"That version was altered before publication without our knowledge in critical respects beyond what might be reasonable as editing of the manuscript: these alterations significantly changed our message"
Read in full at http://www.humanitarian.net/biodefense/fazdc/usaha_fadp.html
(emphasis added by warmwell.com)
U.S. Agricultural and Food Security: Who Will Provide the Leadership?Floyd P. Horn, PhD Roger Breeze, BVMS, PhD, MRCVS Centaur Science Group Washington DC 2003
A version of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 107th Annual Meeting of the U.S. Animal Health Association, San Diego, October 9-16, 2003, pages 79-91. That version was altered before publication without our knowledge in critical respects beyond what might be reasonable as editing of the manuscript: these alterations significantly changed our message. Specifically, the identity of one author was deleted and our ideas of how rapid, on-site test devices should be deployed were completely changed to create the false impression that validation was the next critical step (compare page 87 of USAHA text to page 9 below). The altered text is reproduced here. The authors leave it to the reader to decide why these changes were made.
Our Text: Thus far, agricultural agencies in the U.S. and abroad have not deployed rapid detection – or indeed any other modern technologies – to counter foreign animal disease outbreaks. Other than use of the telephone, control measures still closely follow those introduced by Cardinal Lancisi almost 300 years ago. Provided with a portable state-of-the-art device that can detect FMD and other viruses on farm within minutes, USDA has reluctantly deployed a handful of machines to fixed sites in a dozen state diagnostic laboratories. Given the size of the U.S., this does not add significant new capability. To put this deployment in perspective, the distance between the state diagnostic laboratory in Pullman WA and the dairy industry in Puget Sound is about 300 miles – the same distance as between London and Paris. Putting a fixed FMD detection machine in Pullman is like providing Great Britain with rapid detection capability by placing a machine in Paris, France.
On-site detectors should transform disease surveillance and control, not echo history over smaller geographies. In our view, a federal or state official equipped with an Internet-linked detection device should be on the site of any suspected foreign animal disease outbreak in the U.S. within 4 hours or less of notification so that vigorous informed control measures backed by positive diagnosis can be implemented nationally within 6 hours. Once the presence of FMD is confirmed, as part of an Internet-based Command and Control system, continuous real-time surveillance must be employed to define the extent of the problem around the initial detection and to predict and track the progress of infection through the national agricultural commerce streams. And to prevent natural introduction, real time surveillance must also be extended to all commercial flows entering the U.S. This cannot be achieved by taking samples to a central laboratory.
USAHA version: Thus far, agricultural agencies in the United States and abroad have not deployed rapid detection, or indeed any other modern technologies, to counter foreign animal disease outbreaks. USDA has, however, deployed a handful of machines to fixed sites in a dozen state diagnostic laboratories that provide a portable state of the art device that can detect FMDV and other viruses on farm within minutes. The question remaining is whether validation is in process.