Version 2

1.10 Purpose: Twofold.

1) To implement contingency plans, working with stakeholders to ensure effective control of the disease outbreak.

2) To receive tactical guidance and implement it in liaison with other local responders and provide regular feedback.

Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) under Regional Operations Director/Divisional Veterinary Manager control; to include representatives from relevant agencies, local authorities, other key stakeholders and operational partners (see Annex Q).

1. 1.11 N.B. This Plan covers operations in England. Annex R sets out outline details of the contingency plans for Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland also has a separate contingency plan, details of which are not outlined in this plan as the island of Ireland is treated as a separate epidemiological entity.

2. 1.12 Further action will depend on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary advice. The Decision Tree (Annex C) will be followed in deciding what action to take.

Diagram showing Single-Line Command Structure for Control of Foot and Mouth Disease

Civil Contingencies Committees

Defra Emergency Strategic Level

Management Board

(including Director General Operations and Service Delivery)

Director of

Operations

(Director of State

Tactical Level

Veterinary Service)

National Disease Control Centre

Local Disease Control Centre Regional Operations Director Operational Level

Divisional Veterinary Divisional Operations Finance

Regional Manager Manager Manager

Resilience Teams, Local Authorities, Environment Agency, Police

Operational Personnel Devolved Administrations, Operational Partners, Government Depts & Agencies, Stakeholder Representation

Stakeholder representation, Operational Partners,

Science feed to policy and tactical levels is shown in the diagram on Page 19.

DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN

Diagram showing the development and inter relationship of veterinary and scientific advice and their input to decision making

DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN

DAILY BATTLE RHYTHM

07:30-08:00

08:00-08:30

09:30-10:30

10:30-11:30

11:30-12:00

12:00-12:30

14:30-15:00

15:15-16:00

16:15-17:15

18:00

19:00-19:30

21:00

Strategic

Daily Comms Meeting

Civil Contingen- cies Committee (Officials) CCC(O)

Civil Contingen- cies Committee

Media Briefing

Defra Manage- ment Board (if required)

Tactical (NDCC)

Birdtable

Emergency Direction Group (10:45-11:15)

Birdtable

RODs Teleconfer ence

Emergency Direction Group (if required)

Receive RODs Sitrep

Birdtable

NDCC Report Compiled and Circulated

Operational (LDCC)

Birdtable

Daily Manage- ment Comms Meeting

Media Briefing

Birdtable

RODs Teleconfer ence

Send SitReps to NDCC

Birdtable

2.1 A standard alert system has been adopted as a basis for planning the response to a disease outbreak. Alert states of ‘Amber’ (in the case of suspicion of disease) and ‘Red’ (on confirmation of the first case of disease) will be called.

ACTION ON SUSPICION OF FMD

1. 2.2 Any suspicion of FMD must be reported to the local Animal Health Division Office (AHDO) of the State Veterinary Service who will take action according to SVS instructions. Annex B of this Plan indicates the local veterinary action to be taken in relation to the level of suspicion.

2. 2.3 All investigations into suspicion of disease are reported to Headquarters.

3. 2.4 Responsibility for providing and communicating information on a case of suspect disease, including laboratory results, lies with Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division (VEXD) who use Notification of Disease form NDI 1 to notify Defra Ministers, appropriate Senior Officials within Defra and key veterinary and policy personnel in HQ and the regions, including the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Director of the State Veterinary Service. The NDI 1 form records the appropriate level of suspicion as described in Annex B.

4. 2.5 Out of Hours notification is the responsibility of the Duty Veterinary Adviser and Duty Press Officer. As the Duty VA is unlikely to have immediate access to the necessary IT equipment, notification of suspicion of disease will be made via telephone calls. Key veterinary and policy staff will be notified of developments and an NDI 1 circulated at the first available opportunity

5. 2.6 If the level of suspicion is recorded as Level 1 or above the status of alert will be Amber and the following action will be taken.

AMBER

a) The following protocol governing the distribution and timing of release of information on test results, both internally and externally, will be followed:

Communications Protocol - Laboratory Test Results on a suspect case

2.7 Information will be made available as soon as possible. To enable this a discussion, normally by conference call, will take place with the CVO or nominated representative leading and those listed below participating.

CVO
DG OSD

Director SVS
AHWD - Director or Head of Division
LSDG - Director or Head of Division
CD (and GNN)
Private Offices
No. 10
VEXDD
SVS Contingency Planning
DVM
HVS
Civil Contingencies Secretariat
News Co-ordination Centre
SEERAD
WAG ARAD

1. 2.8 The arrangements for convening the conference call will be undertaken by CD (out of hours the duty press officer will be notified by the Duty Veterinary Advisor in AHWD). A list of contact names and numbers for internal principals and their deputies will be maintained by AHWD and available from the Defra Duty Officer and the SVS Home Duty Clerk.

2. 2.9 The agenda for the communications teleconference call will comprise (with a report from bracketed party)

1. Situation Report - National (CVO or nominated
representative)

-Local (DVM)

1. 2. Timescale (CVO or nominated representative)

2. 3. Risk assessment (CVO or nominated representative/DVM)

3. 4. Communications objectives (Director of Communications)

4. 5. Stakeholder Handling (national and local) (AHWD, DVM)

5. 6. Agreed lines to take/press notice (Director of Communications)

6. 7. Time of release and action points (CVO or nominated representative)

2.10 The following will then take responsibility for informing externally at an agreed time:

�.- DVM: individual farmer (DVM to alert CD/regional GNN as soon as the individual is told and before informing other external groups);

�.- DVM: Emergency planning departments of relevant local authorities, local police force, the Environment Agency, local NFU and local large animal veterinary practices;

�.- DVM: local stakeholders, local vets and farmers;

- DCVO (policy): RCVS and BVA

- AHWD: NFU (HQ)

- DG OSD: CCS, RCU and EA

- CD/GNN: media, website, helpline, intranet (and other internal communications to Defra staff), GNN

1. 2.11 News Releases will be drafted by AHWD in conjunction with CD and must be sent to all internal principals (particularly the DVM and HVS) before being released externally.

2. 2.12 Questions about test results and timing of their delivery must be addressed to the CVO or nominated contact.

End of Protocol

1. 2.13 The Director of the SVS will put the relevant ROD & DOM on alert and will put the relevant Head of Veterinary Service on immediate standby to cover the ROD post until such time as the nominated ROD can take up position (within approx. 48 hours). Heads of Veterinary Service will debrief and provide a ‘handover’ to RODs (and DOMs) upon their arrival.

2. 2.14 The Director General Operations and Service Delivery will notify the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat of the suspect case.

3. 2.15 The Director of the SVS will consider authorising the establishment of a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC). The Director of the SVS will also put all nominated Heads of NDCC cells on alert and will consider the establishment of some elements of the National Disease Control Centre (SVS Instructions contain detailed plans for establishment and resourcing).

4. 2.16 SVS Contingency Planning Division will activate the Emergency First Response Team. The EFRT will be actively involved in the early stages of managing an animal disease outbreak. They will set up the first operational desks in the Disease Reporting Team of the NDCC.

5. 2.17 The Head of Veterinary Exotic Diseases Division will contact SVS ITU in order to instigate the set up of Defra’s Disease Control System (current ‘up and running’ time is 24 – 48 hours).

6. 2.18 In some cases where laboratory confirmation is awaited and the veterinary assessment indicates an unacceptable risk in waiting, the Chief Veterinary Officer may take the decision to move to red alert before final confirmation is received. In this case all action indicated as required under ‘Red’ alert will be immediately initiated.

RED - INITIAL ACTION ON CONFIRMATION OF FMD

2.19 If the suspected case is subsequently confirmed by the CVO as having disease or if the risk assessment indicates, the alert state will immediately be raised to ‘Red’ and the following action will take place:-

. • the Head of Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division will notify Defra Ministers and senior officials, other government departments, devolved administrations and agencies and organisations directly affected;

. • the DCVO (policy) will inform the European Commission, OIE, and national veterinary organisations;

. • The Director General Operations and Service Delivery will notify the Home and Special Forces Secretariat, the Regional Co-ordination Unit and Directors of the relevant Government Offices in the Regions;

. • The Chief Veterinary Officer will notify the Department of Health and Health Protection Agency;

. • The Director General Land Use and Rural Affairs will notify the Department for Culture, Media and Sports;

. • the Director of the SVS will authorise the establishment of a Local Disease Control Centre (LDCC) and the National Disease Control Centre. SVS Instructions contain detailed plans for their establishment and resourcing;

. • the Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will notify all DVMs and Heads of Veterinary Services to ensure that AHDOs are staffed immediately to deal with enquiries from the public and support tracing requirements;

. • the Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will also notify Head of Procurement and Contracts Division, nominated heads of NDCC cells from within Defra, those who will be invited to be represented in the NDCC, and nominated RODs and DOMs;

. • the Head of SVS CP Division will alert the vaccination contractors and put them on stand-by, subject to further direction from the Strategic Group. As soon as the FMD strain responsible for the outbreak is identified and it has been confirmed that one of the available vaccines will afford protection, the Head of AMED Division will instruct the relevant contractor to formulate vaccine;

. • an Emergency Management Board will be convened as soon as possible and will take a decision on triggering the Civil Contingencies Committee on the basis of emerging information about the disease;

• other Government Departments, operational partners and key local stakeholders such as local authorities will be notified as soon as possible. Utilities will be notified by LDCCs as set out in the SVS instructions.

NB. Detail of who should contact whom is set out at Annex I.

2.20 Action to be taken to establish the NDCC and relevant LDCC and to control the disease is set out in detail in the SVS instructions and the AHDO contingency plans.

OUTLINE OF POLICIES

2.21 The following policies will be applied on confirmation of FMD: (Note: The first case will be confirmed by Laboratory Test)

. • A GB wide national movement ban of susceptible species will be put in place immediately.

. • Export health certificates for animals and animal products will be withdrawn. Exports from GB of susceptible animals during the risk period will be identified and notified to the importing countries.

. • Diseased and other susceptible animals on infected premises will be culled with a target of within 24 hours of report. Dangerous contacts will be culled with a target of within 48 hours of report.

. • Emergency Vaccination will immediately be considered as an option based upon emerging epidemiological and logistical factors. If emergency vaccination is used it would be on the basis of vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.

. • A Protection Zone will be imposed with a minimum radius of 3km around the Infected Premises and a Surveillance Zone with a minimum radius of 10km. In the Protection Zone no animal movements will be allowed except for movement to emergency slaughter. In both the Protection and Surveillance Zones, there will be requirements for increased levels of biosecurity on farms, cleansing and disinfection (C&D) of vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms. Movement of animals, animal products, feed and bedding will be prohibited, except under licence. Products from animals in these zones will be subject to treatment to ensure destruction of the FMD virus. This is an animal health measure rather than a public health measure. Such treatments include the pasteurisation of milk (normal process for most milk produced in the UK), heat treatment or de-boning and maturation of milk.

. • Disposal by incineration will be implemented immediately with rendering as the next option and other disposal routes being available as an additional resource subject to environmental, land use planning and public health considerations.

. • Footpaths will only be closed on Infected Premises and within the 3km Protection Zone, (A Veterinary Risk Assessment and Protocol for Rights of Way closure is at Annex G).

1. 2.22 Further action will depend on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on scientific and veterinary advice. The Decision Tree for FMD control strategies (Annex C) will be followed in deciding what action to take. This sets out the factors the Government will take into account in deciding which strategy to adopt in order to control and eradicate the disease. The Animal Health Act 1981, as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002, lays a duty on the Secretary of State to consider vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of the disease. Wherever possible this would be on the basis of emergency vaccinate-to-live. If a decision not to vaccinate were taken the reasons would be explained before further measures were introduced. Consultation with interested parties, to address outstanding technical, commercial and communications issues on emergency vaccination is continuing.

2. 2.23 Additional control strategies include:

. • culling of other susceptible livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus plumes, premises contiguous to the infected premises); and

. • pre-emptive or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals not on infected premises, not dangerous contacts or not necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the wider spread of the disease outwith an area.

2.24 A Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol setting out the requirements that must be followed in the event of a pre-emptive cull is at Annex D.

Further Action

2.25 Once FMD is confirmed the main elements of this plan are brought into action.

Section 3 sets out the resources that would be deployed;
Section 4 describes the key operations that have a central input;
Section 5 sets out the main elements of the Communications Plan;
Section 6 describes the strategic organisations and structures;
Section 7 the tactical organisation; and
Section 8 the operational plan.

These last two are augmented by the SVS instructions and the local office contingency plans.

INVOLVEMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

1. 3.1 On suspicion of disease, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery will contact the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat to notify of the suspect case. Immediately a case of FMD is confirmed, the Director General Operations and Service Delivery will again contact the MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat to inform of the outbreak so that, if necessary, aid can be sought with the minimum delay. If it were decided that it was necessary to seek aid from the armed forces, aid would be provided under the ‘Military Aid to the Civil Authorities’ (MACA) arrangements, subject to other Armed Forces commitments. The Armed Forces may provide assistance with logistic capability and it may be appropriate to deploy at both tactical (Tactical command) and operational (Operational command) levels.

2. 3.2 Contact details for MOD Home and Special Forces Secretariat can be found at Annex I.

3. 3.3 The Armed Forces will have their own command and control structure with overall co-ordination of their effort being controlled by Armed Forces HQ Land. It is not appropriate for regional staff to approach Army Brigade headquarters directly. All requests for initial assistance must be passed through NDCC.

4. 3.4 Brigade Commanders will take direction (but not commands) from RODs/DVMs and will need to be given clear aims and objectives. The local military commander will decide how best to use their troops based on these aims and the directions received. Military Liaison Officers should be posted to LDCCs to take on a local strategic co-ordination function.

HUMAN RESOURCES

Veterinary Personnel

Identification of UK government veterinary personnel

3.5 On authority from the Director SVS individual veterinary staff will be alerted with immediate effect and deployed as instructed by Divisional Veterinary Managers. (SVS instructions and local office contingency plans expand on these arrangements). HR will contact vets from the following sources to secure additional assistance:

. • Retired veterinary staff

. • Veterinary staff from Defra agencies and other government departments.

Identification of non-government veterinary personnel

3.6 Pending new permanent arrangements private veterinary Surgeons in GB and abroad will be engaged as casual veterinary staff. Those who are already local veterinary inspectors (LVIs) will undertake work in that capacity.

