as was the need for all documentation to be reviewed and

revised to reflect issues identified during the Exercise.

Battle Rhythm

64. Exercise artifice meant that the battle rhythm of meetings as laid out in the

Contingency Plan was not adopted until the second day of the exercise.

However, it became clear that in any case the battle rhythm did not allow

adequate time for decisions to be communicated effectively as meetings had to

be curtailed under pressure. Greater use of deputies and clearer communication

lines outside meetings were suggested.

National Disease Control Centre (NDCC)

65. The organisation and role of the NDCC needed further work. The Disease

Reporting Team understood its role and worked effectively although information

flows to the epidemiology team were insufficient. However, within the operational

teams there was a tendency for staff to continue to work only within their own

units, seeming to view their close juxtaposition to other teams in one open plan

office as part of the Exercise, whereas the purpose of bringing teams from so

many different organisations together was to enable and encourage cooperative

working (and for example quick small meetings rather than exchanges of emails)

across teams so that the whole of the NDCC became much more than the sum of

its parts. A change of title to incorporate “Coordination” as in the “Joint

Coordination Centre” of 2001 might help to clarify the purpose.

66. It was suggested that there should be more emphasis within the NDCC on

forward planning and further development of a proactive approach to delivering

the disease control operation across the country.

67. It was noted that the legal team in the NDCC would need access to their

systems and software to allow them, for example to remain in their new location

to make statutory instruments.

Emergency Directions Group

68. The purpose, effectiveness and membership of this group, which is

intended to communicate decisions from CCC to the tactical and operational

levels, was questioned. This will need to be reviewed in the light both of the

Exercise and the need for other structural and responsibility changes identified at

strategic level and because of changes consequent upon the SVS becoming an

Agency.

“Birdtable” Meetings

69. Many separate issues were picked up in the Exercise about the purpose of

the Birdtable and representation at it.

(a) Purpose

Questions were raised as to whether the Birdtable should be:-

• a means of sharing information, updating colleagues and enabling

any issues that arose to be dealt with quickly by identifying those

who should be involved and seeking a report back;

• a means of establishing a rhythm for the day and framework for the

coordination of operational activity; or

• a means of communicating policy decisions and requests for action

to the tactical and operational levels. This would require fewer

representatives to attend.

These issues needed to be resolved.

(b) Operation

It was suggested that the Birdtable should:-

• be held somewhere other than in the open plan office of the NDCC

so as to reduce disturbance to those in the NDCC;

• be more rigidly governed – fixed places to stand, templates for

reports;

• make greater use of technology to impart basic information on

numbers of outbreaks etc. (rather than flip charts, blackboards and

maps); and that

• microphones should be available if numbers were to remain large.

This depends on its purpose, but it was proposed that there should be

fewer people present (there were over 100 at Birdtables during the

Exercise as there were in 2001) and a requirement on them to brief their

teams thereafter; and questions were asked about who needed to be

represented – whether it should be only teams dealing with operational

issues from Defra and operational partners or whether representatives of

animal disease control policy, rural and environmental policy should also

be present. The presence of Ministers and senior officials during the

Exercise was seen by some as affecting the character of the Birdtables.

Roles Of Other Government Departments

Civil Contingencies Secretariat

70. The Exercise helped to identify the ways in which the roles of the NDCC

and the CCS were complementary as interdepartmental coordinators, particularly

in relation to consequence management issues. It was considered that the

NDCC framework for managing animal disease outbreaks would probably make

a CCS led coordination centre unnecessary, although CCS’s role as a

coordinator, ensuring effective cross Whitehall working, would remain.

71. Daily Reports were produced both by the NDCC and CCS in the Exercise,

but it was clear that this could cause confusion. This could best be avoided by

locating representatives of CCS in the NDCC to contribute to a daily NDCC

Report covering all aspects of disease control, including consequence

management issues and the impact on other departments and the Government

as a whole.

Health Protection Agency (HPA)

72. The exercise highlighted the need for a better understanding of the role of

the HPA both centrally and locally in providing advice and assistance in an

outbreak. In particular HPA’s laboratory, science and communications resources

could be utilised in future outbreaks. This would be particularly important in an

outbreak of zoonotic disease.

Health & Safety Executive (HSE)

73. A review of the coordination and liaison between Defra and HSE was

needed. It was felt that a review was needed of the health and safety

arrangements for managing culling, transport, disposal and cleansing and

disinfection. The management and handling of livestock as part of a vaccination

programme posed risks which were of concern to the HSE.

Countryside Agency

74. The Countryside Agency wished to ensure there was unambiguous and

consistent guidance on rights of way closures across the country to prevent local

decisions unnecessarily closing the countryside. A protocol for this is clearly set

out in the current Contingency Plan.

75. Issues raised by other government departments and agencies are

reflected in the general comments and in Annex A.

Devolved Administrations

76. The representatives of the Devolved Administrations were particularly

affected by the number of meetings as they were participating at both strategic

and tactical levels. However, their individual involvement at both levels was

partly an exercise artifice. Current plans allow for more senior representatives to

be present at strategic level during a real outbreak. They also noted the extra

demands placed on such representatives because of the need to liaise with their

parent administrations; this reinforced the need to ensure sufficient staff were

provided.

Roles & Responsibilities

77. Comments from staff who took part in the Exercise and who had not been

involved in an exercise or outbreak before were particularly valuable in identifying

areas where gaps or overlaps might occur because of a lack of clarity. Although

roles might develop and change at later stages of an outbreak, clear descriptions

at the outset were important in ensuring an efficient start.

Communications

78. The value of co-locating the Briefing Team within the NDCC was

considerable in terms of understanding events, access to officials for briefing and

producing coordinated material, although some suggested there would be greater

benefits from closer physical location. Issues needing further work include

ensuring briefing is available to all teams at the same time, including Regional

Operations Directors and LDCCs, websites and helplines, as well as the strategic

core; building up briefing prior to an outbreak on all aspects of disease control

including rural and environment issues, and seeking positive cooperation and

assistance from all officials concerned to ensure good and comprehensive

briefing is prepared and made rapidly available.

Human Resources

79. The great pressures and demands on HR that an outbreak would bring for

their teams, although not fully tested on this occasion, was brought home by the

Exercise. This was particularly important in managing the ramping up of staff

numbers and meeting the demand for personnel management advice and

guidance, both in relation to the many new staff and because many staff

unfamiliar with staffing procedures would be involved.

80. The HR team in the NDCC identified in particular the need to switch

considerable capacity from HR Services Division into FMD at the outset and the

reduction or suspension of activities in less pressured areas, managing

information flows on needs and capacity more tightly and, most importantly,

ensuring that all the agreements, systems and contracts necessary to ensure that

additional staff could be located and recruited were in place. This included the

departmental Volunteers Register, the cross departmental Memorandum of

Understanding to allow the release of staff from other Government departments,

contracts with commercial recruitment agencies and managing the International

Animal Health Emergency Reserve. The question of payment of allowances for

dealing with an emergency in difficult circumstances also needed to be resolved.

OPERATIONAL ISSUES

General

81. Many operational issues were picked up at the Animal Health Divisional

offices that participated and these will be addressed in local contingency plans,

improved emergency preparedness and by liaison with local operational partners.

Regional Operations Directors RODs & Divisional Operations Managers

DOMs

82. Staff participating in the exercise in these contingency roles noted the

need for specific instructions and guidance on their responsibilities as well as

more preparatory training on roles, tasks and responsibilities. This would enable

postholders to be immediately effective and prevent duplication between their

roles and that of the Divisional Veterinary Manager.

83. There was a need for further work to clarify the relationship and integration

of the Regional Resilience Teams in the Government Offices in the Regions with

the RODs and LDCCs.

84. Good communications between the NDCC and the RODs were important

to prevent the RODs from being, or feeling, isolated and exposed.

Finance

85. Calling up the Finance Managers in Scotland was successful, but this

needed further consideration in Wales. The staffing of finance teams at LDCCs

was also an issue as AHDO staff were deployed to more “frontline” activities.

The new interim Disease Finance System could only be tested in some AHDOs

and so its full capabilities were not tested. However, it was shown to be

functional in those offices where it was used.

Communications

86. The relocation of staff from the Government News Network (GNN) to

LDCCs was successful. GNN staff were responsible for briefing, coordinating

media bids and managing media briefing sessions. Their role was vital in helping

to ensure clear, consistent and timely messages were provided to the public,

maintaining the central brief, but ensuring local issues were also dealt with

satisfactorily. As GNN does not have a remit in Scotland, Press Office support

for the Inverness LDCC was provided by the Scottish Executive.

Military Liaison Officers

87. It was recommended that there should be Military Liaison Officers in

LDCCs from the outset; their identification, role, and method of appointment

would need discussion with the Ministry of Defence.

Epidemiology

88. Field and HQ Epidemiology teams needed to be identified, trained and

provided with comprehensive guidance on roles and responsibilities. This

remained an area where much more work was necessary and it should be

integrated with the work aimed at ensuring that information was gathered quickly,

and provided to all concerned; epidemiologists, modellers and policy makers.

Integration with Regional Resilience Teams

89. Although deliberately not tested in the exercise and as noted at paragraph

72 above, it was considered that there would need to be excellent communication

with GO Regional Resilience Teams and that a clear definition of roles and

responsibilities for the LDCC and the GO teams needed to be developed and

captured in the plans and instructions.

Development of Instructions

90. The use of the web based detailed operational instructions for Foot and

Mouth Disease in Chapter 3 of VIPER highlighted many detailed points for further

attention and development. The value of including process maps in the

Instructions was noted, as were the revision of forms and clearer guidance on the

role of the field epidemiology teams, veterinary administration posts and RODs

and DOMs. (More detail can be found at Annex A).

Procurement

91. The procurement operation generally worked well with the team in the

NDCC identifying a range of issues that were not tested by the Exercise and

would need testing in future. This included claim validation and authorisation

procedures and performance monitoring of service providers.

FIELD OPERATIONS

Field Officials

92. The importance of ensuring that good systems and procedures were in

place to communicate instructions and briefing to the field was noted; vets and

other field staff provide the front line in communicating with stakeholders and

need to be provided with the same briefing at the same time as others in the

strategic core who deal with the media and public.

Restricted Infected Areas

93. The need to introduce and enforce restricted infected areas in England

and Wales with tighter biosecurity controls around all infected premises, which

had not previously been tested in a major exercise, identified a number of issues.

These included the importance of HQ involving LDCCs in drawing up boundaries,

providing clear guidance for LDCCs, local authorities and police forces on

enforcement requirements, and questions over the location of cleansing and

disinfection points so that the necessary resources and planning could be

covered in local contingency plans. It should be noted that restricted infected

areas were not utilised in Scotland where the policy is different.

Livestock Movement Licensing

94. The exercise identified a number of areas where enforcement authorities

needed clearer guidance on how they should carry out their duties. The use of

the Animal Movement Licensing System and issuing of a range of licences would

operate effectively only if all responsible clearly understood their tasks before an

outbreak and could build this into their plans. Wherever possible, where

movements requiring licences could be predicted, licences needed to be

prepared, checked and their use agreed with the enforcement authorities prior to

an outbreak.

4.3 SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY LOCAL

DISEASE CONTROL CENTRES

Truro AHDO

95. The Truro AHDO feedback identified areas of concern including

resourcing, IT and Welfare.

96. A major lesson identified was that in an outbreak there would be an

immediate need for the ROD, DOM and DVM each to have sufficient

administrative support to answer the phone, take messages, read e-mails, etc.

This became clear when each was away from their desk for significant periods of

time, unable to monitor emails and missing phone calls.

97. Further, an adequate number of well-trained staff for each team would be

essential to cope with an outbreak. The early presence of a GNN representative

and Personnel team was also necessary to manage the media and staffing

issues.

98. Despite being very helpful in parts, Chapter 3 Instructions sometimes

proved difficult to navigate and further clarity is needed to allow them to be used

to guide staff through the procedures for all teams.

