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From Norm Coates September 9 2007

"There is suspicion, verified by the haulage owner, that a 30tonne truck moved the piles of muck from Pirbright along Westwood Lane to Compton (between Flexwood and Elstead) when it was flooded." This is where they are pinning the blame for the virus getting into the stream and paddocks.

Reading the final report and looking at the images you get the impression that this is a piss-poor operation! I have worked in more modern factories, institutions etc than this place in ENGLAND. Pirbright and those who fund it are a disgrace!
1) In one installation I worked at in 1974 (Solihull, Birmingham) we used Group 4 access cards. Each had it's own individual code that had to be keyed into a pad after you had inserted the card into the slot! You could not allow others through the door into the computer rooms with you because the first door let you into a small corridor with a turnstyle that when activated by the cardholder locked anyone coming through. The exit door from this corridor had a time limit of 5-10 seconds before it locked you out.  If that happened you would be allowed to return through the turnstyle and exit the corridor on the other side. I believe three times and you are out - Security was notified automatically!
2) I see very few formal/paved roads on the Pirbright site and lots of dirt roads - IN THIS DAY AND AGE???? Pirbright should be a showcase and not such a dump! The copse and elsewhere on the grounds should be landscaped with paths and rest areas for the workers not just an adjunct from before the 1930s when the place was established.
3) All governments going back 70 years should be ashamed of themselves to allow such a mess to evolve!
4) No wonder nobody wants to work there!

From Norm Coates to warmwell September 9 2007

Quoting warmwell for Sept 8
Norm writes:
They were even wrong when depicting Woolford farm as the first infected site. The FIRST infected site was an annex that the Prides rented that was the first case (at Normandy next to the stream and the allotments)! . The virus was then transported to the home farm - Woolfords Farm (near Elstead) - where ONE animal was found to have contacted the virus. All animals at Woolford Farm and the agistments were culled as were a neighbouring small farm's animals just north of Elstead (this case has surreptitiously never been mentioned very much in the media although documented by Defra).
Now the other image (attached to the pathetic map) shows "Two soil heaps"! where did they go?

Stabilitech - to me this company is a new player in the scheme of things and became apparent in the HSE Finalreport.pdf and is initially identified on the Defra site on the 8th of September 2007?

Quote -

98 Two Stabilitech researchers were involved in freeze-drying cultures of the O1 BFS
strain in a laboratory within the main IAH facility. Freeze-driers are a known source of
aerosol, and we inspected the arrangements. The equipment did not have an in-line
filter for vented gases, however, the line did pass through an oil sump before discharge
into the room. We consider release of live virus of the O1 BFS strain into the laboratory
as being of a low likelihood.
99 All work (excluding the freeze-drying process) was undertaken in MSCs: these were
examined and found to be operating and tested properly.
100 Our investigations did not reveal any accidents or unusual incidents which may
have resulted in the laboratories used by Stabilitech staff being contaminated with
the O1 BFS strain. However, our investigation revealed that Stabilitech did not have
a written SOP for some procedures carried out in their laboratories which relate to
biosecurity-critical areas during the period covered by our investigation.


records of staff training were poor. We recommend review of arrangements for setting
and monitoring safe operating practices where work is subcontracted under a single
operating SAPO licence with responsibilities clearly defined between the licence holder
and the subcontractor.
129 We did raise concerns about the procedures in use at the IAH and Stabilitech
laboratories: in all the laboratories inspected, the waste bins were overfilled and little
or no segregation of waste occurred.
(Link to Stabiltech:
148 Given that the overall chemical treatment required to inactivate SAPO pathogens
involves both the preliminary and final treatments, Defra informed us that both they
and the management of Merial accept that live pathogens may, on occasion, enter the
Merial effluent sump and get from there into the site' s effluent drainage system. We feel
that this is more relevant for the Merial process, given the amounts of organic matter
and cellular debris generated by centrifuging the contents of their 6000 litre bioreactors.
150 We conclude that it is likely that live virus of the O1 BFS strain entered the
effluent drainage system from the Merial facilities during the period covered by
our investigation.