Identification of overseas government veterinary personnel

3.7 If overseas government veterinary resource is deemed necessary following risk assessment and epidemiological advice, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) will send a formal request to the International Animal Health Emergency Reserve countries. The CVO will also send a formal request to EU Member States if necessary. Induction briefing for incoming veterinary surgeons will be arranged at London HQ through Service Delivery Division. Training will be provided at Local DCCs.

Identification of Regional Operations Directors (RODs) and Divisional Operations Managers (DOMs)

1. 3.8 Members of the Senior Civil Service have been appointed for three years as contingency Regional Operations Directors (RODs) to take up post in the event of an outbreak and lead the LDCCs. They have been allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England. SVS Contingency Planning Division maintains a list of RODs.

2. 3.9 When Amber is declared the Director of the SVS will alert the Head of Veterinary Service for that SVS Region to be on immediate standby to take up post as ROD. A contingency ROD for that region will also be alerted to replace the HVS as soon as possible to lead the LDCC so that the HVS can be transferred to strengthen veterinary management at HQ. Heads of Veterinary Service will debrief and provide a handover to RODs (and DOMs) upon their arrival.

1. 3.10 Grade 6s (or Grade 7s on temporary promotion) have been appointed for three years as contingency Divisional Operations Managers to take up posts in the event of an outbreak and work beside DVMs to manage the administrative (non-veterinary) part of the operation. Like RODs, they have been allocated to one of the three SVS regions in England. Upon confirmation of a case, a DOM for the relevant region will be called upon by SVS CPD to take up post as soon as possible. SVS CPD will maintain a list of DOMs. Similar arrangements are being set up in Scotland and Wales.

2. 3.11 During their period of appointment, the contingency RODs and DOMs will spend 5 days a year training, developing effective links with AHDOs, DVMs and key regional stakeholders and taking part in contingency planning exercises.

Key Administrative, Field & Technical Personnel

1. 3.12 The National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centres (LDCCs) will require access to middle managers who are able to take up key positions immediately on confirmation of disease. Key posts have been identified in the NDCC & LDCCs, together with job descriptions and Day 1 tasks.

2. 3.13 The Director SVS, through HR Resource Centre, Worcester, will maintain a list of Defra staff who have the required skills and experience to take up key positions in the NDCC. These individuals will be called upon as soon as disease is confirmed and are expected to take up post as soon as possible (within 24 hours of request).

3. 3.14 Staff in an AHDO in which an LDCC is being set up, and in the SVS more widely, will be the first to be called upon if FMD is confirmed. They will be expected to take up post as soon as possible while further staff resources are called in.

4. 3.15 Key administrative personnel will be expected to take part in contingency testing exercises. This should be written into their job descriptions and work objectives.

General field, technical and administrative personnel

1. 3.16 The NDCC and LDCCs will require immediate access to general field and administrative staff to support key personnel and veterinary colleagues in the eradication of disease.

2. 3.17 The Director General of Operations and Service Delivery will seek Management Board authority to require the release of staff from Defra and Defra Agencies to work on emergency sites. The Management Board will provide clear direction to Divisions, Agencies and work groups, in order that non-essential staff can volunteer their services and be released quickly. First call will be on those staff on the Defra Emergency Volunteers Register.

3. 3.18 HR Resource Centre, Worcester will co-ordinate action on the redeployment of administrative staff from the Emergency Volunteers Register, and other staff, to the NDCC and to LDCCs. The NDCC Personnel Cell will maintain an overview of numbers, provide terms of appointment for administrative staff in the regions, liaise with DWP and act as a central point, in close liaison with the HR Resource Centre at Worcester, for HR issues both in London and the Regions.

4. 3.19 The HR Resource Centre at Worcester will advise on Human Resource services for LDCCs and will provide one or more HR trained personnel to assist in setting up local HR teams. They will also maintain quality control and provide policy guidance to local managers and HR teams on HR issues. They will also be responsible for liaising with the LDCC personnel points,

monitoring national field-based resources and co-ordinating national veterinary recruitment exercises.

1. 3.20 Additional support staff may need to be drafted in from other government departments. Use of the protocols set out in a central Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Aid and the Redeployment of Human Resources will be triggered if necessary, and the Director General Operations and Service Delivery, through the Permanent Secretary, will contact the Civil Contingencies Secretariat to request assistance with additional staffing. Concurrently, Regional Operations Directors will liaise with Government Office Directors to seek additional assistance in locating further staff.

2. 3.21 Having first sought clearance from the Director General Operations and Service Delivery [or Director SVS], RODs may contact Regional Directors of Jobcentre Plus (Department for Work and Pensions) in order to recruit staff directly on short-term contracts. In this instance, guidance on contractual arrangements should be sought from the personnel cell in the NDCC and the personnel expertise that may be available in the LDCC. The Operational Support Secretariat of Jobcentre Plus (Department of Work and Pensions) may assist in brokering these arrangements and will be invited to send a representative to the NDCC. (See Annex I - Contact List for details).

3. 3.22 Additional technical staff from the following sources will also be considered:

. • Retired SVS technical staff

. • Veterinary students

. • Agricultural students

DEFRA LEGAL SERVICES

1. 3.23 Legal Services Directorate General must be instructed at the start of an outbreak. It is important to have an established system for ensuring the efficient preparation of Declaratory Orders and for the handling of claims for matters such as compensation for slaughtered animals and unintentional damage to premises.

2. 3.24 A Legal Liaison Unit will be immediately established in the NDCC to coordinate actions and evidence gathering between LSDG and the NDCC and the LDCCs. Additionally, a Legal Liaison Officer will be posted in each LDCC. Administrative staff will fill both the NDCC Legal Liaison Unit and the Legal Liaison Officers posts. LSDG will provide lawyers to the NDCC on a rota basis.

3. 3.25 LSDG hold all templates for Orders and must be approached immediately a Declaratory Order is required. Declaratory Orders are required immediately on confirmation of disease and are the means by which restrictions applying in defined areas (for example, a protection zone) are imposed.

VACCINATION TEAMS

Vets and team members responsible for vaccination

3.26 Upon confirmation of disease, the contractor responsible for emergency vaccination will be notified by the Head of SVS CP Division to set its plans in action to establish the required structures and organisation, numbers of vets and team members within the agreed time.

Lay Vaccinators

3.27 To ensure that emergency vaccination can be implemented without delay in any future outbreak, Defra is currently making arrangements, subject to public consultation, for the use of lay vaccinators to be permitted by orders made under the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 and the Medicines Act 1968.

INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS AND OPERATIONAL PARTNERS

1. 3.28 High level involvement of other government departments, executive agencies and stakeholders is defined in Section 6 - the Strategic Level section of this plan. This will be confirmed by the Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) and may change as necessary. The Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will ensure that representatives of other government departments, operational partners and those affected by the disease and measures taken to control it are invited to form part of the NDCC.

2. 3.29 DVMs will engage with local stakeholders as part of their routine emergency-preparedness arrangements and, where possible, include them in the planning and implementation of regular local exercises. DVMs must establish strong links with their local Police Force strategic (Gold) command as this is recognised by all key local agencies as the co-ordination point for emergency response. It is also essential that DVMs have established regular contact with their Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers, Trading Standards Officers and Local Authority Animal Health Inspectors, Environment Agency Emergency Planners, the Government Office Emergencies Team and the Health Protection Agency. All these agencies must know and understand the FMD contingency plans (including relevant sections of SVS instructions and local office contingency plans) and the DVM must have established their capabilities, roles and responsibilities in the event of an outbreak. It is also important that all those that would be affected by an outbreak including representatives of the farming industry, rural businesses, local community groups and those concerned with promoting tourism are engaged and involved, as appropriate, in exercises.

3. 3.30 The regular animal health stakeholder meetings will be upgraded in the event of an outbreak under the chairmanship of the Animal Health Minister [or as necessary by the Chief Veterinary Officer or the Director Animal Health

deputising for him] and meet more frequently. Representatives of key stakeholder organisations from outside the agriculture and the food sectors will be invited to attend in order to embrace wider countryside interests. The possibility of having separate sub-groups to look at particular issues in greater depth (e.g. trade, countryside access, tourism, etc.) will be kept under review, according to the scale of the outbreak.

TRAINING AND EXERCISES

Veterinary training

3.31 All new veterinary entrants to the SVS attend a one-day course on exotic viral diseases at the Institute for Animal Health, Pirbright, in addition to general and specific training related to all their work areas. This includes training in notifiable disease procedures. Selected individuals also attend specific post-graduate training, e.g. in Epidemiology. Courses are held, as required, to ensure adequate numbers of trained people across the country.

Private Sector Veterinary Training

3.32 The current review of Local Veterinary Inspectors (LVIs) is considering the enhanced training of LVIs both in everyday and emergency situations.

AHDO training in key emergency procedures

3.33 DVMs will identify individual Animal Health Divisional Office (AHDO) staff to undertake key emergency roles in line with the job roles outlined in SVS instructions. They will ensure these staff are fully trained and equipped to undertake their respective roles and that their ‘everyday’ objectives include reference to the key responsibilities required.

Induction training

1. 3.34 Managers must ensure that new staff recruited into LDCCs or the NDCC during an outbreak receive induction training covering at least their roles and health and safety procedures. The Director SVS and DVMs will ensure their permanent staff are familiar with this contingency plan, the relevant local office contingency plans, SVS instructions, and business process maps.

2. 3.35 For key personnel, this will centre on the job descriptions within this plan. Desk instructions for key posts will be available in AHDOs. For other individuals recruited to support an LDCC, a brief outline job description must be drafted. Managers must take time to describe the jobholder’s duties, offer support and review the job role regularly. Managers should consider establishing a ‘buddying’ system, whereby new recruits work alongside existing jobholders to learn their job.

3. 3.36 The vaccination contractor will train vets and team members recruited to carry out vaccination in on-farm procedure and bio-security procedures.

Additionally, specialised training in vaccination, tagging and data recording will be provided. All external contractors will be provided with, and will make themselves familiar with, Biosecurity Protocols. All local recruits to vaccination teams must meet, and sign that they comply with, specified criteria including no contact with susceptible livestock for 3 days prior to starting the programme, during the programme and for 3 days after completion.

Media Training

3.37 DVMs/RODs/HsVS should already have received appropriate media training, in order to deal effectively with the intense media interest surrounding an outbreak. If not, a short two day course, organised by Communications Directorate in conjunction with an outside training company, uses broadcast journalists and a film crew to enable participants to deliver professional standard broadcast interviews.

Contingency Planning Exercises

3.38 This plan and the detailed instructions and local plans will be regularly tested at both local and national levels through simulation exercises using the key personnel identified. Operational partners and stakeholders will be involved in these exercises. It is intended that all operational partners and stakeholders should be aware of Defra’s emergency procedures and be fully involved in their on-going development.

HEALTH AND SAFETY AND STAFF WELFARE

1. 3.39 The Defra Departmental Health and Safety Unit (DHSU) and SVS Safety Team are the key safety professionals who must be involved in all aspects of operational planning. They will ensure that all LDCCs have a named safety professional to provide competent advice at all stages of operations; as far as is operationally possible this individual will be located in the LDCC and it is expected that provision will be made for this. DVMs and RODs must ensure that the competent safety person is included as part of their management team.

2. 3.40 The Departmental Health and Safety Manager will operate as part of the Operations Cell in the NDCC, providing health and safety advice at the strategic level.

3. 3.41 The Welfare Service will allocate a Welfare Officer (WO) to deliver the welfare service to each LDCC and HQ offices. The Chief Welfare Officer will keep in close contact with the NDCC to provide strategic welfare advice and guidance to the Deputy Director of the NDCC. The Counselling Support Service will be made available 24 hours daily (including weekends). All staff must be made aware of Defra’s Welfare Service which can provide support and guidance in individual cases of stress or hardship. RODs must ensure that Managers are aware of the potential for stress and must take

appropriate action, including referral to counselling and professional support.

1. 3.42 A strategic health and safety plan in support of these arrangements has been produced by Defra and is detailed in Annex N of this document. All relevant personnel must follow these arrangements. A strategic Welfare Service Plan is attached at Annex O.

2. 3.43 As part of the management of the vaccination operation the contractor will establish a Health and Safety Team. This will consist of a Manager and 2 other trained H&S consultants. This team will produce risk assessments for pre-vaccination visits by vets, for farm vaccinators, on handling facilities and maintain the necessary documentation to accompany this. The contractor will comply with best practice and all relevant provisions, whether statutory or otherwise, relating to health and safety at work.

ACCOMMODATION

Access to accommodation, IT and telephony infrastructure

1. 3.44 DVMs will identify and regularly review the availability of potential LDCC sites in liaison with ESS Division. ESSD has in place Facilities Management Contracts covering all of England and Wales through which temporary and other accommodation can be provided. DVMs should also maintain details of suppliers and contractors of temporary accommodation.

2. 3.45 Additionally, a range of suitable sites are currently being investigated for use as vaccination centres. In doing so, consideration will be given to the following factors:

. • good road access to the target area(s) and to any satellite centres - where possible, within the target area;

. • appropriate security systems (day and night);

. • parking;
• office accommodation for management and administrative staff;

. • appropriate IT and telecoms facilities;

. • secure refrigerated storage facilities for vaccine;

. • storage facilities for equipment (vaccination kits, personal protection equipment, footbaths, buckets, tagging and inspection equipment, etc.;

. • facilities for mixing, storage and safe disposal of disinfectant;

. • suitable area for plunge disinfection of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and subsequent drying;

. • suitable area for vaccination team dispatch.

1. 3.46 Modular office accommodation will also be made available, depending in circumstances, on a call off basis for use as vaccination centres if required. It is envisaged that each vaccination centre will be accompanied by smaller satellite centres that will exist on a smaller scale.

2. 3.47 The National Disease Control Centre will be in London. A room in Defra’s building at 1A Page Street is equipped with the necessary facilities needed to establish the control centre immediately an outbreak is confirmed. However, it is realised that in the event of a rapid escalation of an outbreak it would be necessary to have access to more space. In this event, ESSD could relocate the NDCC to the 7^th and 8^th floors as they have the requisite infrastructure in place. ESSD will therefore be kept fully informed of the likely escalation of the disease in order that they can enact plans for the relocation of staff and the provision of adequate office space, desks, telephones etc.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & DATA SYSTEMS

3.48 The provision of IT hardware and corporate software (Defra EDEN) is the responsibility of Information Technology Directorate (ITD). Additional hardware and software can be quickly supplied through arrangements with Defra’s IT partners. ITD also has detailed plans to ensure IT resilience and Business Continuity.