99. Form Ds, for informing farmers that their premises were under restriction

were a specific issue of concern. It was found that there was still no reliable

system available for rapid communication to hundreds of farmers, eg. when a

movement ban was imposed, or Form C signed.

100. It was also found that there was too much duplication on certain forms, for

instance on the IRF1, IRF2, FM21 and the FM1

101. Other issues raised included the process of ‘employment’ of LVIs, which

was found to lack detail in procedure.

102. Greater emphasis should be given to informing the LDCCs as soon as

possible of policy decisions taken at NDCC in order to ensure the same message

was being given out by both.

103. As a conclusion, it was felt that both staffing and accommodation at Truro

were insufficient to run a full LDCC but could probably just manage with one or

two IPs provided there was no spread, using local TVIs/LVIs and RPA/RDS/WLU

staff.

Stafford AHDO

104. The major concern at Stafford AHDO was the relocation of the LDCC.

Estimates of the time it would take to implement the relocation ranged from 14

days to 60 days, with the general opinion being that the current Stafford location

would not be in a position to function as an LDCC after day 5 of an outbreak.

This needed to be addressed with urgency.

105. Communication between HQ and Stafford over issues such as vaccination

and restricted infected areas were recorded as requiring improvement. There

was a sense of isolation felt in Stafford alongside a general feeling of there being

lack of guidance and instruction from the NDCC. On vaccination policy for

example, feedback suggested that Page St had little recognition of the scale of

the task involved at local level.

106. The presence of a GNN representative was found to be very helpful when

managing the media interest. A GNN presence was an important part of the local

operation and must be fully reflected in contingency planning.

107. Operational Instructions also received criticism, with many in the AHDO

finding the instructions unwieldy and cumbersome. A repeated request was for

the forms in Chapter 3 to be in the form of ‘Word’ documents.

108. The need to ramp up resources as quickly as possible was identified. It

was felt that it would be likely that a significant shortage of staff, both veterinary

and administrative support would be experienced in a real outbreak. Further to

this, there was a request for more training for staff across the board.

Lincoln AHDO

109. Positive feedback was reported on the development of working

relationships between the local office, Operational Partners and Stakeholders.

110. Following the Chapter 3 framework, the LDCC was successfully

established and put into operation.

111. An issue raised was the need to consider the development of a structured

yet flexible working shift pattern for staff during an outbreak.

112. The preponderance of acronyms throughout the Operational Instructions

caused confusion. Further, it was pointed out that if new staff were to be drafted

in during an outbreak, a lot of time would have to be spent explaining what all

these various terms actually meant.

113. Greater expansion and clarification of fine points within the Contingency

Plans was requested. For example, there is no reference to the Foot and Mouth

Disease (amendment)(England)(number 9) order 2001 setting out biosecurity

measures. As this order lays down procedures to be followed in a restricted

infected area, its significance should be highlighted.

114. A further concern at Lincoln was that although confidence was high of the

capability to respond to an outbreak south of the River Humber, if there was an

outbreak to the north then an LDCC would need to be set up there – and

currently no potential sites are identified.

115. Confusion over the roles of Finance and Procurement was identified as an

issue. It was felt necessary to reinforce the fact that PCD and Finance were two

distinct areas and not interchangeable, and must be kept separate for audit

purposes. There was also a request to have better directions to PCD contracts

on-line. Further to this, there was a request to have better on-line guidance in

relation to financial authorisation.

116. Overall, the majority of the Lincoln feedback reflected that although most

staff felt more confident in their roles after the exercise, there was still a need for

further training.

Inverness AHDO

117. The key findings from Inverness related to human resource factors,

communications, IT and operational aspects.

118. The staffing requirements as set out in the operational instructions simply

could not be met from the existing complement and as a result there was

insufficient veterinary and technical resource to meet the demands made by the

exercise.

119. Internal communications were raised as an issue. This was found to be

especially so on day one of the exercise but improved on the second day. Two

factors were identified – staff being too possessive with information and too keen

on concentrating on getting their own tasks completed before looking outside

their team.

120. Strong concern was raised over IT facilities and network capacity. As the

SVS has no direct access to SEERAD SIACS systems there were considerable

delays caused by staff having to move from various parts of the office to others in

order to retrieve information. The need for Defra and SEERAD IT systems to be

able to link effectively was identified as a crucial requirement.

121. Operational aspects were raised. These included the feedback that 69% of

staff felt that Chapter 3 instructions were at best sketchy and further that the

Scottish generic plan failed to give 78% of participants much help. Also, the Milk

Code could not be found on Chapter 3 nor on Defra/SEERAD on-line.

122. Even so, the exercise demonstrated to staff and Operational Partners the

enormity and complexity of setting up and operating an LDCC. There was also a

significant rise in the confidence of staff about their particular role, as prior to

Hornbeam only 30% of participants expressed confidence in their abilities,

whereas this figure rose to 89% after the exercise.

Caernarfon AHDO

123. Feedback from Caernarfon highlighted good liaison between the AHDO

and Page Street HQ with all queries fed through quickly and responded to

efficiently. Further enhancement and improvement of communications with

operational partners was also reported.

124. Operational Instructions represented the main focus of concern at

Caernarfon AHDO. Chapter 3 instructions could be improved for greater clarity

on the transfer of information from one team to another in an LDCC. Guidance

was found on what tasks to undertake but not how they should be undertaken nor

how the tasks interlink with requirements of other branches.

125. Communication with Field Operatives was highlighted as a serious area of

concern during the exercise and particularly how they are notified of new cases

of disease. The only procedural link found was on the Field Operations process

map.

126. A further concern related to the operational instructions for Surveillance

team tasks. For example, the instructions stated that the AMLS helpline should

be contacted for guidance. On following this route, the Surveillance team found

that AMLS were unaware in the Exercise of their responsibility in this advisory

role.

127. As a final issue, the requirement for Welsh language versions of all forms

and legal notices for public use was reiterated.

5. ISSUES IDENTIFIED FOR EXERCISE

PLANNING

128. Defra recognised that to deliver an exercise of this size and scale it would

need to develop some specialist expertise within the Department. To facilitate

this, QinetiQ Ltd agreed to an element of knowledge transfer as part of their

contract with Defra. This was to focus on the organisation and running of

exercises with Defra’s exercise planning team, as there was little or no

experience within the team of planning large exercises. The issues identified

within this section draw on the knowledge gained from the planning process for

Exercise Hornbeam and comments from the consultants.

Project Management

129. A project management discipline lends itself to running an exercise of this

nature. The requirement to define scope, aim, objectives and resource

requirements at the start of the project provides a clear structure to allow

progress to be measured throughout the project life. All those involved should be

quite clear about the project’s remit to avoid gradual and incremental change to

the scope during the project’s life. In order to ensure that the scope and aims are

widely understood Defra should engage with all participants during the planning

stage, including colleagues from the Devolved Administrations of Scotland and

Wales, other Government departments and agencies, and operational partners.

130. As for this exercise, a Project Board should be established to manage

future exercises. This must have representation from key Defra work areas

(SVS, Animal Health and Welfare, Science, Communications, Human

Resources) and the Devolved Administrations and should be chaired by the risk

owner or their deputy. Other directorates should be represented as required and

will include the Rural and Environmental responsibilities of the department.

Issues such as the scope, aims and objectives of the exercise need to be agreed

by senior management at the inception of the exercise planning to ensure that

the project has ownership at appropriate levels within the Department.

Exercises of this size require a large resource input and the exercise team must

have the authority to access that resource.

Scenario

131. The scope, aim and objectives of the exercise define the exercise

scenario. This needs to be believable in veterinary and scientific terms but must

also be designed to meet the objectives of the exercise. It is essential that the

scenario is fully developed early on and is clearly documented with evidence of

policy decisions that would have occurred before the exercise date. This must be

supported by realistic background data. The quantity and quality of data and

information that needs to be generated to support the scenario should not be

under-estimated as this is a critical task and requires a significant amount of

resource, particularly specialist and veterinary input. In any real time exercise

the central planning team should control the regional and local play to avoid

divergence from the scenario.

Commitment

132. An exercise of the size of Hornbeam requires a significant time

commitment for the players. If senior officials are to be involved diary time needs

to be confirmed well in advance.

Performance Measurement and Feedback

133. Future exercises should place greater emphasis on measuring the

performance of the organisation and rely less on subjective feedback. This is

difficult and more work is needed to make such measurement possible. At the

least feedback needs to be collected and collated in a highly organised manner

using a framework with generic headings and structured questions.

Tabletop Exercises

134. The series of tabletop exercises provided valuable lessons prior to the

final exercise and was a helpful catalyst for the involvement of Defra directorates

and operational partners. In many cases, solutions were found for emerging

issues, which allowed a better and more comprehensive contingency plan to be

developed for the final exercise. Scenario-led tabletop exercises, focussed on

specific areas of contingency plans, should be used more widely in order to

review and test emergency preparedness.

Input Cell

135. The exercise input cell was vital to the success of the final exercise.

Future exercises should ensure that the cell is staffed with a wide range of

specialists and include representatives from Defra’s operational partners and key

stakeholders such as the NFU and RSPCA.

136. The master events list used by the exercise input cell should be developed

with the involvement of Defra’s policy directorates and delivery agencies,

operational partners and key stakeholders and should be finalised at least a

month before the exercise. However, members of the input cell should be

allowed to inject ad-hoc material into the exercise in response to the exercise

free-play.

Training

137. Exercises within Defra are often used to refresh the participants’

knowledge and understanding of contingency plans and operational instructions,

with an element of training for staff that are not routinely involved in emergency

response planning. However, further effort is needed to train staff for

emergencies and thought now needs to be given to using exercises as a way of

validating the training.

138. Future exercises could include helplines in order fully to test the policy

teams’ response and the briefing that is available.

6. FUTURE ACTION

139. The Government recognises the need to subject contingency plans to a

process of regular review and to update them accordingly. This exercise series

and future exercises are part of this process. Whilst Exercise Hornbeam has

confirmed that substantial progress has been made since 2001 on the

government’s preparedness for exotic animal disease outbreaks, it was also

demonstrated that there are areas where revisions and improvements should be

made to the Contingency Plan and detailed operational instructions.

140. This section sets out the ways in which work will be taken forward to

develop issues identified during Hornbeam.

Policy Issues

141. The Animal Disease Policy Group, chaired by the CVO, was established in

preparation for Exercise Hornbeam and functioned during it. It will now be

meeting monthly to consider those areas where policy was identified as requiring

further work. This includes the use of emergency vaccination as a control option,

livestock welfare schemes, movement licensing and controls as well as the most

effective way to use epidemiology, data analysis, and modelling in decision

support. It will also be considering the Group’s inter-relationships with the

Science Advisory Council now and during an outbreak and how science can best

contribute to the development of policy.

142. The Science Advisory Council will be maintaining their interest in the

control of foot and mouth disease, particularly in the areas of modelling, effective

use of epidemiology and collection and analysis of epidemiological data and the

impact of disease control options on the countryside and the rural economy.

143. In developing and refining their Contingency Plans the three GB

Administrations will continue to engage with each other to ensure a coordinated

approach and complementary Contingency Plans. They will also be planning

how best to manage the possibility of administrations following different policies

for disease control within the overall framework of the EU Directive. However, it

is not expected that there will be major differences between the Administrations

in policy or implementation.

Strategic Issues

144. Exercise Hornbeam demonstrated the need now to plan an approach to

managing the response to an outbreak which is proactive in relation to the totality

of an epidemic, rather than merely efficiently responsive. With the basic

organisation for an efficient response now in place the emphasis should switch to

using predictive models, developing policies and so planning the operation as a

process with agreed decision and action points. This work will encompass the

policy work set out above and the deployment of resource modelling that is now

being developed. It will be coordinated by SVS Contingency Planning Division.

145. At the same time other issues identified in relation to accountability,

structures, groups and communication flows will be addressed and revised. This

will in particular include a clearer system for activating the contingency plan and

notifying operational partners and stakeholders, and improved information

sharing by making better use of technology.