151 This process was fully in compliance with their SAPO requirements. We feel it
would be better practice for Defra to require a higher degree of inactivation before the
centrifuge waste enters the effluent sump. We recommend that Defra and Merial work
closely together to establish how best this could be done.
154 An assessment of the condition of these pipes was carried out. Dyno-Rod,
working with HSL undertook a CCTV survey which was interpreted by experts from
Dyno-Rod, the Environment Agency and an HSE inspector who has expertise in
containment drainage systems. In addition, physical inspections were carried out,
drawings were reviewed and effluent flows analysed.
155 Weaknesses were identified in the containment standard of the effluent drains
across the Pirbright site. These included displaced joints, cracks, debris build-up and
tree root ingress. For a biosecurity-critical system, record keeping, maintenance and
inspection regimes were considered inadequate.
156 Our investigations revealed that blockages in the drainage system had
been experienced in the past and that IAH had managed this using two different
approaches: either their own staff would use a water bowser and hoses to flush
through the system or external contractors would be hired. While strict supervision and
biosecurity arrangements appear to have been put in place for the external contractor
(rigorously treating the equipment and areas surrounding the manholes with chemical
disinfectants), the biosecurity arrangements in place for IAH staff appeared less robust.
We found no standard operating procedures to be in place for this process, particularly
regarding the chemical treatment of both the hoses and the bowser after they had
been used. We consider this lack of standard operating procedures to represent a
breach to the biosecurity arrangements at IAH.
164 We established that on 20 July 2007, the Pirbright site experienced extreme wet
weather, with very heavy rainfall (up to 62 mm) and localised flooding. Areas of standing
water and high groundwater levels were observed over the weekend and through to at
least 23 July 2007 and perhaps longer.
166 We commissioned a survey of the site' s effluent system by flood defence
engineers from the Environment Agency (see report 2: Annex), who observed that the
system has a series of poorly fitting manhole covers. In their experience of conventional
drainage systems, this is likely to have led to surface water entering the drainage
system via the manhole covers at some point on 20 July 2007. In addition, they
observed that, during periods of high water levels, it is common for groundwater to
enter drainage systems through cracks and misalignments in the pipework due to the
high pressures exerted.
167 We have already concluded there to be a negligible likelihood that the O1 BFS
strain entered the effluent drainage system from the IAH or Stabilitech facilities during
the period covered by our investigation. However, it is likely that the O1 BFS strain
entered the effluent drainage system from the Merial facilities during the period covered
by our investigation. We needed to establish the amount of the O1 BFS strain likely to
be in the drainage system over this period of heavy rainfall and localised flooding.
168 We focused on the liquid waste produced by Merial. We conclude that on 20 July
2007, the O1 BFS strain from the Merial plant may have been in the system, but only
from the cleaning of the empty vessels with 0.8% citric acid and sodium hydroxide.
Treated centrifuge waste from the first batch of O1 BFS production entered the effluent
drainage system some time around 22 - 23 July 2007 and from the second batch
around 25 - 26 July 2007. As outlined above, we consider it likely that this contained live
virus of the O1 BFS strain.
169 Given our concerns regarding the lack of containment offered by the effluent
drainage system, we conclude that it is likely that the O1 BFS strain from the
Merial facility was released from the site' s effluent drainage system between
22 and 26 July 2007.
184 We conclude that it is likely that live virus of the O1 BFS strain worked with
by Merial was released from the Pirbright site' s effluent drainage system into the
surrounding soil 20 - 26 July 2007. This mechanism is likely to have been either
through overflowing of manhole FM1 or general leakage around the drainage
pipes elsewhere in the system or both.
185 We conclude that during this period the Pirbright site may have become
contaminated with live virus of the O1 BFS strain.
186 We conclude that the inadequate levels of containment offered by the
effluent drainage system represent a breach to the biosecurity arrangements at
the Pirbright site.


























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