Disease Control System (DCS)

1. 3.49 The FMD Disease Control System (DCS) is the key Management Information System to be used in the event of an outbreak. It provides the system for recording all actions taken to control the disease in relation to each premises affected and for providing reports on the progress of the disease and its management. DVMs will ensure that all their AHDO staff are familiar with the functionality of DCS, requesting additional staff training from SVS Learning and Development Unit as appropriate.

2. 3.50 Preventative contingency measures for system failure of FMD DCS are in place at the national level. These include the use of a cluster server which enables mirroring between two web servers and databases. This will ensure that should one fail, the second will take over. In addition, the back up routine that is in place means that the risk of data loss in cases of total failure is minimal.

3. 3.51 A system for the tracing of animals - VTVS, updated and enhanced during the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth disease to take account of vehicle and personnel movements, is used for tracings required on a day to day basis. A project to review further tracings work has been initiated, with a view to encompassing both endemic and exotic diseases.

4. 3.52 An improved Exotic Disease Control System (ExDCS), that will enable the task of dealing with any serious animal disease outbreak to be undertaken as efficiently as possible and which will support procedures to assist the veterinary surveillance team in proactive measures, is being developed with the intention that it will be delivered in 2005.

5. 3.53 The goal of the ExDCS project is to create a system to collect, collate and validate animal disease data. The system will facilitate the process of exotic notifiable disease management and control, provide reliable

management information to users at all levels and inform Government policy on animal health and welfare. The system is being designed to deal with more than one concurrent disease and it is expected that elements of it will also be used during peacetime to enable system familiarity to be retained.

3.54 The ExDCS project aims to interface with other Defra projects currently under development ensuring reliable and non-duplication of data.

Financial System

1. 3.55 A project team is developing a generic financial system which will ensure that financial information is collected in the most efficient manner to meet accountancy requirements and the requirements of auditors. This system will be operational during ‘peacetime’, therefore ensuring staff familiarity, with the facility to ramp-up during an emergency. An interim facility is now, Spring 2004, being put in place and in the event of an outbreak could be brought into use with the new system being developed thereafter.

2. 3.56 The new system will be part of the Defra Corporate Finance System and will be installed in all AHDOs to be used in peace time for normal business.

PROCUREMENT

General - Procurement and Commercial Contracting Contingency Plan

1. 3.57 Detailed instructions and guidance on procurement and commercial contracting covering the acquisition of goods, works and services; and the role of the Procurement and Contracts Division (PCD) can be found in the PCD Contingency Plan which is available on-line for internal use.

2. 3.58 PCD are responsible for ensuring that robust, value for money contracts are let and mobilised for goods, services and works requirements including their contract management and forensic examination.

3. 3.59 The PCD contingency plan provides contact details for all nominated PCD personnel. The Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division will notify the Director of Purchasing and Supply if alert state AMBER is declared so that the appropriate resources can be placed on standby. Sources of supply for these procurement personnel have been identified by PCD and these resources can be called upon in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak or other emergency situation.

4. 3.60 The PCD contingency plan sets out the procurement resources that will be mobilised at tactical level to form Procurement Emergency Response Teams (PERT) under the direction of Defra’s Director of Purchasing and Supply or his/her nominated representatives. PCD will provide a procurement cell in the NDCC.

5. 3.61 PCD will ensure that best practice guidance is available to AHDOs and LDCCs covering the requirements from the period from confirmation of the outbreak until the PERT team arrives, including the triggering of contingency contracts; authorisation and use of emergency purchase orders and procurement cards; and contract management and letting.

6. 3.62 Within 72 hours of confirmation PCD will provide a PERT team in an LDCC to manage the procurement and commercial activities for that office. The PERT team is likely to include a Commercial/Procurement Manager, Contracts Manager, Purchasing Manager, Quantity/Claims Surveyor and Field Manager. The exact compilation and size of the PERT team will be governed by the extent of the outbreak and the requirement to ensure that contracted services are provided, monitored and properly accounted. If requested by the LDCC, Field Store Managers will be provided by PCD to enable the release of the existing store manager for other duties. Forensic accountants and surveyors will be engaged prior to receipt and approval of supplier/contractor invoices and will be responsible for the certification, verification and evaluation of these invoices.

7. 3.63 All contracts and commercial arrangements put in place after declaration of an emergency situation will be let in accordance with delegated authorities determined by Defra’s Director of Finance in consultation with Defra’s Director of Purchasing and Supply.

National/Regional/Local Contingency Agreements and Supply Contingency Arrangements

1. 3.64 PCD and AHDOs will put in place national/regional/local contingency agreements and supply contingency arrangements to meet all foreseeable requirements of an emergency. These suppliers will be vetted and subjected to regular review and appraisal by PCD to ensure their validity in the event of an outbreak.

2. 3.65 These agreements and arrangements will be comprehensive in coverage of all the relevant supply chains and include slaughter and disposal, shepherds and gatherers and ancillary equipment; carcase pick-up; preliminary C&D including detoxification and mobile detoxification units; slurry treatment, management and disposal; lagoon and environmental protection measures; electrical works and technical services associated with discrete supply chains; e.g. dairy engineers. A list of agreements and contingency supply arrangements is available on-line for internal use.

3. 3.66 Supplementary lists of preferred and vetted suppliers for use in an emergency situation are available for internal use. These suppliers are a back-up to the contingency agreements already in place and are likely to be engaged where a notifiable disease cannot be confined either in number of outbreaks or geographically. The PERT team will be responsible for putting robust contracts in place with these suppliers should the extent of the outbreak require additional supply.

4. 3.67 For each AHDO a list of transport companies is provided indicating the number and type of vehicles that the companies have available for immediate use together with the companies’ ability to scale up supply within defined timescales.

5. 3.68 Details of agreements made and preferred vetted suppliers available to AHDOs is on the PCD webpage for internal use. DVMs should liaise closely with PCD to ensure timely, scaleable and appropriate supply arrangements in the event of a notifiable disease outbreak. PCD emergency contacts and their details are available for internal use.

FINANCIAL CONTROL

1. 3.69 NDCC Head of FMD Finance will ensure close communication between FMD Finance, Defra’s Finance Director and Finance, Planning and Resources Directorate (FPRD) and, if a claim for Reserve funding has proved unavoidable, HM Treasury. There will be regular meetings of all appropriate members of FMD Finance, FPRD and Procurement and Contracts Division (PCD). These meetings are the forum to raise issues (e.g.- Overpayments, VAT) which require financial policy and procedural advice.

2. 3.70 On confirmation of an outbreak, Head of FMD Finance will submit a request for funding to HM Treasury via FPRD and the Finance Director. Both the Finance Director and, if a claim for Reserve funding has proved unavoidable, HM Treasury will be provided with a financial report on actual expenditure incurred on a regular basis.

3. 3.71 During an outbreak, there will be initial meetings with the National Audit Office, EU Auditors and Defra auditors to:

a) inform them of the role and responsibilities of the teams involved in the eradication process;

b) explain the approach to tackle the emergency situation.

3.72 FMD Finance is responsible for providing regular reports to the auditors on actual expenditure incurred during the outbreak and for responding to audit reports as appropriate, submitting EU claims for reimbursement of costs (in accordance with the EU Regulations) and communicating with EU auditors as and when required.

Arrangements for Financial Control in NDCC

3.73 NDCC Head of FMD Finance will be appointed by the Defra Finance Director immediately following confirmation of disease to be responsible for establishing the FMD Finance Team in the NDCC and for the provision of a contingency regional Finance Manager to each LDCC. They will also be responsible for issuing guidance, in accordance with departmental policy, on accounting policies, financial databases, audit trails, desk instructions and checklists on financial controls including:

. • Roles and responsibilities of Finance Managers (LDCC and NDCC) - and reporting responsibilities which are set out in SVS instructions;

. • Authorisation levels for payments, delegations, management checking, write-off, over payment procedures in accordance with the department’s Finance Manual and Government Accounting;

. • Policy on the retention of records;

. • Chart of accounts, cost centre codes and objective codes;

. • Fraud guidelines in accordance with the department’s policy including the process of dealing with allegations of fraud;

. • Budgeting, estimates and the monitoring of expenditure;

. • Liaison with the National Audit Office (NAO), European Union (EU) and internal auditors;

. • Liaison with the Procurement Team;

. • Liaison with Defra’s Accountancy Services Division (ASD) and Director of Finance and HM Treasury;

. • Provision of regular financial information.

Arrangements for Financial Control in LDCCs

1. 3.74 Contingency regional Finance Managers have been appointed. Finance Managers, like RODs and DOMs, are appointed for a period of 3 years, ready to take up post as soon as possible in an outbreak. They are allocated on a regional basis, currently the Government Offices.

2. 3.75 Contingency Regional Finance Managers will be responsible for managing all financial activity in the LDCC and for providing financial advice to the Regional Operations Director (ROD) and Divisional Operations Manager (DOM), in accordance with departmental policy, on accounting policies, financial databases, audit trails, desk instructions and checklists on financial controls including:

. • Authorising certified contractor invoices for payment;

. • Ensuring suitable records are maintained relating to all financial transactions;

. • Authorising travel & subsistence claims, accommodation costs, other requests for re-imbursement of staff costs and TVI fees;

. • Arranging financial procedures training of finance staff and managers within LDCC;

. • Initial Scrutiny of Compensation Claims for slaughter and for items seized and destroyed.

3.76 Within the LDCC, Contingency Regional Finance Managers will report to the ROD.

EQUIPMENT AND STORES

National minimum stocking levels

3.77 No formal contingency stocks are kept at a national level. An exercise to put in place a robust system of ‘re-supply at short notice’ for field stores and equipment, in times of emergencies, is currently underway.

Divisional minimum stocking levels

1. 3.78 Guidelines on divisional stocking levels may be found in Chapter 3.

2. 3.79 At the local level, each AHDO is required to hold or have immediate access to sufficient equipment to deal with up to 10 disease outbreaks in the first 48 hours, including provision for equipping up to 20 additional Veterinary Inspectors. Stock levels are managed by designated local staff, who have day to day responsibility for monitoring availability and serviceability of stores. They will be responsible for using the generic stock control database, once it has been rolled out.

Stores to supply vaccination teams

3.80 Stores of equipment to supply vaccination teams and vaccination centres are currently maintained equally between two sites. At present, there is enough equipment to supply 50 vaccination teams (each consisting of a 1 vaccinator, 1 ear tag reader/tagger and 1 ear tag recorder) - the initial number of teams required to be provided by the contractor under the terms of the present contract with provision for this number to be ramped up depending on circumstances. Call-off contracts are in place to obtain additional equipment

(e.g. additional vaccine guns and needles). This equipment will be subject to quality control checks in accordance with a quality management protocol by stores managers.

1. 3.81 Call off contracts for mobile cattle/sheep/pig handling facilities are currently being put in place.

2. 3.82 Upon the establishment of vaccination centre(s) Defra will arrange for sufficient equipment to be dispatched to the vaccination centre for use.

EMERGENCY VACCINATION

Introduction

4.1 There are various drivers which will contribute towards the decision on whether to adopt an emergency vaccination strategy against FMD, and if so whether the animals should subsequently be killed or not. The Government’s preferred approach is that emergency vaccination should be on the basis of ‘vaccinate to live’ wherever possible. The full range of options and the factors that the Government will take into consideration in the event of a future outbreak are contained in full in the Decision Tree. This covers the consideration to be given to rare breeds and zoo animals.

Current operational arrangements

4.2 Since 2001, ADAS has been retained to provide operational support for emergency FMD vaccination (vets and vaccination teams working under State Veterinary Service direction). Defra is now letting a formal contract to cover this operation. The following arrangements therefore provide an interim framework for implementation.

Timing

1. 4.3 The vaccination contractor is required to be operationally capable of vaccinating on day 5 of an outbreak with 25 vets and sufficient trained vaccinators and support staff for 50 teams. Working under the overall control of the SVS, the role of these vets will be to conduct pre-vaccination farm visits, to check for any overt signs of disease, and also to be responsible for the veterinary direction of vaccination teams in the field. As emergency vaccination is to be considered as an option from the start of any future FMD outbreak, the vaccination contractor will be placed on standby by the Head of SVS CPD as soon as disease is confirmed. The particular strain of the FMD virus would need to be identified and the vaccine would need to be formulated before vaccination could begin.

2. 4.4 Veterinary advice to Ministers will be based on epidemiological evidence and it is unlikely to be immediately available. It is probable that gathering epidemiological data, veterinary assessment of this epidemiological data, the use of the Decision Tree and the development of advice on the strategic deployment of vaccination make it unlikely that vaccination could begin until more than five days after the first confirmed case.

Operational Process

4.5 This is set out in full at Annex E.

ANIMAL WELFARE

1. 4.6 The needs of animals and their welfare will be given early consideration in the event of a disease outbreak or emergency.

2. 4.7 Consideration will be given to setting up, at the earliest opportunity, an animal welfare forum, chaired by a Minister, with representatives of the RSPCA, Compassion in World Farming and the Humane Slaughter Association. This forum should also include those responsible for welfare activities ie British Veterinary Association, NFU. This forum would enable points of specific welfare concern to be brought readily and quickly to Ministers’ attention and enable Ministers to explain the implications for welfare of their disease control policies.

3. 4.8 Provisions for ensuring the welfare of animals on-farm, at slaughter, at markets or in transit (at the time of movement controls being imposed) are detailed in SVS Instructions Chapters 31-34. Slaughter or killing must be carried out in accordance with the Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995 (Chapter 31 refers). Provisions for emergency slaughter on farm in cases of poor welfare are detailed in SVS Instructions, Chapter 32.G. Procedures for slaughter/killing for disease control purposes are detailed in SVS Instructions Chapter 3 Section L.

4. 4.9 Animal Movement Licensing Unit hold suitable licence templates for the movement of animals and instructions for their issue and use if movement restrictions are imposed. Animal Welfare Policy Division holds copies of advice to stock-keepers to assist them in maintaining welfare if movement restrictions are imposed.