146. The Contingency Plan will be revised and issued for public consultation in

February 2005. The revision will capture many of the changes resulting from

Exercise Hornbeam in the HQ battle rhythm, the organisation and purpose of the

National Disease Control Centre, the interrelations of the groups – both those

making policy decisions and those delivering operational directions. It will also

capture the work the CCS has already undertaken on revision of the timetable for

CCC meetings and their plans for providing the central coordination function and

bringing together government departments.

Liaison with Operational Partners

147. Exercise Hornbeam demonstrated the value of close working with

operational partners at all stages of policy and strategic thinking. This will be

taken forward through the continued development of operational policies such as

the introduction of restricted infected areas, through discussion for example to

clarify guidance on movement controls and through joint activity in exercises.

The aim will be not only to improve overall readiness for an outbreak, but also to

assist local authorities to develop their own comprehensive contingency plans

that serve to reassure the public and stakeholders that the capability of Defra and

local authorities to deal with animal diseases has been enhanced. At the

operational level, engagement of DVMs with local authorities will be maintained

through local exercises.

Operational Instructions

148. Exercise Hornbeam identified, particularly at the five AHDOs, many areas

where instructions needed to be reviewed and amended. These have been

taken forward at a five day workshop in November 2004 for staff from across the

State Veterinary Service to capture the necessary changes in revised instructions

for publication on the Defra website.

149. The need to ensure that the public and stakeholders are informed and

thereby reassured about policies, readiness and the operational plans for an

outbreak is driving the development of leaflets, dummy websites and stakeholder

meetings. New approaches to informing those placed under restrictions during

an outbreak are also being developed – using both modern technology and

helpline centres and will be tested when opportunity presents itself in disease

report cases.

150. Training modules are being developed for veterinary staff including those

recruited to Defra from UK veterinary practitioners and from other countries under

international agreements and for all staff recruited from other parts of Defra and

other government departments. These will help to ensure that all understand

their roles and can act immediately they take up posts in an emergency.

Wherever possible officials from the Devolved Administrations will be given the

opportunity to participate in training programmes.

Future Exercises

151. Exercise Hornbeam demonstrated the value of an exercise both to

individuals and to the organisation as a whole. Some issues raised, such as the

interrelationships between groups, or the organisation of revised communication

flows can, once proposals are developed, best be checked and validated by table

top exercises. These will be undertaken.

152. Issues that were not covered in this Exercise such as calling out

contractors, fully testing the disease finance system, and engaging with the

Regional Resilience Forums and the Government Offices will be tested in further

exercises. The Animal Health Division Offices will continue to hold their regular

exercises.

153. A national exercise provides a valuable means of focussing constructive

thinking and activity on developing emergency preparedness. Further such

exercises are planned, probably starting with a zoonotic disease exercise in

2006.

7. CONCLUSIONS ON EXERCISE HORNBEAM

154. This report has set out the planning that went into the Exercise, the issues

that were identified for development and resolution in policy, strategy and

operations and for the planning of future exercises.

155. Feedback from Exercise participants however also covered whether they,

as individuals and as members of teams had benefited from the Exercise and the

role they saw for exercises in developing readiness for the future. In many ways

one of the prime benefits of the six months of preparatory table top exercises was

the team spirit and cooperation that they engendered among Defra officials and

those representing operational partners. Alongside this there was a wish to bring

policy issues to resolution which was also enabled by the presence of so many

interested parties bringing their experience and expertise into play.

The following quotes – taken from the feedback - give some indication of the

benefits the Exercise brought:-

“An atmosphere relaxed enough to facilitate learning, pressured enough to

simulate reality.”

“An excellent test of Contingency Planning – real challenges put to our

abilities and preparedness”

“I now have a better understanding of what would be involved in the event

of an outbreak”

“I felt that it was a useful exercise. It certainly highlighted a number of

necessary improvements”

“…we felt that the scenarios were carefully thought out to deliberately test

the system” (National Farmers Union).

“There is clear evidence that (Defra’s) hard work in the past 18 since

Exercise Willow 1 has resulted in improvements – well done!” (Meat

Hygiene Service)

“We consider that all Local Authority issues have been recognised and are

confident that we will take all issues forward” (LACORS)

The Science Advisory Council commented in their Report.

“The exercise was extremely valuable and useful, it was well conceived,

conducted and serviced, showing the professionalism of the Civil Service

at its best. In general the tactics used during the exercise were excellent.”

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

1 There should be a clear statement of strategic intent which

outlines the desired outcome of the disease control policy. To be considered for inclusion in the Contingency Plan. Strategic

2 Some policies require more detail for effective implementation.

Established policies should be reviewed and where necessary add more

specific detail behind them in order to allow for immediate and effective

implementation.

Strategic

3 Future operations cell

Consideration to be given to the setting up of a 'future operations' cell within

the NDCC to assist with identifying milestones, integrating decision points

and preparing options

Strategic

4 Team roles and individual responsibilities

A review of team roles and individual responsibilities within Strategic level

groups with an aim of streamlining the system and clarifying the

management chain

Strategic

5 Battle Rhythm The intensity of the daily meetings within the battle rhythm requires review

in order to ensure that the tempo is both practical and sustainable Strategic

6 Secretariat support at Strategic Level Ensure that key decisions are properly recorded and that a timely and

precise audit trail is established Strategic

For each stage of disease outbreak there needs to be activity

which will be Defra's Directorates major focus. This needs to

clearly communicated at all levels.

To be considered for inclusion in the Contingency Plan. Strategic

ANNEX A – ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN EXERCISES

This annex comprises a list of issues raised by individuals during the exercise series

with suggested action to be taken in response outlined alongside.

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

8 Clarity of Legal issues

Greater clarity is required on the coordination of legal issues between the

different administrations. In particular, the primacy of the decisions affecting

Great Britain as a whole. Also a clear understanding of current legal

requirements, [eg vaccination zone order]

Strategic

9 Information flows

The flow of information at Strategic and Tactical Levels requires

examination to obviate the duplication of briefing and decision making by

differing groups.

Strategic/Tactical

10 Deployment of Finance teams Clarification required on appointment and deployment of Contingency

Finance Managers Strategic/Tactical

11 Devolved Administrations : importance of informing and

communicating with DA partners.

Contact details and actions they have taken will need to be logged. When

and how are the DAs informed of key milestones/decisions ? Strategic

12 Communication: Informing ministers and senior officials of the

risks as early possible to eliminate surprise element

Briefing on initial policies to be agreed beforehand. Future milestones to be

communicated. Strategic

13 Formal identification of the Infected Premises (IP) Clarification required of legal and communications position in publicly

identifying Infected Premises Strategic

14 Communication: Clarification on stakeholder handling as to

who is informing whom, when and what

Development of the communications strategy to include details of how this

information will be recorded and disseminated. Strategic

15 Teleconference - trigger and expectations Clarification required including task, purpose and output. Strategic

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

16 Science issues and procedure for bringing them to attention of

Management Board and CCC

To clarify in the plan the mechanism for engaging on scientific issues and

access to data for SAC. Strategic/Tactical

17 Access to data for SAC and Independent Modellers The Contingency Plan must have a clear protocol for the provision of

scientific data to SAC and modellers. Strategic/Tactical

18 The relationship between science advisory groups. The relationship between SAPER and SAC needs to be clarified in terms of

primacy, membership and responsibility Strategic/Tactical

19 Role and constitution of the National Expert Group. To determine the role and constitution of the National Expert Group for

inclusion in the Contingency Plan. Strategic/Tactical

20 The role of modelling in formulating policy. To review the role of modelling in policy formulation both prior to and during

an outbreak. Strategic/Tactical

21 Guard against conflict of interests between procurement and

financial management teams

Procurement process must be clearly separate from financial control in

Contingency Plan. Tactical/Operational

22 Enaction of CCC - Plan needs to say when it is triggered and

how it's called Update Contingency Plan. Strategic

23 Devolved Administrations wish to be members of the

Emergency Management Board

Review membership of the EMB to ensure Devolved Administrations have

representation. Strategic

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

24 National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) : Template report for

1st Emergency Management Board Needs to include Finance, Procurement and Disposal Strategic

25 Communications: Decision to call EMB should be taken at

teleconference Update Contingency Plan Strategic

Business as usual : Defra’s business continuity plans need to

identify areas where staff can be reduced and how these

areas cope with the reduction.

Identify areas of work which will stop and those that require augmenting

(Policy, Legal, Finance, Procurement, Communication). Strategic

27 Departmental business emergency footing A trigger point needs to be identified for when Defra is put onto an

Emergency footing Strategic

28 Enforcement of Livestock Movement Ban Clarification required on powers of police, Highways Agency and Highways

Departments to stop moving vehicles to assist local authorities and SVS. Strategic/Tactical

29 Human Resources: As the outbreak continues key policy

areas will require significant numbers of additional staff Confirm staffing requirements in Departmental plans for an outbreak. Strategic

30 Possible conflict between the need to kill diseased animals

quickly and the need to gather epidemiological information

Animals exposed to disease must be killed as quickly as possible to prevent

disease spread, but blood and tissue samples may also need to be taken.

The priorities must be clearly stated in the policy.

Strategic

31 Communications: Communications plan, the relationship and

interaction between Communications Directorate [CD] & GICS

Review the mechanism and stages of activating an enhanced

Communications centre (NCC) to support the Government operation. Strategic/Tactical

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

32 Dangerous Contact cull Clarification required on when the 48 hour target runs from on the 1st

confirmed case of disease. Strategic/Tactical

33 Defra's relationship with external academic modelling groups Roles and responsibilities should be clarified to ensure policy development

has appropriate scientific input and challenge. Strategic/Tactical

34 NDCC: It is unclear who the field epidemiologist reports to. Line management for Epidemiologists to be clarified. Strategic/Tactical

35 Emergency legislation would be required to provide powers of

direction for disposal to landfill.

An early decision point to enact emergency legislation in an outbreak is

needed. Strategic/Tactical

Further guidance is required for Police, Trading Standards and

Local Authorities Emergency Planning Officers on their role in

implementing a Movement ban

Guidance to be written and communicated before an outbreak. Strategic/Tactical

37 Contingency Plan - Representation of Operational Partners

and Stakeholders

Review at what levels Operational Partners and Stakeholders are

represented and update Contingency Plan.

Strategic/Tactical/

Operational

38 NDCC Instructions Additional National Disease Control Centre cell instructions need preparing

to guide and assist staff in their roles. Tactical

39 Birdtable Both constitution and role of the birdtable in the battle rhythm require review Tactical

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

40 Information Management A single focal point (outside birdtable) is needed where latest information

can be promulgated and disseminated to interested parties. Tactical

41 Laboratory samples Audit of sample delivery process required and consideration given to the

retention of a duplicate sample. Tactical

42 Regional Civil Contingencies Committee - (RCCC) Triggers,

roles and interface with LDCCs, NDCC and CCC

Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) to confirm the roles and liaison

mechanisms with Regional Resilience teams. Tactical

43 Possible requirement for additional vet teleconference on

technical issues

Consideration be given to additional - 'technical' – teleconference between

DVMs and Policy vets. Tactical

44 Clarity required on triggers for National Disease Control

Centre (NDCC) & Emergency First Response Team (EFRT)

On 'suspicion', is this a trigger for activating the National Disease Control

Centre early and/or Emergency First Response Team. Tactical

45 Initial actions and decisions, coordination and logging Consideration be given to initiation of a co-ordination cell being activated as

part of the EFRT. Tactical

46 Digital Photography Consideration needs to be given as to its potential use as an aid to

diagnosis. Tactical/Operational

47 Detail on FM 21 Consultation with field for potential improvements. Tactical/Operational

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

48 Clarification of when initial press statement is released, on

issue of Form C or post Teleconference ?

Contingency plan to be revised as appropriate following issue of Form C, a

public statement will be required. Farms under restriction need to be

informed.