1. 4.10 The first and most basic level of contingency planning is for the farmers themselves to anticipate and avoid problems. Guidance would be issued by Defra to farmers in advance of, or in the early stages of, movement restrictions being put in place. Once the restrictions start to affect the welfare of animals and problems arise which cannot be alleviated by management or husbandry practices, farmers will be given the opportunity to move their animals off their holdings, if disease control measures allow. Such movements will be licensed and will include movement to slaughter for the food chain. If livestock is unable to be moved and the lack of feed becomes a problem Defra will assist in the establishment and running of a national fodder brokering service to facilitate access to fodder.

2. 4.11 Finally and as a last resort, and if all other measures fail to keep animals alive and to an acceptable welfare standard, Defra will arrange the slaughter and disposal of animals. Slaughter would take, as far as practicable, on farms rather than in abattoirs. However, we recognise that slaughter in abattoirs might need to be arranged. These practical details will

be explored in consultation with stakeholders. Moreover, there would be no compensation paid to farmers for animals slaughtered under the scheme. This is in line with the policy set out in the Government’s response to the FMD Inquiries (November 2002). This states that “experience has shown that payments to farmers under such schemes can provide a disincentive for them to take responsibility for looking after their animals, and may also create a false market”.

4.12 The Head of Livestock Strategy Division in consultation with the Heads of Animal Welfare Policy Division and Animal Welfare Veterinary Division is drawing up a contingency plan for such measures and will be consulting stakeholders.

CONSERVATION OF “FARM ANIMAL GENETIC RESOURCES”

4.13 Under the EU FMD Directive special measures can be applied for the conservation of “farm animal genetic resources” on premises that are identified in advance, in the event of an FMD outbreak. There are agreed definitions for such groups of animals and a registration process is currently being developed, which will be publicised on the Defra website. Providing the highest levels of biosecurity are implemented to prevent the spread of disease, premises holding the registered breeding nucleus may then qualify for derogations from killing all susceptible animals if the premises becomes infected, and emergency vaccination.

VALUATION

1. 4.14 A list of valuers has been approved to undertake livestock valuations on behalf of Defra. This list is maintained by the SVS and reviewed annually. Each valuer has been sent instructions for carrying out valuations. In the event of an outbreak of FMD, Defra will notify these valuers of the outbreak and provide the latest version of Defra’s instructions for carrying out valuations.

2. 4.15 LDCCs will contact individual valuers on the list as necessary to deal with each premises where compulsory slaughter is to take place. No other valuers will be used.

3. 4.16 In the event of an animal disease outbreak, Animal Movements and Exotic Disease Division will call upon the services of the four Monitor Valuers who have been appointed (these appointments will be reviewed regularly, at least every 3 years). Initially the Monitor Valuers will attend Defra offices in London to advise on further instructions and guidance to issue to valuers (reflecting species affected, area etc.) to try to ensure uniformity in valuations and fairness to both livestock owners and taxpayers. Depending on the extent of the outbreak the Monitor Valuers could be situated in London or in/near LDCCs.

4. 4.17 A review of all the animal disease compensation arrangements is being undertaken with a view to rationalisation and simplification. Part of this

process will be to look at the case for compulsory standard valuations. This would remove the need for individual valuation in many or most cases. Such a system would help speed up the slaughtering process and would ensure a greater degree of uniformity in animal valuation.

PROTECTION AND SURVEILLANCE ZONES

4.18 A Protection Zone will be imposed with a minimum radius of 3km around the Infected Premises and a Surveillance Zone with a minimum radius of 10km. In the Protection Zone no animal movements will be allowed except for emergency slaughter. In both the Protection and Surveillance Zones, there will be requirements for increased levels of biosecurity on farms, cleansing and disinfection (C&D) of vehicles, people and machinery moving on/off farms. Movement of animals, animal products, feed and bedding will be prohibited, except under licence. Products from animals in these zones will be subject to treatment to ensure destruction of the FMD virus.

IMMEDIATE BAN ON MOVING LIVESTOCK

1. 4.19 All livestock movements from any farm premises are prohibited once disease has been confirmed. Movements within farm premises (e.g. from field to field) may continue to take place. This will apply nationally if the disease is FMD but will only apply within the Infected Area for other notifiable diseases.

2. 4.20 These restrictions will continue to apply until the risk of spreading disease has been minimised. The movement of infected livestock is by far the most efficient way to spread disease.

3. 4.21 Livestock in transit at the time disease is confirmed will be allowed to continue to its destination or to return to the premises of departure. Stock at markets, collecting centres and assembly centres should remain there for up to 21 days, unless their owner or new owner wishes to send them to slaughter (once the abattoirs are operating) or move them back to the premises from which they were consigned there. Premises which receive/take live animals (excluding abattoirs) in these circumstances would be subject to restrictions for at least 21 days.

4. 4.22 With time certain types of movements will be permitted subject to certain pre-conditions. The first movement is likely to be movements of livestock to slaughterhouses and the pre-condition attached will depend upon the type of restrictions the premises or area are under. It will be some considerable time before movements of livestock to other farms will be permitted especially if the recipient farm has resident livestock. Likewise it will be some considerable time before movements of livestock to other livestock markets or shows will be permitted.

5. 4.23 In a few circumstances it may be necessary to move livestock in an emergency situation e.g. stock found on a public road because a fence was damaged or gate left open; livestock on a flood plain when the river is rising;

emergency veterinary treatment etc. These exceptional circumstances will be dealt with on a case by case basis taking into consideration the welfare and safe being of the livestock concerned.

BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE

1. 4.24 Anyone coming into contact with livestock or their waste runs the risk of spreading animal diseases. Biosecurity is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving a livestock premises. It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent potential disease causing agents being spread from one premises to another.

2. 4.25 Biosecurity guidance to prevent the spread of animal diseases has been developed to reflect the provisions of the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002). This guide, for anyone who comes into contact with animals, can be found at Annex P of this Plan and on the Defra website at:

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/biosecurity/farmguidance/biosecurity_guidan ce.pdf

DISPOSAL

Disposal Hierarchy

4.26 The current disposal hierarchy has changed from the guidelines originally issued by the Department of Health (published 24/04/2001) and is as follows:

1. 1. Commercial fixed plant incineration

2. 2. Rendering

3. 3. Licensed commercial landfill (may need direction from the Secretary of State)

1. 4.27 Decisions on disposal options to be used in the event of a disease outbreak will take into account assessments of risks from TSEs and the latest SEAC guidance at the time; advice from the Department of Health; and an assessment of the potential impact on the environment.

2. 4.28 A number of strategies, such as emergency vaccination, are now in place which could reduce the numbers of animals to be disposed of in any future outbreak and this should mean that these three disposal routes would be sufficient. Although mass pyres will not be used in the future, the use of alternative methods of disposal routes such as on-farm pyres and on-farm or mass burial cannot be completely ruled out if demand exceeds the capacity of the preferred options of incineration/rendering and licensed commercial landfill. Any decisions to utilise these disposal routes will be taken in consultation with key stakeholders and appropriate environmental and public health assessments will be made at each disposal location.

3. 4.29 Defra recognises that there are a number of factors that may impact on the disposal hierarchy in the future. These include the implementation of possible new environmental or waste management legislation and changes to capacity and accessibility of the disposal outlets. The hierarchy will be regularly reviewed, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, to take account of these issues. New technologies and facilities will also be reviewed on a regular basis.

Incineration

1. 4.30 Agreement in principle has been obtained with nine animal incinerator operators in England, Scotland and Wales, to dispose of FMD carcases. Defra intends to review this list and will establish a preferred supplier listing which will be subject to an annual review.

2. 4.31 Incineration capacity is limited and will only be able to deal with small isolated outbreaks for the first few days of a new outbreak or disease recrudescence.

3. 4.32 As soon as a decision to slaughter has been taken, or where slaughter is likely, the DVM or LDCC Disposals Manager will, in consultation with the SVS Contingency Planning Division, the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) , the Regulated Incinerator Operators (RIO), Animal Handling facilities Ltd. (AHF) and the national transport logistics manager, arrange disposal of the carcases. The DVM responsible for the disposal site will be informed, as will other key stakeholders.

4. 4.33 DVMs will liase with the relevant local authorities and EA (or SEPA) to agree access arrangements and monitoring requirements.

Rendering

1. 4.34 A call-off agreement with a major rendering company has been agreed to ensure a minimum lead-in time should there be an outbreak of disease. Additional capacity will be arranged in the event of a major outbreak, in consultation with the United Kingdom Renderers Association (UKRA) and the RPA. Total weekly capacity in the order of 20,000 tonnes per week could be made available. Transport will be provided separately through regional contracts with hauliers, renderers and the knacker industry.

2. 4.35 Local AHDOs will ensure that they are aware which rendering facilities are available to them in the event of an animal disease outbreak. In the event of rendering capacity being required, the DVM or LDCC Disposals Manager will, in consultation with the SVS Contingency Planning Division, the Rural Payments Agency (RPA) and the national transport logistics manager, arrange disposal of the carcases. The DVM responsible for the disposal site will be informed as will the EA (or SEPA) and other key stakeholders.

3. 4.36 DVMs will liase with the relevant local authorities and EA (or SEPA) to agree access arrangements and monitoring requirements.

Licensed Commercial Landfill sites

1. 4.37 If incineration and rendering capacity has been exhausted, it may be necessary to consider the use of licensed landfill.

2. 4.38 The implementation of the Landfill Directive is likely to impact on the use of licensed landfill from July 2004 and may limit the number of suitable landfill sites for carcase disposal. The EU Animal By-Products regulation, already implemented, has also had an impact on the use of licensed landfill. Defra is currently drafting, in consultation with the EA, SEPA, ESA and devolved administrations, structured agreements and national operational protocols for the use of licensed landfill sites. The Secretary of State and Welsh and Scottish Ministers may seek powers of direction for the use of commercial landfill sites in the event of an emergency.

3. 4.39 DVMs will ensure they are aware which licensed landfill facilities are available to them during an animal disease outbreak and liase with EA (or SEPA) and local authorities to discuss access arrangements and monitoring requirements.

On-Farm Burial

4.40 If incineration and rendering capacity has been exhausted and licensed landfill capacity is limited, it may be necessary to consider on-farm burial. In this event Defra will consult with EA (or SEPA) to ensure that no burial is undertaken until an appropriate risk assessment has been completed and prior written authorisation from the EA (or SEPA) has been obtained. All burials would be undertaken in accordance with the relevant EU and national regulations so as to minimise the risk of environmental and public health impact.

Pyre Burning

4.41 Pyre burning would not normally be considered until the use of Air Curtain Burners had also been considered and then only in exceptional circumstances. If it is decided that pyre burning has to be utilised on a limited basis, Defra will follow the guidelines developed by the Department of Health in 2001 together with the SVS instructions. In preparing for pyre burning, Defra will consult with local authorities, the Health Protection Agency and EA (or SEPA) and ensure that any burning is undertaken in accordance with the relevant EU and national regulations so as to minimise the risk of environmental and public health impact. Advice on air quality issues would be obtained from the local authority in the case of pyres and the EA (or SEPA) in the case of Air Curtain Burners.

Transport

4.42 A series of centrally negotiated transport call-off agreements are in place with a number of specialist local, regional and national haulage companies. PERT advisers, in consultation with the HQ disposal team, the local DVM and LDCC disposal manager will identify and procure appropriate transport for carcase disposal. The duty officer will initially deal with requests for transport. On confirmation of an outbreak, a national transport logistics manager will be appointed, supported by a regional transport manager(s). The transport logistics manager(s) will take over responsibility for all transport logistics and tasking from the local DVM, although transport will continue to be procured locally.

SEROLOGY

Serology capacity - Surveillance

1. 4.43 Serological surveillance may be carried out for a number of reasons, such as epidemiology, but its main use is likely to be as part of the surveillance of protection and surveillance zones following an outbreak, prior to declaring them free from disease. Serology surveillance in support of lifting restrictions should not commence until at least 21 days following preliminary cleansing and disinfection of an infected premises.

2. 4.44 IAH Pirbright offers an immediate serology capacity of up to 8,000 samples per week. Defra has an agreement with the Veterinary Laboratories Agency (VLA) that they will provide serological testing capacity for FMD on a contingency basis of 120,000 samples per week at three laboratories. The first laboratory would be ready to start testing within 3 weeks with an initial capacity of 7,000 tests, 20,000 tests in the second week and reaching full capacity of 40,000 in the third week. The second laboratory would be operational within 6 weeks and a third laboratory within 8 weeks with the same capacity build up. Full capacity of 120,000 tests per week would be reached by the 10^th week.

3. 4.45 The Institute for Animal Health (IAH) Pirbright provides the diagnostic testing service for FMD. It also carries out additional tests (i.e. VNT) on positive or inconclusive serology samples submitted by VLA.

4. 4.46 Personnel required to undertake blood sampling will be recruited and trained under the co-ordination of Human Resources Services Division. Personnel could be drawn from veterinary/agricultural students and from local Job Centres.

5. 4.47 In a vaccination zone surveillance will be carried out, after a minimum of 30 days have elapsed since vaccination was completed, to establish whether any vaccinated herd or flock has become infected with virus.

Transport of samples

4.48 DVMs will ensure they have access to the best means of transporting blood samples during an animal disease outbreak as set out in SVS operational instructions.

RURAL STRESS ACTION PLAN WORKING GROUP

4.49 The Department recognises that any future outbreak may result in significant social, economic and personal emotional impact, affecting farmers, other rural business-people and residents, and Defra staff and contractors. These issues will be addressed through consultation with the Rural Stress Action Plan (RSAP) Working Group (see para. 4.51), and the Group will be represented on Defra’s FMD Contingency Planning Stakeholder Group. Steps will be taken to ensure that:

. • Contingency Plans are drawn up to include the ‘human dimension’ of an outbreak;

. • Provision is made for appropriate feedback and consultation during an outbreak to address issues that arise, including arrangements for information to be communicated on a daily basis by an appropriate Defra official (Head of Rural Communities Division) to a representative of the RSAP WG;

. • The issues of de-briefing and aftercare, relevant both to the individuals affected and to the staff involved in measures taken to control an outbreak are addressed.

1. 4.50 Contacts will be made via the RSAP Working Group with support organisations at a local level and issues such as referral procedures, confidentiality and debriefing for staff addressed.

2. 4.51 The Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group brings together, under Defra’s chairmanship, representatives of organisations that make an important contribution to the rural support sector, namely the Rural Stress Information Network (RSIN), Royal Agricultural Benevolent Institution, (RABI) Farm Crisis Network (FCN), Arthur Rank Centre (ARC), Samaritans, Citizens Advice Bureaux (CAB), National Farmers’ Union (NFU), Tenant Farmers’ Association (TFA), Country Land and Business Association (CLA), Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), Institute for Rural Health (IRH) and Department of Health (DoH).

3. 4.52 Organisations represented on the Working Group, with others, also form partnerships at the regional and local level to address the needs of the rural community including supporting those in distress. County - based support “groups” are facilitated by RSIN and FCN, whose organisations and volunteer members provide information, signposting and, in some cases, telephone helplines. The groups draw on the expertise of the wider partnerships that the network fosters, and there are various “entry points” for enquiries and assistance. Initial contact with these local partnerships should

be made via the RSAP Working Group, but once contact has been established, local Defra staff should be encouraged to deal with them direct.

4.53 Farming Help is the banner under which RSIN, RABI, FCN and Samaritans promote confidential help for all in the farming community, and contact with any of these via the national telephone numbers will offer callers a wide range of guidance, assistance and support.

http://www.farminghelp.org.uk/

4.54 Farmers and others in the rural community are increasingly aware of the support network, and those Defra staff likely to deal directly with farmers have access to guidance on how to respond to cases of stress they encounter, including advice on how to make referrals to specialist agencies. This is set out in RDS’s Rural Support Operational Guidance (link at http://omega/operations/ruralsupport/default.htm) , part of which is designed to increase awareness of the role of national and local rural support networks.

CLEANSING AND DISINFECTION OF AFFECTED PREMISES

1. 4.55 Government funding of secondary cleansing and disinfection will be subject to review and separate consultation as part of the consideration of the future funding of disease control measures. Preliminary cleansing and disinfection will remain the responsibility of Defra, and will be charged to Defra. When carrying out cleansing and disinfection, disinfectants used must be approved by Defra for this purpose and must be used according to manufacturer’s instructions.

2. 4.56 Detailed guidance on the procedures for cleansing and disinfecting affected premises is available at SVS Instructions Chapter 3, Section N. The EA or SEPA must be consulted before any disposal of disinfectant or seized material is considered. All disposals will be subject to a prior risk assessment and will be undertaken in accordance with EU and national regulations and guidance.

RODENT CONTROL

4.57 Rodent Control will be carried out on infected premises, on behalf of Defra, until the disease risk from rodents has been minimised (e.g. carcases and potentially infected feed have been removed during preliminary Cleansing and Disinfection procedures). This control will be by the National Wildlife Management Team (NWMT) and will be co-ordinated nationally with staff operating within, and reporting to, the Biosecurity Unit of the LDCCs. Thereafter responsibility for rodent control will revert to the owner or occupier of the infected place.

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION AND DISEASE CONTROL INFORMATION

1. 5.1 DVMs will ensure that appropriate staff are familiar with the Management Information reports of the Disease Control System (DCS). This will ensure the accurate and timely collation of statistical information for circulation to the NDCC and within the LDCC itself.

2. 5.2 RODs are required to submit daily situation reports (Sitreps) to the NDCC Operations cell. NDCC Operations will then circulate the reports to colleagues as appropriate in order that they may be drawn upon to inform the daily NDCC Report. These are required by 1800 hours. The sitrep format can be found at Annex M. The NDCC will collate information from the RODs, from DCS and other appropriate sources to produce a daily evening report on the disease and its management and control, for Ministers, the Civil Contingencies Committee and senior officials.

3. 5.3 It is essential that the collection and processing of data within the NDCC and LDCC spheres of command is done without delay. The supply of accurate management information to the tactical and strategic command levels is of critical importance. All personnel involved with the collection, collation and processing of this information should be made aware of this and understand its importance.

4. 5.4 Case Officers must be deployed to ensure that the data required by the strategic and tactical levels is captured on-farm as soon as is practicable. The outline requirements for this are as follows:

-Animals slaughtered;

-Performance against 24 hour slaughter target (if farm is IP);

-Animals disposed;

-Disposal route;

-Cleansing and Disinfection - when primary C&D complete.

COMMUNICATIONS

Media -also Annex J

5.5 News releases will be co-ordinated through Communications Directorate. Defra Press Office will take all national media inquiries, organise press briefings and interviews with Ministers, vets and officials. A briefing, by relevant veterinary experts, specifically on emergency vaccination will be held for the media within two days of a confirmed outbreak, outlining the factual background on vaccination, how decisions would be taken on the issue and the factors involved. This is aimed at meeting the inevitable high profile the issue would have. Key stakeholders will receive the same briefing and will be requested to cascade this information within their own groups. If a central governmental response is initiated, the NCC will take the lead, working closely with Defra and other departments with a shared interest e.g. Environment Agency and Department of Culture, Media and Sport. The Government News Network will do likewise in the regions.

5.6 DVMs/RODs will work with their local Government News Network (GNN) representative to ensure that accurate and timely briefings are given to the media and stakeholders.

Website

1. 5.7 Defra’s FMD website is a key source of information in the event of an outbreak of disease. Outline pages are being prepared in advance so that an information site can be established as soon as possible in an outbreak. This is the responsibility of Animal Health and Welfare Planning Division working in co-operation with the Head of News Media in Communications Directorate.

2. 5.8 The site will include:

. • A full list of Infected Premises (IPs) updated daily. This will not include Dangerous Contact premises (DCs) or premises slaughtered on suspicion of disease (SOS) for data protection reasons.

. • Full details of Infected Areas and Surveillance Zones including interactive maps.

. • Full details of disease control measures and restrictions.

. • Updated information on emergency vaccination.

. • Advice to farmers, local authorities, and other rural stakeholders.

. • Advice on rural activities.

. • Links to relevant websites (e.g. other Government departments and Agencies, Meat and Livestock Commission, English Nature, National Farmers Union, Open Britain and Local Authorities).

Helplines

5.9 The Defra General Helpline 08459 335577 will be prepared for intense public interest, by providing additional staff resources, establishing supplementary helplines and providing adequate briefing.

Central Co-ordination

5.10 The Emergency Management Board meeting chaired by Defra’s Permanent Secretary on Day 1 will consider the need to engage CCC. A representative from the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat should attend this meeting to advise on Government-wide co-ordination. If CCC is engaged, it will need to consider whether to activate the News Coordination Centre (NCC), to co-ordinate communications between Government departments and agencies. This will depend on an assessment of the scale and possible course of the outbreak and the extent of involvement of other Departments. Defra will immediately establish a multi disciplinary communications team as part of the NDCC, this will work closely with the NCC if established.

5.11 The CCS, in conjunction with OD Sec will provide accommodation capable of housing a 24/7 operation in support of the CCC. Units may include a situation cell and a coordination cell (subject to OD Sec/CCS confirmation) and may include representatives from Defra and other Departments as necessary. CCS would provide the secretariat for CCC and CCC(O) meetings. The NCC, located at 10 Great George Street could provide daily rolling media briefs, take all media calls and centralise all press office functions. It could also contain web and internal communications specialists and would maintain a constant electronic link with the Defra briefing and knowledge network units.

PUBLICITY AND DISEASE AWARENESS

Notifiable Disease Awareness programmes

5.12 Headquarters and DVMs, working with Communications Directorate, are involved in awareness programmes: lectures/demonstrations to veterinary schools, veterinary practices and agricultural colleges; direct mailing to livestock producers and articles in the veterinary and farming press as appropriate; and frequent contact through testing, inspection and advisory visits to livestock producers and those working in ancillary industries including markets, slaughter houses and livestock transport.

RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

Environmental Information Regulations, Freedom of Information Act and Data Protection Act

1. 5.13 All staff must visit the following intranet site before responding to requests for information: http://intranet/imd/access2info/data.asp . (This site includes a checklist designed to help Defra staff decide how to respond if they are asked for information that has not previously been made public).

2. 5.14 Legislation such as the Environmental Information Regulations and the Freedom of Information Act places extensive and increasing obligations on public authorities to be open in responding to requests for information. Over and above this, accessibility is one of Defra’s core values and it is committed to establishing its reputation as an open Department which shares information with its stakeholders.

3. 5.15 The Environmental Information Regulations (EIRs) apply to the majority of information that Defra holds including any information that relates to air,

water, land, natural sites, flora and fauna, the built environment and health. It also covers all information relating to decisions or activities affecting, or likely to affect, any of these. Requests for non-environmental information currently fall under the Code of Practice on Access to Government Information and, from January 2005, will fall under the Freedom of Information Act. Similar principles apply when considering requests for information under the various regimes. Remember that a request for information does not need to mention any legislation or the Code, in order for the relevant requirements to apply.

1. 5.16 The Data Protection Act 1998 sets out rules for processing personal information held on paper records and computers. Some provisions of the Act came into force on 1 March 2000 and most of the other provisions came into force on 24 October 2001. A few provisions remain to come into force on 24 October 2007.

2. 5.17 Data Protection Officers are appointed to oversee data protection matters within Departments. Contact details for Defra's Data Protection Officer may be found at: http://intranet/imd/access2info/data.asp

3. 5.18 Defra's general policy statement on the release of personal data relating to a Foot and Mouth outbreak may be found at Annex K.

Mobile Assurance Team

5.19 A small team of senior civil servants will be established in the early stages of an outbreak. Their remit will be to quality assure local structures and processes, and the capture of critical management information in Local Disease Control Centres.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

1. 6.1 Defra is lead Government Department for the control of Foot and Mouth Disease outbreaks. This section relates to the strategic level structures and functions necessary for effective command, control and communications in the event of a disease outbreak.

2. 6.2 The decision-making processes at strategic level will be focussed entirely on defining, reviewing and refining strategies for disease control, communications, disposal, relief and recovery. (See below for Defra Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee). The Strategic Group will direct the Tactical Group and will receive feedback on operational issues from stakeholders and from the operational command in order to inform further strategic decisions.

3. 6.3 In the event of a confirmed outbreak of disease, Defra’s Management Board will meet as soon as possible (as detailed below) to ensure a rapid and appropriate response. The Management Board will consider the need to establish the Civil Contingencies Committee. This will be triggered by the Permanent Secretary contacting the Security and Intelligence Coordinator or the Head of Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat.

4. 6.4 Whilst Defra will retain overall command responsibility as lead department, if required the Civil Contingencies Committee(s) [CCC and CCC(O)] will be responsible for the assessment of the wider impact of the developing outbreak. It is responsible for reviewing and developing cross-departmental strategies, and in particular accounting for issues affecting the wider UK economy.

5. 6.5 Defra’s Science Advisory Council (SAC) exists to ratify, audit, advise and guide the development of the control strategies that are implemented by Defra and its agents. It will also need to consider whether the Science Advisory Panel for Emergency Response (SAPER) should be involved. The mechanisms for activating SAPER require the departmental Permanent Secretary or Chief Scientific Adviser to write to the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, or, in his absence the Head of the Civil Contingencies Secretariat, copied to the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser.

6. 6.6 Operational Partner and Stakeholders’ issues and concerns will be raised at separate meetings including the Rural Affairs Forums of the

Government Offices in the Regions, and the issues (as appropriate) will be tabled at CCC(O) by Defra representatives.

1. 6.7 Tactical issues will be addressed at the daily Emergency Direction Group and by the National Disease Control Centre.

2. 6.8 Operational decisions are devolved, in the main, to the Local Disease Control Centre lead by the Regional Operations Director.

Strategic Aims and Objectives

Aim: In the event of a confirmed case of FMD

To rapidly establish a command structure which enables a cross-departmental response and which gives clear strategic direction to the control effort.

Objectives: Strategic Group (Defra Management Board and Civil Contingencies Committee)

• Gives clear strategic instructions and direction to the tactical level, in particular clarifying the key priorities for action, (Emergency Direction Group, daily communications meetings and National Disease Control Centre).

NB: It is expected in the early days of an outbreak that the control strategies laid out in this plan will be adhered to and therefore minimal strategic direction will be required at this stage. However, strategists will be required to consider the impact of control policies in the face of the emerging disease picture and to suggest policy modifications as necessary.

. • Provides initial strategy for direction of communications, within Defra and in liaison with GICS across wider Government and externally to the public.

. • Defra Management Board must give urgent consideration of the need to establish the Civil Contingencies Committee(s).

. • Members of Defra Management Board are the principal advisors to Defra Secretary of State, Number 10 and the Civil Contingencies Committee.

. • Defra Management Board must ensure Defra’s business continuity arrangements, in particular the impact on departmental business as a result of the reallocation of staff to the control effort.

. • Defra Management Board must review departmental business priorities, make recommendations to Ministers and give guidance on the reallocation of resources. This must be clearly communicated to managers and staff in the Department.

. • The Permanent Secretary is responsible for ensuring the financial integrity of the control and recovery operations by establishing proper procurement, finance and audit procedures, in liaison with HM Treasury and the National Audit Office.