Tactical

49 Human Resource : need to identify Heads of NDCC teams in

very early stages of an outbreak Review need for a list of key personnel and exercise Volunteers Register. Tactical

At Amber and Red alerts there is a need to Log who has been

notified from Contingency Plan Lists in order to ensure swift

response

Guidelines and protocol for the Emergency First Response Team (EFRT). Tactical

51 Human resource: Ramping up AHDO capability Develop models and processes for staff augmentation. Tactical/Operational

52 Need to identify and inform deputies / alternatives if key

personnel are unavailable. Up to date contact lists and identify deputies. Tactical

53 Communications: Concern as to information being in the public

domain before strategic personnel are briefed.

Communications plan needs to address the issue of when information is

released and how it is controlled. Strategic/Tactical

54 Communications: Contact Lists on initial suspicion of disease Confirmation required on who is to be contacted on suspicion of disease. Tactical

Communications: Initial lines to take and guidelines for

dealing with enquiries on suspicion and confirmation of

disease

Communications Plan with agreed lines to take for releasing initial

information. AHDO needs support at this initial stage. Tactical

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

Communication: How key policy decisions, including

vaccination, are communicated to all partners and especially

to the operational level.

Clarification of information flows regarding policy decisions. Process needs

to be better defined. Tactical

57 Communication: Develop communications plans with

operational partners, cascading and sharing of information Operational Partner communication plan. Tactical

58 Communication: Contacting key people over the weekend

Consider details of how contact is made with required staff/OP's if suspicion

of FMD is raised over a weekend and confirm who should be on call. This

needs to be tested in future exercises.

Tactical

59 Communication: CD should approve the statements to media

that can be made on farm Statements prepared and be approved by CD. Tactical

60 Communication: Use of informal networks (e.g. NFU) to

circulate details of restrictions

To identify and communicate information routes to inform livestock owners

of Form C restrictions and other critical information. Tactical

61 Communication: Initial Teleconference Call Consider DVM role in teleconference provision of template. Tactical

62 Licensing for movement of animal feed and bedding Clarification of who is responsible for this in an outbreak. Tactical

63 Occupational licence for dairy cattle. Clarification required of who is responsible for producing the licences. Tactical

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

64 Closures of Rights of Way are difficult to enforce. Clarify responsibility and process for enforcing the policy. Tactical

65 Human Resource: Access to VLA staff Clear agreement between Defra and VLA needed on access to VLA staff

and mechanism for implementation. Tactical

66 Biosecurity : Guidance to the public to prevent disease spread Guidance and briefing exists, but early briefing on this issue would be

required in an outbreak. This must be part of the communications plan. Tactical

67 Livestock Movement ban - notification to Devolved

Administrations, Local Authorities and Police. Update Contingency Plan to identify who will notify whom, when and how. Tactical

68 Communications: An activation process map would help clarify

when actions are taken. To consider whether this should be included in the Contingency Plan. Tactical

69 Policy for susceptible livestock on common or open land Policy needs clarifying and a briefing provided. Tactical/Operational

70 Human Resource: Disposal sites will require risk assessment

inspection by veterinary staff. The resource to carry this out will need to be identified and planned. Tactical

71 Finance: The method for reimbursing Operational Partners

needs to be made clear. Outline arrangements within Contingency Plan. Tactical

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

72 Communication: There should be links to the Regional

Resilience websites To review potential and if necessary reflect in the communications plan. Tactical

73 Communication: Direct links required with Operational

Partners to ensure consistent messages To review links and update communications plan if necessary. Tactical

74 Communications: Do not rely on electronic means to get

message to farmers

The methods of communication to farmers, farming community and the

public need to be reviewed and solutions reflected in the communications

plan.

Tactical/Operational

75 Communications: A clear protocol for communication between

the vaccination teams and the LDCC is needed.

Plans must include a process for ensuring that communications between

the LDCC and vaccination teams are timely and accurate. Tactical/Operational

76 What information is required from HQ about local situation in

cases when DCS not up and running. Method of recording required data needs to be clarified. Tactical/Operational

77 Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines

VIPER (Chapter 3): Indexing

Consideration should be given to a 'top-layer' being added to the

instructions giving the work flow detail and also the actions required in

response to information being received.

Operational

78 VIPER (Chapter 3): Devolved Administrations There is a need for better sign-posting of the differences in roles and

responsibilities in the Devolved Administrations.

79 VIPER (Chapter 3): Communication Flows There needs to be complete instructions for channels of communication

with all forms detailing intended recipients. Operational

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

80 VIPER (Chapter 3): Search Function A more refined index should be incorporated into the Chapter - currently

'search' is used for this but only gives all occurrences of word requested. Operational

81 VIPER (Chapter 3): Glossary A glossary of terms and abbreviations needs adding to the Chapter. Operational

82 VIPER (Chapter 3): Epidemiology Specific and detailed explanation of the roles and responsibilities of the

Field Epidemiology team needs to be in the Chapter. Tactical/Operational

83 VIPER (Chapter 3): Forms Consideration needs to be given to all forms on the Chapter being available

as 'Word' docs. Operational

84 VIPER (Chapter 3): Forms

Review is required for Finance forms. FMD-specific forms still available

from the on-line Forms Catalogue when only the generic forms should be

being used.

Operational

85 VIPER (Chapter 3): Dangerous Contacts Clearer instructions needed for LDCCs on correct procedure and forms with

which to submit details of Dangerous Contacts. Operational

86 VIPER (Chapter 3): Role of RODs/DOMs The roles and specific responsibilities of the RODs and DOMs should be

contained in the Chapter. Operational/Tactical

87 Standby Procedures for contractors

Clarification required of procedure for putting contractors on 'stand-by'. Operational

Issue Issue Description Action Required Level

88 Human resource: requirement for support for DVM to provide

record of decisions and audit trail Clarification of procedures for getting administrative support to DVM Operational

89 Communications : information to farmers (under restriction)

(also see 63)

Guidelines/protocol for informing farmers within Form C area needs to be

prepared Operational

90 Communication: Press Notice : DVMs want sight of draft press

notice

Press Office to ensure circulation of draft Press notices/releases to include

DVM at 'suspicion' stage Operational

91 Communication: Notifications to Local Authorities and other

statutory informees

Local Authorities Trading Standards officers require notification on issue of

both Form A and Form C. Police need informing of Form C issue - means

of notification need to be agreed.

Operational

92 LDCC: All decisions need to be recorded within an LDCC to

ensure a complete Audit Trail Instructions needed for LDCCs to include a record of decisions made. Operational

93 Communications: What contact details should be in the local

Contingency Plans A standard format for local plans should be agreed and established Operational

94 Accommodation: Who is developing the infrastructure for the

rapid expansion of LDCCs ? A co-ordinated plan is required for expansion of LDCCs. Operational

Annex B – THE DEVELOPING SCENARIO

Summary of the scenario up to end of Day 8

The outbreak is based on infected sheep being imported to a farm in Cheshire

from another European country where disease has not yet been confirmed.

There are no other confirmed cases of FMD in any countries that trade with

the UK in live ruminants and pigs.

The above farm in Cheshire was not the first premises in Great Britain in

which Foot and Mouth Disease was first confirmed in this scenario. The link

to the first case in the UK was indirect (person/vehicle type contact) and

resulted in infected sheep being sold through a livestock market. This lead to

regional spread of disease.

Location of Infected Premises

Infected sheep went through a livestock market in Cheshire and this resulted

in the following outbreaks:

Cheshire 4 infected premises of which 2 are due to local

spread

Cornwall 4 infected premises of which 3 are due to local

spread

North Wales 2 infected premises of which 1 is due to local

spread

Lincolnshire 1 infected premises with no local spread

A further outbreak occurs in Scotland. Within the timeframe of this scenario, it

is not possible to establish a link to an outbreak in England or Wales.

Highland 3 infected premises of which 2 are local spread

Location of high risk dangerous contact premises

Dangerous contacts to the above infected premises were identified and those

which were regarded as high risk were slaughtered pre-emptively. Details of

those which were slaughtered out and the reason why are included in the

Table below. The sorts of premises that would fall within this group are those

which received live animals from an infected premises while disease was

there or those which the veterinary inspector considers are high risk because

there has been very close contact with infected animals (nose to nose contact

across boundary fences, straying livestock due to open gates or damaged

fences or common grazings).

County / Authority Infected Premises No of DCs slaughtered

Cheshire IP1

IP 2

IP 3

IP 4

6 DCs

2DCs

4 DCs

None

Cornwall IP 5

IP 7

IP 8

IP 14

4 DCs

2 DCs

4 DCs

North Wales IP 6

IP 10

3 DCs

None

Lincolnshire IP 9 None

Highland IP 11

IP 12

IP 13

3 DCs

2 DCs

Location of Dangerous Contact premises restricted for 21 days

Many other farms would be assessed as Dangerous Contacts during the

veterinary investigations of the above infected premises. These premises

would have been placed under specific restrictions and kept under veterinary

surveillance for 21 days to see if disease developed. For the purposes of this

scenario, disease did not become apparent within this timeframe i.e. to the

end of day 8. The sorts of premises that would fall within this group would be

those which have had movements of vehicles (milk tankers, feed lorries) or

persons who have had had contact with infected livestock for their work e.g.

veterinary surgeons, contract workers e.g. milkers, shearers etc.

The following table indicates how many premises were subject to these

restrictions:

Cheshire 146 premises

Cornwall 97 premises

North Wales 51 premises

Lincolnshire 26 premises

Highland 68 premises

Fate of the imported sheep

Following confirmation of the outbreak in another country a decision was

taken to slaughter the imported sheep as dangerous contacts to that outbreak.

Samples taken at the time of slaughter were positive for FMD and disease

was then confirmed. That farm became an Infected Premises on Day 2 (IP 4).

The involvement of the livestock market and the outbreak

A total of 50 premises received sheep from the market in Cheshire. Six of

them were abattoirs and the remaining were farm premises. Tracings for

these 44 farm premises were requested by the DVM in Stafford – with a

request for a clinical examination and in the absence of any suspicion of

disease - blood sampling at 95/5.

Once it was established that FMD had gone through the market, a decision

was taken on a precautionary basis to slaughter all sheep that went through

the market premises on that day. The slaughtered sheep were clinically

examined and samples taken at the time of slaughter. Four of those

premises were found to be infected and had disease confirmed.

Within the timeframe of this scenario the remaining 40 premises in England,

Wales and Scotland were slaughtered as Dangerous Contacts. Disease was

not confirmed in any of the animals tested and so all of these premises

remained as Dangerous Contacts. The following AHDOs were involved in the

this investigation, sampling and slaughtering:

Ayr - 1 premises

Preston - 5 premises

Cardiff - 3 premises

Carmarthen - 2 premises

Stafford - 9 premises

Exeter - 3 premises

Galashiels - 1 premises

Gloucester - 5 premises

Leicester - 3 premises

Perth - 1 premises

Reading - 2 premises

Taunton - 3 premises

Truro - 2 premises

A further gathering (market) was held in the Cheshire market premises a

week later (day minus 2). A decision was taken to put all premises that

received livestock from that gathering under restrictions for 21 days.

This meant that 53 farm premises in England & Wales were restricted

and put under veterinary surveillance. A veterinary investigation was

undertaken at these premises but sampling was not undertaken on any

of these premises in view of the short period of time between the

gathering taking place and the restrictions being applied. A decision on

testing these premises at 95/5 will be taken at Day 13 – outside the

timeframe of this scenario.

Options for Vaccination – Outline to Day 6

Vaccination of livestock must now be considered right from the start of any

outbreak as a option to control any outbreak of disease. The decision

whether or not to vaccinate will be taken by Ministers acting on the advice of

the Chief Veterinary Officer.

Vaccination within this scenario

Within the timeframe of this scenario the pros and cons for using vaccination

will be considered for each regional outbreak.