Battle Rhythm – Strategic Level Key Strategic Structures and Roles:

Time	Event	Location	Attendees
0800 – 0830	Daily Communications Meeting	Conference Room LG20 Page Street	Minister, No.10, DG OSD (Chair) CVO, Dirs: FMD Ops, , Comms, DG LURA,
			[PUS]
0930 –	Civil Contingencies	COBR	Chair: Cabinet Office
1030	Committee (Officials)
	CCC(O)
1030 –	Civil Contingencies	COBR	Chair: Defra Minister
1130	Committee (CCC)
1130 - 1200	Media Briefing	Nobel House	Defra Minister, CVO,
			Defra CSA,
1515 –	Defra Management	Room 806, Nobel	Perm Sec, MB
1600 (as	Board	House	members,
necessary)

Title	*Defra Emergency Management Board*

Purpose	The strategic decision-making body in Defra
Meets	Meets as soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease
	and then as necessary in Room 613, 9 Millbank, London
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of the Emergency Management Board and to consider the establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee. Thereafter the CVO will notify Management Board members as soon as practically possible (as per the Communications protocol of this plan).
	Timing: 15.00 (as necessary), to avoid clashes with other meetings
Reports to	- Secretary of State and Defra Ministers
	- Reports forward to the Civil Contingencies Secretariat
Directs	Defra daily Emergency Direction Group
Core Membership	[Minister], Permanent Secretary (Chair), DG OSD (Deputy Chair) All Defra Directors General, Environment Agency, Countryside Agency, Directors: SVS, CD, Finance,
	[N.B. A minimum of DGOSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) & CD (or their deputies) is
	necessary]]
Other	Other Defra Directors (as invited)
Members
Information	Birdtables, NDCC daily report, Animal Disease Policy Group,
received	Science Advisory Council, Rural Issues Group, Civil
from	Contingencies Committee, Emergency Direction Group report,
	Finance Report (from Director of Finance)
Tools	(Template for meeting provided below), Decision Tree for
	Control Strategies,
Objectives	- Liaise with Cabinet Office on input to the Civil Contingencies
	Committee (and who should Chair)
	- Consider advice/recommendations from Defra Emergency
	Direction Group
	- Agree appropriate strategies for disease control and their
	application, taking into account the impact of these upon the
	rural economy - If necessary, develop existing strategies in response to the
	developing disease situation and advice received from policy
	for a (Animal Disease Policy Group, Science Advisory
	Council)
	- Consider representations (via Directors) from Stakeholder
	Meetings when developing strategies
	- Horizon scanning for future scenarios that may have an
	impact on strategies

	This is NOT the forum for discussion of operational or tactical
	issues – these should be dealt with at the daily Emergency
	Direction Group
Output	- Emergency Management Board Report, (notes of key decisions on strategies, including background information) - and/or Minutes of meetings, - Requests for additional briefing, - Reports to Civil Contingencies Committee and Emergency Direction Group (requiring action)
Secretariat	Defra Permanent Secretary’s Office

Defra Emergency Management Board Meeting Agenda

Chair: Permanent Secretary (or nominee [DG OSD])
Membership: [Minister], (DG OSD - Deputy Chair) All Directors General,
[Environment Agency, Countryside Agency], Directors: SVS,
Communications, Finance.

[N.B. A minimum of DG OSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) & CD (or their deputies) is necessary]

1. 1. Disease and Epidemiology - current situation.

2. 2. Action taken and its implications.

3. 3. Operational Organisation - current situation; move to CCC.

4. 4. Proposals for future action (including communications internal and external).

5. 5. Parliamentary/Devolved Administration Issues.

6. 6. EU/International Issues.

7. 7. Media/Communications Issues.

8. 8. AOB.

9. 9. Date/Time of Next Meeting.

Template for First Report to Defra Emergency Management Board Meeting

(see also AMED Notification Proforma NDI 1)

Chair: Permanent Secretary (or nominee [DG OSD])
Membership: [Minister], (DG OSD - Deputy Chair) All Directors General,
Environment Agency, [Countryside Agency], Directors: SVS, AHW, CD,
Finance.

[N.B. A minimum of DG OSD, CVO, CSA, Directors: SVS, Legal Services A (or DGLS) & CD (or their deputies) must be present]

Issue: Outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease confirmed at:-

Facts: -

Disease signs:
(use layman’s terms)

Samples taken to lab on (time and day):

(Diagnosis on basis of clinical signs or Lab test):

Name of Proprietor/Owner/Keepers: (or ‘location’ for data protection issues)

Address:

Animal Health Divisional Office Dealing:
Name of DVM (or their nominee):
Name of SVS Region Head of Veterinary Services:

Summary of the Disease Outbreak (including IPs and DCs, number of animals
affected, animals slaughtered and awaiting slaughter):

Epidemiological Report:

Progress on Implementation of the Contingency Plan, issues identified and resources required.

General Summary

Specific issues: Vaccination Communications and Media Human Resources – vets, technicians and admin Armed Forces Finance Procurement Disposal Devolved Administrations Engagement with Operational Partners Surveillance

Title	*Daily Communications Meeting*
Purpose	A daily forum for considering the major issues arising from the
	outbreak in order to identify and agree key points to make for
	communications (internal & external) and media brief.
Meets	0800 - 0830 daily after initial confirmation of disease in Room
	LG20, 1A Page Street, London
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of an emergency Management Board meeting. Thereafter the Director of Communications will notify the relevant senior officials (listed below) as soon as practically possible and agree their attendance at the Communications Meeting (as per the communications protocol of the contingency plan).
	Timing: 0800 – 0830 (brief taken from 07.30 NDCC Birdtable and overnight NDCC report)
Reports to	Civil Contingencies Committee, Emergency Direction Group, Defra Directorates involved with control effort (as required – e.g. ITD, CSD,)
Directs	N/A
Core	Director Communications, Director SVS, [Permanent
Membership	Secretary], Minister(s), Chief Veterinary Officer, DG
	Operations & Service Delivery (chair), Number 10,
Other	Other Defra DGs / Directors (as necessary and invited through
Members	Chair)
Information	NDCC Birdtables, NDCC daily report, Emergency Direction
received	Group, Stakeholder meetings
from
Tools	early Press Cuts, NDCC overnight report
Objectives	- Share information between key strategists (after NDCC Birdtable 07.30) - Identify and agree the key messages, points to make and issues of the day for CCC; also for other communications - agree appropriate media handling for possible briefing at 11.30
Output	- Media handling position for 08.30 No10 News briefing and 11.30 media briefing (owned by Director Communications), - Report of major issues and key messages for CCC - Requests for additional briefing,
Secretariat	DG OSD’ office / Communications Directorate

Title	*Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials) CCC(O)*
Purpose	The forum for reviewing strategies in a wider Government
	context and for dealing with operational strategy issues that
	affect other Government Departments
Meets	09.30 as necessary in COBR or 10 Great George Street
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary. The Permanent Secretary’s office will notify other Departments’ Permanent Secretaries by e-mail. This will be followed by [GICS] briefing provided to OGDs via Defra Communications Directorate
	Timing: 09.30-10.30 (subject to OD Sec confirmation)
Directs	- Other Government Departments - Defra daily Emergency Direction Group - Defra NDCC
Core	Chair: Cabinet Office; Secretariat: CCS
Membership	DEFRA (Permanent Secretary, DG OSD, CVO, CSA), SEERAD, WAG, Number 10, Cabinet Office (CCS, Econ/Domestic Sec.), ODPM RCU, EA, CA, [LGA / LACORS,] MOD, Home Office (& ACPO), DWP, DoH (inc. CMO & HPA), DCMS, DfT, HMT, FSA,
Other	N/A
Members
Information	CCS Situation Report (drawing on NDCC Daily Report and other
received from	sources) and NCC Comms report.
Tools	N/A
Objectives	- Consider and reach agreement on issues that need to be highlighted to CCC for collective decision. This a forum for strategic discussion – detailed operational
	issues should be raised through representation at National
	Disease Control Centre
Output	- Committee Report of key decisions on Strategies - reports (requiring action) to Defra Emergency Direction Group and OGDs
	- and Minutes of meetings and Action Points - Requests for additional briefing and assessments
Secretariat	Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat

Title	*Civil Contingencies Committee CCC*
Purpose	The forum for reviewing strategies in a wider Government
	context and for dealing with decisions relating to policy and
	operational strategy issues that affect other Government
	Departments
Meets	10.30 as necessary in COBR
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary. The Permanent Secretary’s office will notify Defra Ministers and the Civil Contingencies Secretariat giving notice of probable need to establish CCC (subject to Defra Emergency Management Board agreement). This will be followed by [GICS] briefing provided to OGDs via Defra Communications Directorate
	Timing: 10.30 - 11.30 (subject to OD Sec confirmation)
Directs	- Other Government Departments - Defra daily Emergency Direction Group - National Disease Control Centre
	- News Coordination Centre
Core	Chair: Defra Minister; Secretariat: CCS
Membership	Defra (DG OSD, CVO, CSA), SEERAD, WAG, Number 10, Cabinet Office (CCS, Econ/Domestic Sec.), ODPM RCU, EA, CA, MOD, Home Office (& ACPO), DWP, DoH, DCMS, DfT, HMT, FSA,
Other	N/A
Members
Information	CCS Situation Report (drawing on NDCC Daily Report and other
received from	sources) and NCC Comms report.
Tools	N/A
Objectives	- Consider and develop policies and operational policies where wider government commitment is required. Receives CCC(O) position on strategic issues for consideration of wider implications and for refinement if necessary; in particular strategies for relief and recovery - Consider representations (via Directors General) from Stakeholder Meetings when developing strategies - Report back to Defra Emergency Management Board and/or CCC(O) - Reports to home departments and the centre This a forum for strategic discussion – detailed operational
	issues should be raised through representation at National
	Disease Control Centre
Output	- Committee Report of key decisions on - reports (requiring
	action) to CCC(O) Defra Emergency Direction Group and OGDs
	- Requests for additional briefing and assessments
Secretariat	Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat

CIVIL CONTINGENCIES COMMITTEE/CCC(O) (Chaired by Defra Minister/Government Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator)

Meetings in COBR at 10.30AM/09.30AM

AGENDA

1. 1. Actions arising from last meeting

2. 2. Situation Report

3. 3. Likely development of the outbreak

4. 4. Government’s management of response: issues for decision (including resourcing issues)

5. 5. Wider impacts: issues for decision

6. 6. Public information and media handling

7. 7. Actions arising

Title		*Defra Science Advisory Council*
Purpose		To provide independent science advice to the Animal Disease Policy Group and the Civil Contingencies Committee; and to audit and advise on strategic assumptions
Meets		As necessary (and initially after the first Defra Emergency Management Board) in Room 806 Nobel House, 17, Smith Square, London
Activation criteria		As soon as the CSA is informed of confirmation of the disease he will alert Science Advisory Council members. Timing: Science Advisory Group will meet after the first Defra Emergency Management Board. Time: to be agreed
Reports to		Civil Contingencies Committee & Defra Emergency Management Board
Core Membership		Defra Chief Scientific Adviser, Members of the Science Advisory Council Animal Disease Sub-Group augmented by experts from their emergency stand-by list (including EU experts who may be accessed through protected internet link).
Other Members		CVO’s representative, Science Directorate Officials, and representatives from MoD, OST, CCS, FSA, EA, DoH & HPA as appropriate. Other technical experts, including those with relevant industry expertise may be asked to provide briefing on specific issues.
Information received from		NDCC daily report, Disease Control System (database), Epidemiology (Interspread) model(s), Met Office, ‘other’ models, Animal Disease Policy Group, Defra Rural Issues Group, Defra Emergency Management Board, Civil Contingencies Committee,
Tools		Disease Control System (database), Epidemiology model(s), Met Office and ‘other’ models.
Objectives		- Advises the Civil Contingencies Committee on the science relating to disease control, carcase disposal and farm restoration and its implications, in order that the Committee can develop appropriate strategies - Peer reviews the quality of the scientific evidence supporting veterinary policy, including, if necessary, commissioning duplicate modelling. - Audits and advises on assumptions within strategy development - Horizon scanning for future scenarios that may have an impact on strategies - Close liaison with Animal Disease Policy Group (to avoid overlap and gaps)
Output		- Notes of advice and key decisions, and background information in support of these; - Minutes of meetings,
Secretariat		Chief Scientific Adviser’s office

Title		*Defra Animal Disease Policy Group*
Purpose		To provide disease control advice and policy
		recommendations to the Civil Contingencies Committee and
		challenge strategic assumptions
Meets		As necessary (and initially after the first Defra Emergency
		Management Board / Civil Contingencies Committee) in Room
		XXX, 1A Page Street, London
Activation criteria		As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary. Thereafter the CVO will notify Emergency Management Board members (including the Directors of Veterinary Policy and Animal Health and Welfare) as soon as practically possible (as per the Communications protocol of this contingency plan). This will trigger the Director Veterinary Policy to alert other Animal Disease Policy Group members.
		Timing: Animal Disease Policy Group will meet after the first
		Defra Emergency Management Board. Time: to be agreed
Reports to		Defra Emergency Management Board / Civil Contingencies
		Committee
Core Membership		Defra Chief Veterinary Officer (Chair), Defra Chief Scientist’s representative, Director Vet Policy, Director Animal Health and Welfare, Head of Epidemiology (VLA), Head of LSDG Animal Health & Welfare Division (or Director Legal Services A)
		others to be confirmed
Other		External Membership to be confirmed
Members
Information		NDCC daily report, Defra Science Advisory Council, Defra
received		Rural Issues Group, Defra Emergency Management Board,
from		Civil Contingencies Committee,
Tools		Disease Control System (database), Epidemiology model(s)
		e.g. Interspread, Met Office and ‘other’ models
Objectives		- Advises the Civil Contingencies Committee on disease control policy, in order that the board can develop appropriate strategies - Challenges assumptions within strategy development - Horizon scanning for future scenarios that may have an impact on strategies
Output		- Notes of advice and key decisions, and background information in support of these; - Minutes of meetings,
Secretariat		Chief Veterinary Officer’s office

Title	*Defra Rural Issues Group*
Purpose	To provide advice and policy recommendations on rural
	issues to the Civil Contingencies Committee and challenge
	strategic assumptions
Meets	As necessary and initially after the first Defra Emergency
	Management Board / Civil Contingencies Committee in Room
	806 Nobel House, 17, Smith Square, London
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary. Thereafter the CVO will notify Emergency Management Board members (including the Director General LURA) as soon as practically possible (as per the Communications protocol of this contingency plan). This will trigger the Director General LURA to alert Rural Issues Group members and confirm communication networks with Regional Affairs Forums through the Government Offices in the Regions.
	Timing: Rural Issues Group will meet after the first Defra
	Emergency Management Board. Time: to be agreed
Reports to	Civil Contingencies Committee & Defra Emergency
	Management Board
Core	Director General Land Use & Rural Affairs, Director Rural
Membership	Policy, Director Land Management & Rural Development, Countryside Agency, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (Regional Co-ordination Unit)
Other	DCMS, DTI, DWP (Jobcentre Plus), Stakeholder
Members	representatives.
Information	NDCC daily report, Defra Science Advisory Council, Defra
received	Rural Issues Group, Defra Emergency Management Board,
from	Civil Contingencies Committee,
Tools	N/A
Objectives	- Advises the Civil Contingencies Committee on the affect of policies on rural communities and industries, including carcase disposal and farm restoration, - Provides detailed rural feedback from stakeholders
	- Challenges assumptions within strategy development - Horizon scanning for future scenarios that may have an impact on strategies
Output	- Notes of advice and key decisions, and background information in support of these; - Minutes of meetings,
Secretariat	Director General LURA office

Title	*External Stakeholder Meeting*
Purpose	To provide stakeholders with a forum for discussing and influencing policy developments and to help steer the strategic direction
Meets	Meets (suggested once a week) in Room 808 Nobel House, 17, Smith Square, London
Activation criteria	By open invitation, managed by Communications Directorate
Reports to	- Reports back (via Defra Directors General) to Civil Contingencies Committee and Emergency Direction Group
Core Membership	Defra Minister (Chair), Defra Chief Scientist or Deputy, Defra Chief Veterinary Officer or Deputy, Defra Directors: - Communications, State Veterinary Service (or their Deputies), Environment Agency, Countryside Agency, [English Nature], Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group. Stakeholders representing agricultural, rural, food supply and other organisations (by open invitation), lists of stakeholders provided by AHWD and DG LURA N.B. Key Stakeholders and Operational Partners have representatives within the NDCC and LDCC(s) for input into tactical and operational decision-making.
Other Members	Other Government Departments (as necessary) [inc. Department of Health, Food Standards Agency]
Information received from	Civil Contingencies Committee, Defra Emergency Management Board Report, Stakeholders
Tools	N/A
Objectives	- Discuss strategy development and provide a forum to raise concerns and issues - Offer constructive input to policy development via Defra Senior Officials
Output	- Minutes of meetings, - Report (via Defra) to Civil Contingencies Committee, Defra Emergency Management Board, Defra Emergency Direction Group and OGDs (requiring action)
Secretariat	Minister’s Office or AHW Directorate General

Defra Roles at Strategic Level

NB It is vitally important that the people identified below appoint Deputies as soon as possible after confirmation of disease.