If vaccination is to adopted as a control measure the following factors will

need to have been assessed or addressed:

1. likely spread of the virus during the outbreak by any means

2. date of introduction into a particular area

3. species affected - amount of virus being excreted by livestock

4. the rate at which outbreaks are being confirmed

5. the size of any vaccination zone and vaccination surveillance zone

6. species of livestock to be vaccinated

7. availability of a suitable vaccine and in sufficient amounts

8. availability of a sufficient number of vaccination teams

9. any ‘special cases’ for vaccination incl rare breeds, zoos, research

centres

Information on the virus responsible for the outbreak

The virus responsible for the outbreak is very similar to the Type A -

Argentine 2001. The Type A 24 Cruzeiro is the best match (but not perfect) to

the field virus and is stockpiled in various vaccine banks and is available for

us to manufacture.

The exercise assesses the size of the Vaccination Zones, the size of the

buffer zones around them, the policy to be adopted (vaccinate to live or die)

species to be vaccinated, the speed at which more vaccine can be made

available from sources in the UK and elsewhere etc.

Resources

The outbreak has been developed such that there is regional spread of

disease before we become aware of it. However, the scenario assumes

current disease control measures e.g. the standstill rules, the notification of

movements to AMLS and SAMU, the cleansing and disinfection of vehicles

etc. have all been complied with.

Slaughter, disposal and preliminary cleansing and disinfection of farms

DVMs will have to ensure that they are able to call on slaughter-men and the

necessary facilities to ensure that on-farm slaughtering is carried out safely in

accordance with HSE guidance etc.

The Disposal cell in the NDCC will have to manage the disposal of carcases

on Infected Premises and Dangerous Contacts. As time passes more

disposal should become available as the demand increases. Incineration,

rendering and landfill will be considered.

NB. Contracts will not actually be invoked in the exercise.

Communications

The exercise will test the internal Defra communications, the communications

to other Government departments, the CCC / CCS and No 10 and

communications with the media.

Potential for airborne spread of the virus

For the purpose of this scenario, predictions of viral spread by the airborne

route (i.e. viral plumes) produced after receipt of the weather data received

from the Met Office suggested that any fall out would have been restricted to

the 10 km surveillance zones established around the Infected Premises.

The links between infected premises

(to end of Day 8)

Infected sheep imported from an Infected Premises in another country

Farm premises in Cheshire

DCF 1 then confirmed as IP 4 (Day 2 )

[Indirect link – person / livestock vehicle]

Market premises in Cheshire (Day minus 9) – also used on Day minus 2

Cattle & sheep farm in Cheshire – IP 1 (Day zero)

Local spread – IP 2 – found on patrols (Day 2 )

Local spread – IP 3 – report case (Day 2)

Cattle & sheep farm in Cornwall – IP 5 (Day 3)

Local spread – IP 7 – report case & confirmed on clinical (Day 4)

Local spread – IP 8 – report case & confirmed on clinical (Day 4)

Local spread – IP 13 – report case & confirmed on clinical (Day 7)

Sheep farm in North Wales – IP 6 (Day 4)

Local spread – IP 10 – report case (Day 6)

Sheep farm in Lincoln – IP 9 (Day 5)

No Local spread – but there is a large super-nucleus pig herd

on the edge of the 3km Protection Zone

DCF 2 to DCF 41 All premises that received sheep / livestock from the

market in Cheshire on Day minus 9 were taken as Dangerous Contacts

once the link through the market had been established – 13 AHDOs .

A further 53 premises were restricted following a market on Day minus

For the purpose of the exercise there is no established link between any

premises in England / Wales and the premises in Scotland. This is the

subject of an intense investigation that is on-going.

Farm in Scotland (Highland) – IP 11 (Day 6)

Local spread – IP 12 – found on patrols (Day 7)

Local spread – IP 14 – report case (Day 8)

Daily highlights and decisions taken

Day Highlights, decisions and summary

Ex. Day 0

Tuesday

22 June

Important highlights

Disease confirmed in Cheshire – IP 1

Type A virus is responsible

Decisions

Red Alert in FMD Contingency plan implemented for control

National movement ban imposed across Great Britain

Restricted Infected Area declared in Cheshire

Vaccination contingency plan implemented – contract triggered

UK FMD vaccine manufacturer put on standby - Yes

Take a pre-emptive guess and authorise immediate production of a

Type A vaccine – Not advised

Ex. Day 1

Wednesday

23 June

Important highlights

No known regional spread yet in the UK

All tracings requested on IT system – livestock market involved

Disease confirmed in another EU Member State – Type A Virus

also. One batch of sheep imported from their IP – notified on

ANIMO / TRACES. No known link to the outbreak in Cheshire. The

farm with imported sheep restricted and subject to a clinical

investigation (examination and sampling).

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) - 12

Decisions taken

Slaughter and test the imported sheep as Dangerous Contacts

Providing no clinical disease is seen keep all other livestock on that

premises under surveillance

Summary

1. National movement ban in force across Great Britain

2. One RIA in Cheshire around IP 1

3. Tracings from IP 1 requested on IT system

4. Disease now confirmed in another EU member State

5. One dangerous contact to an outbreak in another country is

in Cheshire being investigated and sampled – i.e. batch of

imported sheep

6. Twelve on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

Ex. Day 2

Thursday

24 June

Important highlights

No known regional spread yet in the UK and no spread reported in

the other member State

Disease confirmed on clinical on 2 premises around the

Cheshire IP 1 – IP2 and IP3

Disease confirmed on serology on the farm in Cheshire which

imported the sheep – IP 4

Market tracings - 25/114 Tracings visited, examined and sampled

Disease suspected on one premises in Cornwall – not

slaughtered out on suspicion as there is no direct link to the current

outbreaks in Cheshire (this premises is already being traced as

one which took sheep from the market in Cheshire – but not yet

visited). Authority given to stock affected stock.

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) - 15

Late afternoon - Virus from IP 1 confirmed by IAH Pirbright very

similar to FMD Type A Argentina 2001 - confirmed by genetic

sequencing tests. Best available vaccine choice is the Type A24

Cruzeiro.

Summary

1. National movement ban in force across Great Britain

2. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP 3 & IP4

3. One Form C signed in Cornwall

4. Fifteen on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally –

of which 1 set of samples submitted for testing

5. 25/114 market tracings now visited, examined and sampled

Ex. Day 3

Friday

25 June

Important highlights

Disease confirmed in Cornwall by laboratory test – IP5 – Type A

virus implicated

Market tracing - 65/114 Dangerous Contacts visited, examined and

sampled. Clinical disease not suspected in any in the last 24 hours

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) – 10 of which one in

Lancashire results in Form C restrictions being served and

samples being submitted

Decisions

Now that FMD has been shown to have gone through the livestock

market – authority given to slaughter all sheep on all premises that

received them from the market on Day minus 9 and any other

premises to which sheep may have gone after undergoing their

initial 6 days standstill in England and Wales - in Scotland the

sheep are still under a 13 day standstill. All premises that received

them from the market on Day minus 2 would be placed under

restrictions and kept under surveillance. A decision would be taken

on Day 13 re sampling these premises (outside the timeframe of

the scenario)

Summary

1. National movement ban in force across Great Britain

2. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP 3 & IP4

3. One RIA in Cornwall around IP5

4. One Form C signed in Lancashire – report case

5. Ten on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

6. One set of samples submitted for testing from report /

consultation cases today.

7. 65/114 market tracings now visited, examined and sampled

Ex. Day 4

Saturday

26 June

Important highlights

Disease confirmed in North Wales on laboratory tests– IP6 –

samples taken as part of the market tracing

2nd IP in Cornwall – IP7 – local spread from IP5 and confirmed on

clinical in cattle

3rd IP in Cornwall – IP8 – local spread from IP5 and confirmed on

clinical in cattle

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) – 8 of which two result in

Form C restrictions being served and samples being submitted –

Borders and Pembrokeshire

Summary

1. National movement ban in force across Great Britain

2. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP 3 & IP4

3. One RIA in Cornwall around IP5, IP7 & IP8

4. One RIA in North Wales around IP6

5. Form C signed in restrictions still on in Borders and

Pembrokeshire Form C restrictions still on in Lancashire

6. Two sets of samples submitted for testing from report /

consultation cases today

7. Eight on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

8. All market tracings now visited, examined and sampled

Ex. Day 5

Sunday

27 June

Important highlights

Disease confirmed in Lincolnshire on laboratory – IP9 – samples

taken as part of the market tracing

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) – 14 of which one is in

Cheshire within the RIA around IP 1 – Slaughter on suspicion

Decisions

There is a valuable pig herd in Lincolnshire, which is a supernucleus

herd with very high standards of biosecurity that is located

on the periphery of the Protection Zone around an infected

premise. – the decision to be taken: do nothing and rely on their

biosecurity; pre-emptive slaughter or vaccinate

Summary

1. National movement ban in force across Great Britain – some

movement licences issued for livestock to go to abattoirs.

2. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP 3 & IP4

3. One RIA in Cornwall around IP5, IP7 & IP8

4. One RIA in North Lincolnshire around IP9

5. One RIA in North Wales around IP6

6. Fourteen on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

7. Form C restrictions still on in Borders, Pembrokeshire and in

Lancashire

8. One new set of samples submitted for testing from report /

consultation cases today (SOS case in Cheshire RIA)

Ex. Day 6

Monday

28 June

Important highlights

Disease confirmed (IP10) on clinical on 1 neighbouring premises

to the North Wales Infected Premises – IP 6

Highland Area, Scotland - Disease reported in cattle at 1 pm.

Disease suspected on clinical grounds in a beef herd. Samples

taken and submitted to IAH Pirbright. Initial laboratory results

confirmed Type A virus in the late evening of Day 6 – disease

confirmed (IP11).

No known link to any of the infected premises in England or Wales

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) – 11 of which two result in

Form C restrictions being served and samples being submitted –

Devon and Somerset

Summary

1. National movement ban in force across Great Britain – some

movements of livestock to slaughter occurred today

2. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP 3 & IP4

3. One RIA in Cornwall around IP5, IP7 & IP8

4. One RIA in North Lincolnshire around IP9

5. One RIA in North Wales around IP6 & IP10

6. One Form C signed in Highland Region - converted into an

Infected Area in the evening.

7. Initial SOS results from Cheshire are still negative – final

results could take another 3 days

8. Eleven on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

9. Two new Form Cs signed in Devon and Somerset.

10. Form C restrictions still on in Borders, Pembrokeshire and in

Lancashire

11. Two sets of samples submitted for testing from report /

consultation cases today.

Ex. Day 7

Tuesday

29 June

Live

Exercise

Important highlights

Disease confirmed (IP12) on clinical on a neighbouring premises

to the Highland Infected Premises – IP11

Still no known link between IP 11 and any of the infected premises

in England or Wales

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) –10 of which one results in

samples being submitted in the Wiltshire (Gloucester AHDO).

Suspect disease reported in Cornwall – Confirmed on Clinical

(IP13)

Summary

1. Form C area lifted in Lancashire – results are negative

2. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP3 & IP4

3. One RIA in Cornwall around IP5, IP7, IP8 & IP13

4. One RIA in North Lincolnshire around IP9

5. One RIA in North Wales around IP6 & IP10

6. One Infected Area in Highland around IP11 &IP12.

7. Ten on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

8. Initial SOS results from Cheshire are still negative – final

results could take another 2 days

9. One new Form C signed in Wiltshire.

10. Form C restrictions still on in Borders & Pembrokeshire –

final results expected tomorrow

11. Form Cs still on in Devon and Somerset

12. Two new sets of samples submitted for testing from report /

consultation cases – (Wiltshire and Cornwall)

13. Miscellaneous feed in from the Input Cell

Ex. Day 8

Wednesday

30 June

Live

Exercise

Important highlights

Disease confirmed on clinical (IP14) on 1 premises around the

Highland Infected Premises – IP11

Disease investigations done nationally in the last 24 hours by the

SVS (report cases and consultations) – 10

Summary

1. Form C areas lifted in Borders & Pembrokeshire – results

are negative

2. Initial SOS results from Cheshire are still negative – final

results could take another 1 day

3. Two new Form Cs signed in Devon and Somerset.

4. One enlarged RIA in Cheshire around IP1, IP2 IP 3 & IP4

5. One RIA in Cornwall around IP5, IP7, IP8 & IP13

6. One RIA in North Lincolnshire around IP9

7. One RIA in North Wales around IP6 & IP10

8. One Infected Area in Highland around IP11, IP12 & IP14.

9. Form Cs still on in Devon and Somerset

10. Ten on-farm investigations done by the SVS nationally

11. Two new sets of samples submitted for testing from report /

consultation cases (One in Dartmoor and the other ….. )

12. Miscellaneous feed in from the Input Cell

Vaccination decisions and actions

Ex. Day 0

Tuesday

22 June

Virus type

Type A virus is responsible

Decisions

Vaccination contingency plan implemented

UK FMD vaccine manufacturer put on standby - Yes

Take a pre-emptive guess and authorise immediate production

of a Type A vaccine – Not advised

Vaccination Cell:

– Place vaccination contractor on standby.