Permanent Secretary - Defra Strategic Commander

. • Ultimate responsibility for all strategic decisions taken within Defra.

. • Responsible for triggering the establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee by contacting the Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary (or direct to Head of Civil Contingencies Secretariat).

. • As Chairman of the Management Board establish Departmental priorities, achieve clarity of impact on other Departmental business and give clear leadership.

. • As Departmental Accounting Officer, and in liaison with the Director of Finance, ensure that appropriate financial and audit procedures are in place.

. • Take an outward-facing role to engage Number 10 and other Permanent Secretaries, particularly Cabinet Office regarding the Civil Contingencies Committee and HM Treasury. Issues likely to be: augmenting staff resources from OGD pool, communication with OGD partners and Ministers, response to EFRA and Treasury Select Committees.

. • Horizon scan for wider governmental issues.

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Attend Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.30 - as necessary, Chair: Cabinet Office; Secretariat: CCS).

. • When necessary, attend daily Communications Meeting (08.00 - 08.30) and ensure that the Secretary of State, Ministers and Number 10 are regularly briefed.

. • Chair Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00, as necessary), ensuring the meeting focuses on strategic outcomes.

. • Appoint deputies (at least DG Operations and Service Delivery).

DG Operations & Service Delivery

. • Ensure that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs with key roles to play (e.g. Heads of Professions) understand their roles and the need for a rapid reaction to support the control effort.

. • Responsible for making recommendation to Defra Permanent Secretary on the establishment of the Civil Contingencies Committee.

. • Establish strategic delivery priorities.

. • Engage other Directors General and Other Government Departments (particular responsibility for engaging Civil contingencies Secretariat and Armed Forces support), issues likely to be: Augmentation of Defra staff from OGD pool and elsewhere, calling in the Armed Forces (in liaison with MOD Home & Special Forces Secretariat - see contact list at Annex I).

. • Ensure Local Authority engagement through Local Government Association and LACORS.

. • Strategic Liaison with Government Offices in the Regions.

. • Horizon scan for strategic issues.

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Chair daily Tactical/Communications Meeting (08.00 - 08.30).

. • Attend Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.30, Chair: Cabinet Office; Secretariat: CCS).

. • Chair daily Defra Emergency Direction Group (10.45), ensuring the meeting focuses on Tactical outcomes.

. • Deputise for Permanent Secretary at Emergency Management Board meetings (15.00 as necessary).

. • Appoint deputies.

Chief Veterinary Officer

. • Responsible for confirmation of disease in first case.

. • Head of State Veterinary Profession - increased liaison with RCVS and BVA.

. • Establish and Chair Animal Disease Policy Group (N.B. this is separate from Science Advisory Council) to devise/refine disease control policies, horizon scan and inform development of strategies at Civil Contingencies Committee (09.30).

. • Ensure that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to key staff as outlined in the Tactical Section of this plan, and also to Heads of Division level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the control effort.

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30) (optional).

. • Attend daily Tactical/Communications Meeting (08.00 - 08.30).

. • Attend Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.30).

. • Brief media (11.30).

. • Attend Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

. • Attend Stakeholders Group (once per week) or send deputy.

. • Appoint deputies.

Defra Chief Scientist

. • Establish and Chair Science Advisory Council to audit and advise on the development of strategies at Civil Contingencies Committee (N.B. this is separate from Animal Disease Policy Group).

. • Horizon scan for strategic issues.

. • Ensure that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the control effort.

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Attend Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.30).

. • Brief media (11.30).

. • Attend Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

. • Attend Stakeholder Group (once per week) or send deputy.

. • Appoint deputies.

Director Legal Service A/DG Legal Services

. • Provide Legal advice to the Defra Emergency Management Board and the Civil Contingencies Committee.

. • Ensure that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the control effort.

. • Ensure that there are sufficient legal staff to meet emerging needs.

. • Ensure that there is a lawyer posted (on a rota basis) to the National Disease Control Centre at its inception.

. • Horizon scan for strategic issues.

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Attend daily Defra Emergency Direction Group (10.45).

. • [DG Legal Services to attend Civil Contingencies Committee (O) (09.30) if necessary].

. • Attend Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

DG Land Use and Rural Affairs

. • Ensure that notification of a confirmed outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs with key roles to play understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the control effort.

. • Ensure that the Countryside Agency is briefed and invited to attend Civil Contingencies Committee [and Emergency Management Board] and provide a representative within the National Disease Control Centre.

. • Horizon scan for strategic issues.

. • Establish and Chair Rural Issues Group (see description above) to horizon scan and develop policies to inform development of strategies at Civil Contingencies Committee and Defra Emergency Management Board.

. • Review procedures for information gathering from rural stakeholders with the aim to ensure close stakeholder liaison and adequate feedback to Civil Contingencies Committee and Defra Emergency Management Board.

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Attend Civil Contingencies Committee when required (09.30).

. • Attend regular stakeholder meeting.

. • Attend Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

. • Appoint deputies.

Other DGs

. • Ensure that notification of a confined outbreak is cascaded down to Heads of Division level within the Directorate General without delay and that those HODs with key roles to play (e.g. Heads of Professions) understand the need for a rapid reaction to support the control effort.

. • Attend Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary).

. • Appoint deputies.

. • N.B. Attendance at 07.30 NDCC Birdtable is recommended for briefing.

Director SVS -Tactical Commander Director of Disease Operations.

• Establish and lead the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC):

- appoint deputies (see Joint Deputy Directors of NDCC

- notify NDCC Heads of Teams

- ensure that contingency arrangements are enacted

. • Direct the RODs and LDCC in controlling and eradicating the disease.

. • Attend NDCC Birdtables (especially 07.30 for briefing).

. • Attend daily Tactical/Communications meeting (08.00 - 08.30).

. • Attend and brief daily Defra Emergency Direction Group (10.45).

. • Ensure that clear instructions are produced from Emergency Direction Group for dissemination to NDCC and LDCC(s).

. • When necessary, attend and brief Civil Contingencies Committee (09.30).

. • Chair daily conference call with RODs (14.00) or send deputy.

. • [Attend and brief regular Defra Emergency Management Board (15.00 as necessary)].

. • Horizon scan for tactical issues.

. • Attend Stakeholder Group (suggested once per week) or send deputy.

. • Responsible for Health and Safety issues in all disease control and clear-up operations.

Director Vet Policy

. • Notify members of the Animal Disease Policy Group,

. • Attend Animal Disease Policy Group.

. • European Union SCOFCAH and OIE liaison.

. • Liaison with industry and other stakeholders over policy development.

. • Deputise for CVO at Defra Emergency Direction Group, and if necessary at Civil Contingencies Committee (09.30) and Animal Disease Policy Group.

. • Attend NDCC Birdtables (where possible, but especially 07.30 for briefing).

. • Horizon scan for tactical issues.

. • Attend Stakeholder Group (once per week) or send deputy.

. • Appoint deputies.

Director Animal Health & Welfare

. • Liaison with industry and other stakeholders over policy development.

. • European Commission liaison.

. • Deputise for CVO at Defra Emergency Direction Group, and if necessary at Defra Emergency Management Board and Animal Disease Policy Group.

. • Attend NDCC Birdtables (where possible, but especially 07.30 for briefing).

. • Horizon scan for tactical issues.

. • Attend Stakeholder Group (once per week) or send deputy.

. • Appoint deputies.

Director Communications

. • Organise and chair teleconference upon notification of initial case of suspect/confirmed disease.

. • Establish national communications hub in NDCC and working with RODs/DVMs set up regional/divisional communications presence in local disease control centres (LDCC).

. • Engage GICS (and GNN).

. • Horizon scan for tactical issues.

. • Ensure that internal communications actions are taken to keep all Defra staff informed.

. • Establish appropriate media briefing at national and local levels.

. • Attend NDCC Birdtables (where possible, but especially 07.30 for briefing).

. • Attend daily Tactical/Communications meeting (08.00-08.30).

. • Attend Civil Contingencies Committee(O) (09.30-10.30).

. • Attend and brief Emergency Direction Group (10.45) or send deputy.

. • Provide Media briefing (with CVO and CSA) at 11.30 every day.

. • Attend and brief Defra Emergency Management Board (15.15 as necessary).

. • Attend Stakeholder Group (once per week) or send deputy.

. • Review communications protocols on a regular basis.

. • Appoint deputies.

Finance Director

. • Appoint Head of FMD Finance in NDCC and agree appointment of Finance Managers to LDCC(s).

. • Appoint team to impose financial control and audit procedures at all levels.

. • Liaise with HM Treasury and National Audit Office.

. • Submit a regular Finance Report to the Emergency Management Board [and Civil Contingencies Committee].

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Attend and brief daily Defra Emergency Direction Group (10.45) or send deputy.

. • Attend and brief Defra Emergency Management Board (15.15 as necessary).

. • Horizon scan for strategic and tactical issues.

. • Appoint deputies.

Other Directors (as necessary)

. • Attend morning NDCC Birdtable (07.30).

. • Attend and brief daily Defra Emergency Direction Group (10.45) if necessary.

. • Brief Directors General for the Civil Contingencies Committee (09.30) [and Emergency Management Board] if necessary.

. • Appoint deputies.

CSA/SAC role

The contingency role of the Science Advisory Council will be to:

. • Advise on emerging threats, including those raised by horizon scanning;

. • Assist the CSA in evaluating the scientific content of contingency plans for handling national emergencies in areas of Defra’s responsibility;

. • Act as an important source of advice and a conduit to specialists in the science community during an emergency. As required the CSA would convene a sub-group of the SAC, with independent experts co-opted as appropriate, to advise on the handling of the emergency;

. • Provide independent review of the science that underpins Defra’s response in the event of an emergency.

FMD Expert Group

6.9 The EU FMD control Directive (Council Directive 2003/85/EC) requires the establishment of a permanently operational expert group comprised of epidemiologists, veterinary scientists and virologists, to maintain an expertise in order to assist the competent authority in ensuring preparedness against an outbreak of FMD. The Directive also sets down the functions this group would be expected to fulfil if an outbreak occurred.

1. 6.10 In ‘peacetime’ the FMD Expert Group will consist of core Defra vets who specialise in disease control, core Defra administrative staff and disease consultants based at the National Reference Laboratory at IAH Pirbright.

2. 6.11 In the event of an outbreak, the FMD Expert Group will be convened on a regular basis and will be enhanced to comprise:-

Chair: Defra CVO/DCVO

FMD advice/consultation IAH Pirbright

on clinical disease recognition

FMD virologist/diagnosis IAH Pirbright

FMD pathogenesis/pathology IAH Pirbright

FMD Vaccination IAH Pirbright

FMD Epidemiology Defra’s Consultant Epidemiologist

Meteorologist Met Office/IAH Pirbright

Serology VLA

Observer/link to Science Head of Veterinary Research Advisory Council, Division, Defra

Epidemiologists SVS (HQ) Vets and other staff responsible for field epidemiology.

6.12 The expert group will be a strategic/tactical level group of specialists whose role will be to provide advice to senior management on surveillance programmes, analyse information and advise on control strategies. They will report to the CVO and the NDCC.

Epidemiology

6.13 A group of people will be established who have skills and technical knowledge of clinical science and epidemiology of FMD and the methods of prevention and eradication of an outbreak of the disease. In the event of an outbreak this group will become the national expert epidemiology group providing advice and information to the Centre and to the policy group.

The group will consist of:

ChairFMD advice/consultation

on clinical disease recognition FMD virologist/diagnosis FMD pathogenesis/pathology FMD Vaccination FMD Epidemiology

Meteorologist SerologyObserver/link to Science Advisory Group Defra DCVO IAH Pirbright

IAH Pirbright IAH Pirbright IAH Pirbright Head of Nat Emergencies Epidemiology Group Met Office/IAH Pirbright Veterinary Laboratories Agency Head of Defra Veterinary Research Division

National Emergencies Epidemiology Group

6.14 This group will comprise of 5 teams with expertise drawn from the AHWDG, SVS, VLA, IAH and Met office as appropriate. The teams will be responsible for:

. • Descriptive epidemiology

. • Analytical epidemiology to include data analysis, data release, GIS and involvement with surveillance strategy for disease and disease freedom

. • Modelling to including interspread, development of models and liaison with other modelling groups

. • Providing epidemiological information from the field (National Field Epidemiology Team)

. • Risk assessment to update the existing risk assessments from the 2001 outbreak.