– Arrange for emergency lay vaccination Orders to be

made/laid and liaise with RCVS over this.

– Liaise with policy on size of potential vaccination zone.

– Provide estimates of number of holdings, animals and

vaccine requirements (based on double dose strategy) in

10km surrounding IP.

– Liaise contractor and ESSD to identify suitable sites to

house a vaccination centre.

– Arrange mobilisation of vaccination equipment to area.

– Establish link within LDCC to ensure liaison arrangements

between contractor and LDCC are put in place.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Inform field co-ordination staff and management (inc. vets,

vacc. team members, and supporting admin. staff) of

situation.

– Activate vaccination database to review stock numbers in

area.

Vaccination Teams:

Informed of situation.

Ex. Day 1

Wednesday

23 June

Vaccination (incl decisions)

Take a pre-emptive guess and authorise immediate production of a

Type A vaccine – Still ‘No ‘

Vaccination zone – size and location(s) – information gathering

Vaccination policy is being assessed – species to be vaccinated

on farms / requests to vaccinate rare breeds in zoos and other

registered establishments

Vaccination Cell:

– Maintain communications with contractor, policy and LDCC and

ensure arrangements activated on Day 0 are progressing to

plan.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Maintain communications

Vaccination Teams:

– On standby

Ex. Day 2

Thursday

24 June

Virus type

Late afternoon - Virus confirmed by IAH Pirbright as being very

similar to FMD Type A Argentina 2001 - confirmed by genetic

sequencing tests. Best available vaccine choice from the Vaccine

Bank is the Type A24 Cruzeiro

Vaccination (incl decisions)

UK FMD vaccine being manufactured - first bottles ready for

shipment on Wednesday (2 days time)

Vaccination zone – size and location(s) – information gathering

Vaccination policy – species to be vaccinated on farms / requests

to vaccinate rare breeds in zoos and other registered

establishments

Vaccination policy -

Vaccination Cell:

– Inform vaccination contractor to ramp up number of vets and

vaccination teams to take account of newly confirmed cases.

– Revise estimates of number of holdings, animals and vaccine

requirements to take account of newly confirmed cases and

provide information to policy.

– Maintain communications with contractor, policy and LDCC.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Field co-ordination staff and management assemble on site and

receive vaccination equipment.

– Secure mobile handling facilities within area.

– Arrange to recruit and train additional vets and team members.

Vaccination Teams:

– Arrive at Vaccination Centre.

Ex. Day 3

Friday

25 June

Vaccination (incl decisions)

UK FMD vaccine being manufactured - first bottles ready for

shipment on Wednesday (1 days time)

Vaccination policy - species to be vaccinated on farms / requests

to vaccinate rare breeds in zoos and other registered

establishments

Vaccination zone(s) – size and location(s) – information gathering

Vaccination Cell:

– Revise estimates of number of holdings, animals and vaccine

requirements to take account of newly confirmed case in

Cornwall and provide information to policy

– Liaise contractor and ESSD to identify suitable sites to house a

vaccination centre in Cornwall.

– Maintain communications with contractor, policy and LDCC.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Vaccination teams receive updated briefing and refresher

training.

– Mobilises field co-ordination staff and management to Cornwall.

– Recruitment and training of additional vets/teams underway.

Vaccination Teams:

– Receive updated briefing

Ex. Day 4

Saturday

26 June

Vaccination (incl decisions)

Early evening - FMD vaccine ready for dispatch from the UK

manufacturer

Vaccination policy - species to be vaccinated on farms / requests

to vaccinate rare breeds in zoos and other registered

establishments

Vaccination zone(s) – size and location(s) – information gathering

Vaccination Cell:

– Revise estimates of number of holdings, animals and vaccine

requirements to take account of newly confirmed case in North

Wales and provide information to policy.

– Liaise with policy about whether sufficient stocks of vaccine are

available and clarify what stocks are available from EUB and

IVB.

– Liaise contractor and ESSD to identify suitable sites to house a

vaccination centre in N. Wales.

– Maintain communications with contractor, policy and LDCC and

WAG.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Accommodation for vaccination teams identified in Cheshire and

Cornwall.

Vaccination Teams:

On standby, awaiting decision to vaccinate

Ex. Day 5

Sunday

27 June

Vaccination (incl decisions)

Vaccine available - Late afternoon - 1,000,000 doses of FMD

vaccine ready for dispatch from Merial Pirbright – estimated

wastage rate – 30% - This means we can vaccinate approx.

700,000 animals once or 350,000 animals twice – 2nd dose of the

vaccine is recommended for cattle 28 days after the first dose.

Vaccination policy - species to be vaccinated on farms / requests

to vaccinate rare breeds in zoos and other registered

establishments

Vaccination zone(s) – size and location(s) – information gathering

Vaccination Cell:

– Maintain communications with contractor, policy and LDCC.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Accommodation for vaccination teams identified and being

equipped (office furniture, telephone and IT) in Cheshire and

Cornwall.

Vaccination Teams:

– On standby, awaiting decision to vaccinate.

Ex. Day 6

Monday

28 June

Vaccination (incl decisions)

Vaccine available - 1,000,000 doses of FMD vaccine ready for

dispatch from Merial Pirbright – estimated wastage rate – 35% -

This means we can vaccinate approx. 700,000 animals once or

350,000 animals twice – 2nd dose of the vaccine is recommended

for cattle 28 days after the first dose.

Vaccination policy - species to be vaccinated on farms / requests

to vaccinate rare breeds in zoos and other registered

establishments

Vaccination zone(s) – size and location(s) – information gathering

Vaccination Cell:

– Maintain communications with contractor, policy and LDCC.

Vaccination Contractor:

– Additional teams recruited and training being arranged

Vaccination Teams:

– On standby, awaiting decision to vaccinate.

Epidemiological summary (up to end of day 6)

Stafford

AHDO

No of foci – within one extended RIA

No of Infected premises

No of secondary outbreaks (local spread)

Time to slaughter out infected premises

No of Dangerous contacts slaughtered

Time to slaughter out the DCs

Date infection introduced

Species affected

Population data within the RIA / [10 to 20 km zone]

Species - Mainly dairy with a few sheep / pigs

No of livestock

Within 3 km of IPs - 11,000 cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 84,000 + cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~112,000

Within 3 km of IPs - 79 pigs

Within 10 km of IPs – 15,500 + pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone – ~12,500

Within 3 km of IPs – 1,700 + sheep and goats

Within 10 km of IPs – 20,000 sheep and goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone – ~61,000

No of farms

Within 3 km of IPs - 60 farms - cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 577 farms – cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone – 1,010

Within 3 km of IPs - 1 farm - pigs

Within 10 km of IPs - 37 farms – pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 76

Within 3 km of IPs - 23 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 km of IPs - 239 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 396

2

4

2

>1 day

12

2 – 3 days

IP4 ~ 3½ wks

sheep)

IP1 - 9 days

Sheep & cattle

Cornwall

AHDO

No of foci

No of Infected premises

No of secondary outbreaks (local spread)

Time to slaughter out infected premises

No of Dangerous contacts slaughtered

Time to slaughter out the DCs

Date infection introduced

Species affected

Population data within the RIA

Species - Mainly dairy with a few sheep

No of livestock

Within 3 km of IPs – 3,400 cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 30,000 + cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~43,000

Within 3 km of IPs - 8 pigs

Within 10 km of IPs – 3,790 + pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~1,900

Within 3 km of IPs – 5,300 + sheep and goats

Within 10 km of IPs – 29,000 sheep and goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~ 40,000

No of farms

Within 3 km of IPs - 26 farms - cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 304 farms – cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 672

Within 3 km of IPs - 2 farm - pigs

Within 10 km of IPs - 41 farms – pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 105

Within 3 km of IPs - 14 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 km of IPs - 157 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 241

1

3

2

>1 day

10

2 – 3 days

11 days in sheep

3 days in cattle

Cattle and sheep

Lincoln

AHDO

No of foci

No of Infected premises

No of secondary outbreaks (local spread)

Time to slaughter out infected premises

No of Dangerous contacts slaughtered

Time to slaughter out the DCs

Date infection introduce

Species affected

Population data within the RIA

Species – Primarily pigs – incl nucleus herd

No of livestock

Within 3 km of IPs - 1,000 + cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 3,300 + cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~9,500

Within 3 km of IPs – 10,825 pigs

Within 10 km of IPs – 27,250 + pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~ 153,000

Within 3 km of IPs – 18 sheep and goats

Within 10 km of IPs – 46 sheep and goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~12,100

No of farms

Within 3 km of IPs - 60 farms - cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 577 farms – cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 143

Within 3 km of IPs - 1 farm - pigs

Within 10 km of IPs - 37 farms – pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 105

Within 3 km of IPs - 23 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 km of IPs - 239 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 130

1

1

0

>1 day

0

Not applicable

14 days

No clinical disease

/ confirmed on

serology

N. Wales

AHDO

No of foci

No of Infected premises

No of secondary outbreaks (local spread)

Time to slaughter out infected premises

No of Dangerous contacts slaughtered

Time to slaughter out the DCs

Date infection introduced

Species affected

Population data within the RIA

Species - Mainly sheep and a few cattle

No of livestock

Within 3 km of IPs – 3,700 cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 30,000 cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~46,500

Within 3 km of IPs - 0 pigs

Within 10 km of IPs – 676 pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~2,500

Within 3 km of IPs – 38,700 + sheep and goats

Within 10 km of IPs – 267,600 sheep and goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~546,000

No of farms

Within 3 km of IPs - 38 farms - cattle

Within 10 km of IPs - 328 farms – cattle

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 584

Within 3 km of IPs - 0 farm - pigs

Within 10 km of IPs - 19 farms – pigs

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 24

Within 3 km of IPs - 50 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 km of IPs - 390 farms – sheep / goats

Within 10 to 20 km zone - 780

1

2

1

>1 day

3

4 to 6 days

13 days sheep

2 days in cattle

Cattle and sheep

Highland

AHDO

No of foci

No of Infected premises

No of secondary outbreaks (local spread)

Time to slaughter out infected premises

No of Dangerous contacts slaughtered

Time to slaughter out the DCs

Date infection introduce

Species affected

Population data within the IA

Species -

No of livestock

Within 3 km of IPs -

Within 10 km of IPs –

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~

Within 3 km of IPs -

Within 10 km of IPs –

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~

Within 3 km of IPs –

Within 10 km of IPs –

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~

No of farms

Within 3 km of IPs -

Within 10 km of IPs –

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~

Within 3 km of IPs -

Within 10 km of IPs –

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~

Within 3 km of IPs -

Within 10 km of IPs –

Within 10 to 20 km zone - ~

1

1

being assessed

>1 day

0

Not applicable

Unknown – no link

to any IP in

England / Wales

Cattle

Annex C – Exercise Methodology

The Exercise Players

1. The exercise participants from within Defra reflected the department’s

broad ranging policy portfolio and the far-reaching impact that an animal disease

outbreak would have on the department’s business. Directorates and Divisions

involved were: the State Veterinary Service, Animal Health and Welfare, Science,

Finance, Procurement, Human Resources, Communications, Legal, Rural

Communities and Countryside, Waste.

2. The Devolved Administrations of Scotland and Wales and Defra’s

operational partners were involved throughout the exercise programme.

Operational Partners included the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat

and News Co-ordination Centre, the Local Government Association (LGA), Local

Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS), the Association of

Chief Police Officers, the Regional Coordination Unit (RCU) of the Office of the

Deputy Prime Minister and the Environment Agency.

The Final Exercise

3. The Government’s Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) was also

convened in the final exercise in order to coordinate the wider crisis response

from other Government Departments. Government Departments represented at

the Civil Contingencies Committee meetings, although not necessarily at the

table, were: the Home Office, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO),

the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS), the

Environment Agency (EA), the Department of Health (DH), the Health Protection

Agency (HPA), the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), the Department

for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS), the Office of Science and Technology

(OST), the Department for Transport (DfT), the Department of Work and

Pensions (DWP), the Treasury Solicitors (TSol), the Food Standards Agency

(FSA), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

(FCO), the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), Department of Trade and

Industry (DTI), Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT), the Welsh Assembly Government

(WAG), the Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department

(SEERAD). There was also a representative from Number 10.

4. Other organisations such as individual local authorities and police forces,

the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), the

Government News Network (GNN) and the National Farmers’ Union (NFU) were

also variously involved in the final exercise.

5. Defra’s Emergency Management Board, Animal Disease Policy Group,

and Emergency Direction Group were established for the final exercise and were

tested against the roles assigned to them in the contingency plan. However, the

Animal Health Minister, Ben Bradshaw, was involved at the Emergency

Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee meetings. Defra’s

independent Science Advisory Council engaged in a pre-exercise review of the

FMD contingency plan. Although the SAC did not meet during the final exercise,

the Chair of the SAC and Defra’s Chief Scientific Adviser attended meetings of

the Animal Disease Policy Group and other strategic meetings throughout the

exercise and gave science advice to the Chief Veterinary Officer. The Civil

Contingencies Secretariat activated its Crisis Co-ordination Centre in order to

support the Civil Contingencies Committee and other government departments’

involvement in the exercise.

6. The National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) was set up at State

Veterinary Service Headquarters in Page Street, London during the final

exercise. Additionally, five regional SVS Animal Health Divisional Offices

(AHDO) in Caernarfon, Lincoln, Inverness, Stafford and Truro were involved as

Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs). Altogether the final exercise involved

over 500 people.

7. All the exercise participants, including the facilitators, were briefed in the

week before the live exercise. This took the form of individual briefings, seminars

and e-mails. Information packs consisting of the scenario to Day 6, mock press

cuttings, daily situation reports from Day 0 to Day 6, the layout of the NDCC and

other miscellaneous information were distributed in the days immediately

preceding the exercise to allow the exercise players to read themselves into the

scenario be sufficiently prepared for live play at Day 7 of the scenario. A final

verbal briefing was held in the NDCC immediately before the exercise began.

8. The Defra Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan sets out a battle

rhythm for the key strategic and tactical meetings. This was adapted to the

timings of the live exercise and the key meetings schedule is as shown overleaf.

The Input Cell

9. An ‘Exercise Input Cell’ composed of twenty directing staff was situated in

SVS headquarters to feed pre-scripted and ad-hoc information injects from a

master events list into the NDCC and LDCCs. These injects, together with the

established scenario and the subsequent development of issues, generated

sufficient momentum to take the exercise forward and test the requisite elements

of the contingency plan and operational instructions.

Exercise Observers

10. The Exercise Planning Team observed the exercise play to identify gaps

in the plans and instructions, spot any significant deviation from the exercise

objectives and ensure that the exercise maintained a credible tempo. An

independent observer from the Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College was

invited but could not attend. There was also significant interest in the exercise

programme from Defra’s stakeholders and from other countries’ science

communities and veterinary services. A visitor and observer programme was

drawn up provide information to individuals from these organisations. This is

attached at Annex E.

Local Disease Control Centres

11. At the local level each of the five Animal Health Divisional Offices involved

took a slightly different approach, although each established a Local Disease

Control Centre in one form or other. The difference in approach reflected the

local scenario at Days 7 and 8 of the outbreak. Some of the offices would have

been dealing with confirmed cases for some days while others would be in the

process of confirming their first case and establishing a disease control centre.

Divisional Veterinary Managers in each office were given a free rein to develop

their part of the exercise to test the elements that most concerned them, whilst

following the scenario that was set by the Planning Team and the Input Cell in

London. This raised a significant element of risk to the running of the final

exercise as there was potential for the scenario to go ‘off track’ in local offices if

communications broke down or there were other unforeseen circumstances.

12. In an outbreak the staff at the Local Disease Control Centres would be

augmented with staff from other departments and agencies and by days 7 and 8

there would be a large number of staff present in each centre. In Wales,

Assembly staff did participate in support of the Caernarfon LDCC, but generally

such augmentation was beyond the scope of this exercise.

Gathering Feedback

13. Feedback was gathered from questionnaires completed by exercise

participants at the end of some of the tabletop exercises and the final exercise.

There were also ‘hot wash-up’ sessions immediately after the final exercise

ended for senior Defra officials and at the end of the second CCC(O) meeting.

Players in the input cell and NDCC were offered a debrief surgery on the day

following the exercise. LDCC teams compiled their own feedback and reported

this to the Exercise Planning Team. The exercise team later contacted many

NDCC Heads of Cells and other key players to gather further feedback. There

were also debriefs with Defra’s Permanent Secretary, the Chief Veterinary

Officer, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery and the Director of

the State Veterinary Service. Written feedback was received from the

participants from Scotland and Wales, operational partners and from many of the

official observers. This feedback forms the basis of the issues identified in this

report and the recommendations for future action. The quantity and complexity

of the feedback received and the issues arising from it required considerable time

and resource to draw out the generic themes included in this report. The way

feedback is gathered and structured should be considered in future exercise

planning.

14. The direct costs to the State Veterinary Service for planning and

implementing the entire exercise series were in the order of £435,000. Other

areas of Defra, other Government departments and the Devolved Administrations

also incurred costs during the final exercise which are not reflected in this report.

KEY MEETINGS SCHEDULE

29 JUNE STRATEGIC TACTICAL

10.00 -11.00 Animal Disease Policy Group

Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Scientific Advisor, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer,

Consultant Epidemiologist, Director of Animal Health & Welfare, Head of Veterinary

Endemic Animal Diseases & Zoonoses Team, Deputy Head of Veterinary Exotic

Diseases Division, Head of Animal Welfare Veterinary Division, Head of Animal

Movements & Exotic Diseases, Head of Animal Welfare, Legal Director A

NDCC Birdtable

Permanent Secretary, Director General of Operations and Service Delivery,

Director of Communications, Head of State Veterinary Service, Legal

Director, NDCC staff, additional operational partners, policy and veterinary

staff from Defra Animal Health and Welfare DG.

11.00 – 11.30 Emergency Management Board

[Minister], Permanent Secretary (Chair), DG OSD (Deputy Chair) All Defra Directors

General, Environment Agency, Countryside Agency, Directors: SVS, CD, Finance,

[N.B. A minimum of DGOSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) &

CD (or their deputies) is necessary]

11.30 – 12.00 Media Brief (Live)

Minister, Permanent Secretary (chair), Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Scientific Advisor,

Director of Communications

Emergency Direction Group

Director General of Operations and Service Delivery, Head of State

Veterinary Service, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Press Officer,

Legal Director, Deputy Director National Disease Control Centre, Deputy

Director State Veterinary Service

12.00 – 12.30 NDCC Birdtable

13.00 – 14.00 CCC(O)

Chair: Defra Minister, Defra (DG OSD, CVO, CSA), SEERAD, WAG, Number 10,

Cabinet Office (CCS, Econ/Domestic Sec.), ODPM RCU, EA, CA, MOD, Home Office

(& ACPO), DWP, DoH, DCMS, DfT, HMT, FSA,

14.30 – 15.00 Media Brief (-simulated)

Minister, Permanent Secretary (chair), Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Scientific Advisor,

Director of Communications

Emergency Direction Group

(if necessary raising the issues raised at CCC (O))

Director General of Operations and Service Delivery, Head of State

Veterinary Service, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Press Officer,

Legal Director, Deputy Director National Disease Control Centre, Deputy

Director State Veterinary Service

15.15 – 16.00 RODs Teleconference

Head of State Veterinary Service, Deputy Director National Disease Control

Centre, Chief Press Officer, Regional Operations Directors

19.00 – 19.30 NDCC Birdtable

30 JUNE STRATEGIC TACTICAL

07.30 – 08.00 NDCC Birdtable

08.00 – 08.30 Daily Comms Meeting

Director General of Operations and Service Delivery, Minister, Permanent Secretary,

Director of Communications, Chief Veterinary Officer, Head of State Veterinary Service,

No 10

09.30 – 10.30 CCC(O) - Followed by debrief

10.45 – 11.15

Emergency Direction Group

Director General of Operations and Service Delivery, Head of State

Veterinary Service, Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Press Officer,

Legal Director, Deputy Director National Disease Control Centre, Deputy

Director State Veterinary Service

11.30 – 12.00 Media Brief

Minister, Permanent Secretary, Chief Veterinary Officer, Chief Scientific Advisor,

Director of Communications

12.00 – 12.30

Birdtable

14.30 – 15.00 RODs Teleconference

Head of State Veterinary Service, Deputy Director National Disease Control

Centre, Chief Press Officer, Regional Operations Directors

ENDEX

Annex D – EXERCISE PLAYERS

Defra HQ

Players (Defra)

Players (Non-Defra)

Observers

Visitors

Press

Consultants

Total

117

27

21

13

97

194

AHDOs

Players (Defra)

Players (Non-

Defra)

Others

Total

205

98

30

333

Total: 447 Players (322 Defra Staff, 125 Non-Defra Staff)

80 Observers/Visitors/Press/Others

Total Involvement: 527 personnel

Annex E – EXERCISE DOCUMENTATION

1. SITUATION REPORT AT DAY 6

29 June, 2004 SC(R) 7

SITUATION CELL REPORT TO CCC

RESPONSE TO OUTBREAK OF FMD IN GB

This report provides key data on the present state of the outbreak (source of

information: Defra) and the Government’s response. It also presents available

information on wider impacts (source of information: Regional Resilience

Teams and OGDs). Primarily for submission to CCC, it provides one source of

daily national data and will be updated each day.

This report is based on the information available at 17:00 on 28 June 2004

Key data and issues

• Summary of GB position at 17:00 on 28 June, 2004 [NDCC Report Table

Last 24 hours Cumulative total since

start of outbreak

Confirmed cases – Infected

Premises

1 10

Affected premises1 1 76

Condemned animals2 35 19409

Animals slaughtered 2600 17383

Animals awaiting slaughter 2026 (not applicable)

Carcass disposals 3396 17383

Carcasses awaiting disposal 0 (not applicable)

1 includes infected premises, premises with dangerous contacts, premises

with slaughter-on-suspicion cases.

2 includes animals from Infected Premises, dangerous contacts and

slaughter-on-suspicion cases.

• Further data about the outbreak are at Annex A. Details on cases per

region and on slaughter and disposal, including daily flows, are given in

Annex B.

• Response continues as Defra and the Devolved Administrations

contingency plans. Key control measures are GB-wide livestock movement

ban, culling of animals from infected premises, dangerous contacts and

slaughter-on-suspicion cases and biosecurity.

• Defra and the Devolved Administrations are reviewing epidemiological and

scientific advice and are close to taking decision on vaccination.

Vaccination teams and vaccine supplies are ready if the decision is taken

to proceed.

• Disposal routes continue to be incineration and rendering, although a

shortfall in rendering capacity has started to emerge.

• Numbers of vets are short, although vets from other countries are

assisting. Some concerns also about availability of administration staff.

• Defra and the Devolved Administrations report growing concern over

animal welfare in intensive pig and poultry units as a consequence of the

movement ban.

Status of Government’s response

1. Control measures as set out in Defra and the Devolved Administrations

contingency plans continue to form the basis of the Government’s

response. Defra and the Devolved Administrations expect to have

sufficient epidemiological data and veterinary and scientific advice to

propose vaccination as a control measure at their Emergency

Management Board meeting on 29 June. If a decision is taken to proceed,

vaccination teams and vaccine supplies are ready to be deployed.

2. Powers of direction for use of landfill to dispose of carcases now available

and in the event of further pressures on rendering capacity a decision on

their use will need to be made.

3. There are difficulties over the availability of vets, although vets from

Ireland, New Zealand and Australia are on their way. Private vets are

coming forward to assist. Staff are being identified in OGDs, but release

to Defra is slow and administrative and field staff are in demand.

4. Following the spread to Lincolnshire MOD has been alerted to the

possibility that armed forces may be called upon to help if the outbreak

continues to escalate. Advice has been requested from MOD on the

timelines for putting armed services on the ground, if the decision to

deploy to assist Defra is taken.

5. Proposals for a Welfare scheme – in which Defra would facilitate slaughter

and disposal without compensation are now available.

EU and overseas issues

6. Five infected premises have now been confirmed in a Close Member State

since the first case was confirmed on 23 June. The virus has been typed

and is the same as the one causing disease in Great Britain. They are

currently considering whether to vaccinate.

7. Defra continues to inform the EU of the outbreak, its spread and disease

control measures. The ban continues on UK exports of meat and meat

products and on imports from the close Member State.

Impact of outbreak

8. Impacts of the control measures on the farming sector are being felt

across Great Britain. Stakeholders and lobby groups are demanding

urgent action to address increasing numbers of welfare cases reported.

9. There are no reported shortages of UK or imported livestock products

available to consumers. Supermarkets are pressing for movements to be

allowed to slaughter outside of the Infected Areas.

10. The Rural Affairs Forums in England report some effects from local

communities in affected areas. Media led campaigns are supporting

stakeholder pressure for emergency vaccination.

11. Defra and DCMS are receiving letters from rural businesses – auction

marts, abattoirs, wildlife parks - requesting compensation from

Government for disruption to their businesses due to the disease control

measures.

12. There are signs that tourism is beginning to be affected by the outbreak.

Industry reports indicate that forward inbound bookings are rapidly falling

off and there have been a number of cancellations by French and Irish

school parties. Visit Britain's offices are reporting a steep rise in calls

particularly from long-haul markets, concerned as to whether it remains

safe to visit Britain. Domestic tourism is also being affected. Initial reports

from the Regional Tourist Boards indicate that visits to rural attractions

were significantly down last weekend. Major urban attractions have been

relatively unaffected so far. In 2002, tourist expenditure in the UK totalled

£76 billion (accounting for 4.4% of the UK economy).

Annex A

ADDITIONAL SUMMARY DATA [from Defra’s NDCC Daily Report]

As at 17:00 on 28 June, 2004

Graph showing number of cumulative confirmed cases since start of outbreak

CONFIRMED CASES

Day 0 Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 6

Slaughter targets

% meeting target

in last 24 hours

Cumulative %

meeting target

Infected Premises 24 hour target 100 100

Dangerous contact premises 48 hour

target

25 85

Species affected

Total Cattle Sheep Pigs Goats Deer Other

Condemned 19409 5993 13394 20 2 0 0

Slaughtered 17383 5222 12139 20 2 0 0

Disposed 17383 5222 12139 20 2 0 0

Regional summary of confirmed cases

County and

countries

Last 24 hours Cumulative total

since start of

outbreak

Cheshire 0 4

Cornwall 0 3

Lincoln 0 1

Summary

England

0 8

Wales 1 2

Scotland 0 0

Great Britain 1 10

Disposal chain – carcass disposal by each route

Disposal route Numbers of carcasses

disposed – last 24 hours

Number of carcasses

disposed – cumulative total

Incineration 330 1648

Rendering 3066 15735

Landfill 0 0

Wider consequences of outbreak [DN – for CCS to gather and

present based on contacts with OGDs]

No data currently available

Annex B

ADDITIONAL DATA ON TRENDS [from Defra’s NDCC Daily Report]

As at 17:00 on 28 June, 2004

New confirmed cases and total affected animals and premises - over last

7 days

Day 28

June

New

confirmed cases

1 1 3 1 3 0 1

Cumulative total

(confirmed cases)

10 9 8 5 4 1 1

Total affected

premises1

76 74 73 61 11 8 7

Total condemned

animals 2

19409 19374 19078 14908 3054 1564 1544

1 includes infected premises, premises with dangerous contacts, premises

with slaughter-on-suspicion cases

2 includes confirmed cases, dangerous contacts, slaughter-on-suspicion

cases

Regional summary of new cases – over last 7 days

Counties

and

countries

June

Cheshire 3 1

Cornwall 2 1

Lincoln 1

Summary

England

0 1 2 1 3 0 1

Wales 1 1

Scotland

Great

Britain

1 1 3 1 3 0 1

Slaughter and disposal data – over last 7 days [note: recent data may be

provisional and subject to revision as more data become available]

Day 28

June

Animals slaughtered 2600 5002 6532 1125 1199 20 905

Cumulative total 17383 14783 9781 3249 2124 925 905

Awaiting slaughter 2026 4591 9297 11659 930 639 639

New disposals 2425 5032 6502 1125 1199 20 905

Cumulative total 17208 14783 9751 3249 2124 925 905

Awaiting disposal 175 0 30 0 0 0 0

Annex F – VISITOR/OBSERVER PROGRAMME

There follows a selection of the information given to Visitors and Observers in

their introductory booklet. Some elements have been removed as they are

duplicated elsewhere in this report.

WELCOME MESSAGE

The State Veterinary Service Contingency Planning Division in the

Department for Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs was established to

ensure that Defra and its operational partners are adequately prepared to deal

with any future outbreak of exotic animal disease, focusing in particular on

emergency preparedness for an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD).

The three official inquiries into the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak

each stressed the necessity for regular exercising of the Contingency Plan.

The latest version of the plans for handling an outbreak of Foot and Mouth

Disease was laid before Parliament in March this year and there has also

been an extensive revision of the instructions detailing operational

arrangements in the Animal Health Divisional Offices and in Headquarters.

Exercise Hornbeam is the product of a year’s planning by the SVS

Contingency Planning Division. It is also the culmination of a series of tabletop

exercises looking at the strategic, tactical, and operational responses to

suspicion and confirmation of disease and to its regional spread. The

Devolved Administrations, operational partners such as the Environment

Agency, Association of Chief Police Officers, Local Government Association

and Local Authorities Coordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS) have

been involved throughout the exercise programme, exploring their roles and

responsibilities at each stage.

I am grateful to all those who have contributed to the planning of this event,

which I envisage will be a valuable learning experience for all those involved.

I hope you find Exercise Hornbeam to be an enjoyable and worthwhile

experience. We welcome your participation and look forward to receiving your

feedback.

Mark Addison

Director General - Operations and Service Delivery

FMD Website

During a real outbreak situation Defra would launch its FMD Website which

would provide up to date information relating to the outbreak. For the

purposes of the exercise we have created a “dummy version” of this site

accessible through computers in the visitor’s room using the following URL:

http://defrawebd/animalh/emergency/fmd/ Please note that this URL will only

be available during the exercise for internal use within Defra.

Post Exercise Report

The Contingency Planning Division’s Exercise Planning Team, in association

with QinetiQ Consulting will oversee the conduct of all aspects of the exercise,

with an emphasis being placed on the importance of identifying lessons to be

learned. We will be inviting feedback from participants and guests. A post

exercise report will be produced, the findings of which will be published in the

autumn of 2004.

Visitor Programme

Observers are attending for the duration of the exercise as an invited guest of a

Defra sponsor who will be acting as a host.

Visitors are attending an organised programme lasting approximately 1 ½ hours

providing an overview of the main elements of the exercise.

DATE TIME INTERNATIONAL

OBSERVERS

OBSERVERS VISITORS REMARKS

13.00

Welcome Briefing

FMD Planning

Wider Government Issues

13.30

Exercise Briefing

Exercise Organisation

The Scenario

13.45 Arrive

14.00 Visit National Disease Control Centre

Visitor Briefing

Welcome

FMD Planning

Wider

Government

Issues

14.30

Exercise Briefing

Exercise

Organisation

The Scenario

14.45

Attend Emergency

Direction Group Visit National

Disease Control

Centre

15.30 Depart

16.30

17.00

Sponsor’s programme

Hosted by NDCC

Cell

19.00 Attend NDCC Bird Table

29

June

20.30 CVO Dinner

07.30 RV at Defra HQ Attend NDCC

Bird Table

08.00 Attend Daily

Communications Brief

09.00 Sponsor’s programme

11.00 Attend Emergency

Direction Group

Visitor Briefing

Welcome

FMD Planning

Wider

Government

Issues

11.30

Exercise Briefing

Exercise

Organisation

The Scenario

11.45

Sponsors Programme

Hosted by NDCC

sponsor cell

12.00 Final discussion with

DCVO and DCSA

Tour of National

Disease Control

Centre

30

June

12.30 Depart

Annex G - GLOSSARY

ACPO Association of Chief Police Officers

ADPG Animal Disease Policy Group

AHDO Animal Health Divisional Office

AMED Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division

BCMS British Cattle Movement Service

CA Countryside Agency

C&D Cleansing and Disinfection

CCC Civil Contingencies Committee

CCC(O) Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials)

CCS Civil Contingencies Secretariat (Cabinet Office)

CD Communications Directorate

CEO Chief Executive Officer

COBR Cabinet Office Briefing Room

CP Contiguous Premises

CSA Chief Scientific Adviser (Defra)

CVO Chief Veterinary Officer

DARDNI Dept of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern Ireland

DC Dangerous Contact

DCS Disease Control System Database

Defra Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

DGLS Director General Legal Services (Defra)

DG OSD Director General Operations and Service Delivery (Defra)

DOH Department of Health

DOM Divisional Operations Manager

DfT Department for Transport

DVM Divisional Veterinary Manager

DWP Department for Work and Pensions

EA Environment Agency

EC European Commission

EDG Emergency Direction Group

EU European Union

FMD Foot and Mouth Disease

FSA Food Standards Agency

GICS Government Information and Communication Service

GNN Government News Network

GOs Government Offices in the Regions

HMT Her Majesty’s Treasury

HPA Health Protection Agency

HSE Health and Safety Executive

HsVS Heads of Veterinary Services in Defra Regions

IAH Pirbright Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright

IP Infected Premises

LA Local Authority

LACORS Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services

LDCC Local Disease Control Centre

LGA Local Government Association

LVI Local Veterinary Inspector

MOD Ministry of Defence

MPs Members of Parliament

NDCC National Disease Control Centre

NFU National Farmers Union

ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister

OGD Other Government Department

OIE Office International des Epizooties

OST Office of Science and Technology

PCD Procurements and Contracts Division

PZ Protection Zone

RCU Regional Co-ordination Unit (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister)

RDS Rural Development Service

ROD Regional Operations Director

RPA Rural Payments Agency (Defra Agency)

SAC Science Advisory Council (Defra)

SAPER Science Advisory Panel for Emergency Response

SEERAD Scottish Executive Environment and Rural Affairs Department

SEPA Scottish Environment Protection Agency

Sitrep Situation Report

SVC Standing Veterinary Committee

SVS State Veterinary Service

SVSCP State Veterinary Service Contingency Planning Division

TVI Temporary Veterinary Inspector

VIPER Veterinary Instructions, Procedures and Emergency Routines

VLA Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Weybridge

VTVS Vetnet Tracing Verification System

WAGARAD Welsh Assembly Government Agriculture and Rural Affairs Dept

Annex H