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

1. 7.1 Defra is lead Department for the control of Exotic Animal Disease outbreaks. This section of the Plan defines the tactical structures and functions necessary for effective control, operations and communication in the event of a disease outbreak. The Tactical Group receive direction from the Strategic Group and instruct field operations. They are also the conduit for feedback from the operations on the ground back to the Strategic Group.

2. 7.2 The Tactical Level centres around the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) (See Annex L), which includes representatives from other government departments, devolved administrations, agencies, other operational partners and key stakeholders. Policy divisions from the Animal Health and Welfare Directorate have key roles to play here and close liaison is essential.

Objective

1. 7.3 To focus on co-ordination, identifying operational problems and issues and taking authoritative decisions to resolve them; creating a ‘relevantly advised network’, dissemination of policies, strategies, decisions and other information; provision of data to and from the Strategic Level and of ensuring the accuracy and integrity of data; the provision of direct access to senior State Veterinary Service (SVS) management and policy makers for the Operational Level.

2. 7.4 Strategic issues should be addressed at the Defra FMD Strategy Board, the Government FMD Co-ordination Committee, the Daily Emergency Direction Group and their associated groups.

3. 7.5 Tactical issues should only be addressed at the Defra Daily Exercise Direction Group, Daily Communications Meeting and National Disease Control Centre (Birdtable Meetings).

4. 7.6 Operational decisions are devolved (in the main) to the Local Disease Control Centre under the overall control of the Regional Operations Director.

ACTIVATION

Authority

7.7 The following Defra Officers have the authority to activate the NDCC:

1) Director of State Veterinary Service

2) Director General Operations and Service Delivery
3) Permanent Secretary

Process

7.8 Action to be taken to contact personnel and so establish the NDCC is set out at Section 2.13. The Map of Initial Defra actions explains what would happen at this time.

NDCC TEAM TASKS

Disease Reporting Team

7.9 The Disease Reporting Team (DRT) authorises slaughter and act as a central co-ordination point to collate, refine and present up-to-date information on disease reports. They provide an accurate picture of the disease outbreak situation by establishing and managing a team of Telephone Report Veterinarians and other teams within DRT.

Operations (Non-Veterinary)

7.10 Aim - To co-ordinate and manage the non-veterinary aspects of the control, eradication and recovery operation by co-ordinating the work of the Operations Teams. Overall responsibility for operations, disposals, statistics and management information and cleansing and disinfection will lie with the Operations Team as well as responsibility for ensuring liaison between operations and veterinary, animal health and welfare, environment, rural policy, Briefing Unit, Corporate Services, legal, stakeholders and operational partners represented in the Operations Team. Representation of the Operations Team at Defra Emergency Direction Group meetings. The team also manages the Birdtable meetings and co-ordinates the information from the 1800 daily situation report.

Veterinary Operations

7.11 Aim - To co-ordinate and manage the veterinary aspects of the control, eradication and recovery operation by liaison with the Animal Health and Welfare Directorate and direction of the Divisional Veterinary Managers (DVMs).

DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN

Communications and Briefing

7.12 The Communications and Briefing Team aim to gather information on the disease outbreak, on the policies employed to control it and the control operation, from a number of sources including the Management Information Cell in the NDCC. It aims to provide accurate and timely media briefing and points to make for Ministers, senior officials, helplines and all staff dealing directly with the public. The team will liaise with the GNN and communications teams in LDCCs to ensure that briefing can be deployed effectively. They will ensure that all Defra staff are kept aware of developments in controlling the disease.

FMD Personnel

7.13 The FMD Personnel Team aim to manage and co-ordinate the provision of veterinary, specialist and administrative resources to the NDCC and the field by liaising with Defra divisions, Defra Agencies, Government Offices, Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat, the Employment Service (Jobcentre Plus) Operational Support Secretariat and other Government Departments to secure emergency staff, including veterinary staff resource. There will also be liaison with RCVS,BVA, FCO and worldwide CVOs over transfer of staff. Establishment of contract terms and conditions for staff and contracted personnel as well as provision of training, Health and Safety procedures for staff and contractors and support and advice to Personnel Teams based in the LDCCs.

FMD Finance

7.14 The FMD Finance Team aim to establish, co-ordinate and manage the framework of financial controls and the resulting expenditure. Setting delegations for payments and authorisation levels throughout the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) and Local Disease Control Centre(s) (LDCC) in consultation with the Director SVS and Defra’s Director of Finance, ensuring LDCCs are trained in the use of financial management systems. To be done by:

- Resource Accounting - Ensuring that an appropriate accounting system in place to meet the Departments Resource Accounting requirements.

- Establishing a chart of accounts.

Audit

7.15 Liaison with the National Audit Office (NAO), European Union (EU) and Defra Internal Audit.

Estimates and Expenditure

7.16 Maintaining an adequate cost forecasting and reporting system to meet the requirements of senior management, Financial Planning and Resources Directorate (FPRD) and HM Treasury.

Costing Systems

7.17 Establishing a system of regular reports on the expenditure by expense and activity.

Inquiries

7.18 Providing briefing responses to PQs, Ministerial Correspondence.

Payments

7.19 Authorisation of payments for contractors and other expenses including costs from Other Government Departments (OGDs).

Compensation

7.20 Establish a payments system for animals slaughtered with a full database validated and reconciled to the Disease Control System (DCS). Maintaining an audit trail of documentation to meet the European Union (EU), National Audit Office (NAO) and Defra audit requirements. Arbitration -

. • Establish and maintain a unit to receive appeals against valuations.

. • Establish and maintain a database of cases.

. • Helpline for Arbitration queries.

Business Continuity

7.21 Maintain a strategic plan for Business Continuity in FMD Finance and in the
Finance Units in the LDCCs.
Arrange periodic visits to LDCCs to confirm financial controls are in operation as
expected.
Hold monthly FMD Finance Managers Meetings to deal with major issues - staffing
and operations.
Set standards for file documentation and financial databases.
Establish a retention of records policy.

Vaccination Operations

7.22 The Vaccination Operations Team aims to co-ordinate and manage the emergency vaccination exercise and provide the link between the NDCC and the commercial contractors responsible for the supply of vaccination teams and supervisory veterinary surgeons. This is done by ensuring that commercial resource and supplies are sufficient to meet the needs of the disease outbreak, ensuring that vaccine and supplies reach the designated vaccination centres promptly and are replenished as required, by providing advice and guidance to the commercial contractor and advice and guidance on vaccination capability and operational arrangements to NDCC, Animal Health & Welfare/Veterinary Policy and LDCC staff. And by providing briefing on vaccination issues and drafting instructions to the field.

STAKEHOLDERS

7.23 Stakeholders and operational partners within the NDCC are likely to include representatives from the following organisations:

Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO)
Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS)
Countryside Agency (CA)
Department for Transport (DFT)/Freight Transport Association (FTA)
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP)/Jobcentre Plus
Environment Agency (EA)
Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS)
Local Government Association (LGA)

Military Liaison Officer
National Farmers Union (NFU)
Regional Co-ordination Unit (Cabinet Office) (RCU)
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA)

Representatives from other organisations will be invited if necessary.

CO-ORDINATION

7.24 The National Disease Control Centre falls under the responsibility of the Director of SVS. In order for the NDCC to operate effectively, co-ordination from other parts of Defra and its agencies is essential; Directorates will loan staff and equipment for the eradication effort. The teams that will be formed are as follows:

Geographical Information System -Reporting to Director SVS via (GIS) staff and equipment. Head of Disease Reporting Team. Epidemiology Team and equipment -Reporting to Director SVS via

Head of Disease Reporting Team.

1. 7.25 Director SVS will be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of all equipment and for the availability of all loaned staff for the duration of the loan period (i.e. the duration of the outbreak).

2. 7.26 Certain sectors of the NDCC will not fall under the management of the Director SVS. These sections will remain under the management of their home divisions, but will form part of the NDCC to facilitate a joined up disease eradication effort. The teams that fall into this category are:

Communications and Briefing Unit
Procurement
Legal
Finance

(See detailed job descriptions in SVS Instructions for lines of communication/liaison)

CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS

7.27 Communications Directorate are responsible for updating the external website, internal website and the Knowledge Network. Before communicating with the media, stakeholders, operational partners and other external bodies, please refer to the Knowledge Network and Operational Communications Team.

MEETINGS

7.28 The meeting schedule for the NDCC is:

Birdtable, at 07.30, 12.00 and 19.00 daily, to be held in the NDCC, to provide daily, short, outcome-focussed briefing and co-ordination by identifying operational problems and issues, problems and progress against them, tasking individuals to resolve them and creating the ‘relevantly-informed network’. This should be attended by a representative from each team within the NDCC and policy representatives from Animal Health and Welfare and Livestock Strategy.

Daily Emergency Direction Group, at 10.45 – 11.15 to be held initially in Room LG20, 1A Page Street, London. To define the major issues arising from the outbreak and provide tactical direction to the NDCC. For more detail see the Defra Daily Emergency Direction Group Table.

Battle Rhythm - Tactical (NDCC) Level BACKGROUND AND SCOPE

Time	Event	Location	Attendees
0730 –	NDCC Birdtable	NDCC Page	Key Strategic and
0800	Meeting	Street	Tactical personnel
1045 – 1115	Emergency Direction Group (Tactical Command)	Conference Room LG20 Page Street	DG OSD (Chair), Dirs: FMD Ops, Comms, Finance, Legal (A), Rural Affairs,
1200 –	NDCC Birdtable	NDCC Page	All key Tactical
1230	Meeting	Street	personnel
1430 – 1500	Regional Operations Directors’	Page Street	Dir FMD Ops, RODs
	Teleconference

1615 –	2nd Emergency	Conference	DG OSD (Chair), Dirs:
1715 (as	Direction Group	Room LG20	FMD Ops, Comms,
necessary)	(EDG)	Page Street	Finance, Legal (A),
			Rural Affairs,
1800	ROD Sitreps due	NDCC
1900 -	NDCC Birdtable	NDCC Page	All key Tactical
1930		Street	personnel
2100	NDCC Report	NDCC	NDCC Management
(approx)	compiled & circulated		Information Cell

Title	*Defra Daily Emergency Direction Group*

Purpose	A daily forum for defining the major issues arising from the
	outbreak and providing tactical direction to the NDCC
Meets	10.45 – 11.15 daily, after initial confirmation of disease in
	Room LG20 1A, Page Street, London
Activation criteria	As soon as possible after initial confirmation of disease the Chief Veterinary Officer (or representative) will notify the Permanent Secretary and agree the establishment and timing of the Emergency Management Board. The CVO will also notify the Director SVS, who will in turn notify Emergency Direction Group members as soon as practically possible. Timing: 10.45 [after CCC(O)]
Reports to	Civil Contingencies Committee [CCC/CCC(O)], Defra Emergency Management Board, NDCC, Directorates involved with control effort (as required – e.g. ITD, CSD), Operational Partners as appropriate
Directs	National Disease Control Centre (via Director SVS),
Core Membership	DG OSD (Chair), Director SVS, (Deputy Chair), Director Vet Policy, Director Animal Health & Welfare, Director Communications (or Chief Press Officer), Director Legal Services A
Other	Other Defra Directors (as necessary invited through Chair)
Members
Information	Civil Contingencies Committees, Birdtable meetings, NDCC
received	daily report, Stakeholder meetings
from
Tools	NDCC Report, Disease Control System (database),
Objectives	- Share information between key tacticians (after CCC(O) 09.00) - Identify the daily tactical issues that need to be addressed and report back to CCC/CCC(O) for resolution (e.g. policy and strategic resourcing issues) - Agree the tactical application of the strategies produced by CCC/CCC(O) - Disseminate tactical instructions to the National Disease
	Control Centre (NDCC) - Consider representations (via Directors) from Stakeholder meetings in defining the application of strategies N.B. This is NOT the forum for discussion of strategic issues – these should be discussed at CCC/CCC(O)
Output	- Report of major issues and key decisions on the tactical application of strategies (owned by Director SVS) – sent to NDCC Heads of Cells, all Directors General, Director
	Communications,
	- Requests for additional briefing,
Secretariat	Director General - Operations & Service Delivery office

1. 8.1 Defra is lead Department for the control of Exotic Animal Disease outbreaks. The Operational-Level Plan forms a Section of the Defra Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan and relates to the operational level structures and functions necessary for effective control, operations and communication in the event of a disease outbreak. The role of the operational command is to implement contingency plans, working with stakeholders to ensure effective control of the disease outbreak and to receive tactical guidance and implement it, and to provide regular feedback to inform strategic decisions.

2. 8.2 The Operational Level centres around the Local Disease Control Centre(s) (LDCC), which may include representatives from other government departments, devolved administrations, agencies, other operational partners and stakeholders.

OBJECTIVES

. • Manage and co-ordinate the local components of a national response to control and eradicate the notifiable disease outbreak; to allow a return to disease-free status;

. • Identify operational problems and issues and taking authoritative decisions to resolve them;

. • Provide data to the Tactical Level ensuring the accuracy and integrity.

. • To minimise the effect of the necessary disease control measures on the community without diminishing the effectiveness of the disease control measures.

1. 8.3 The key aims for administrative and field staff are to work to support veterinary and technical staff in the eradication of disease, establish effective communication with key stakeholders and the rural community and ensure value for money.

2. 8.4 Strategic issues should be addressed at the Defra FMD Strategy Board, the Government FMD Co-ordination Committee, the Daily Emergency Direction Group and their associated groups.

3. 8.5 Tactical issues should only be addressed at the Defra Daily Exercise Direction Group, Daily Communications Meeting and National Disease Control Centre (Birdtable Meetings).

4. 8.6 Operational decisions are devolved (in the main) to the Local Disease Control Centre under the overall control of the Regional Operations Director.

ACTIVATION PROCESS

1. 8.7 SVS Instructions cover the implementation of control measures and guidance on the establishment of a LDCC.

2. 8.8 Once FMD is confirmed, the Director of the SVS will authorise the establishment of an LDCC and confirm this with the DVM and HVS.

3. 8.9 Each AHDO maintains a list of local organisation details for personnel (including other government departments, the devolved administrations, stakeholders and operational partners) that must be contacted upon confirmation of disease. The DVM is responsible for notification.

8.10 The DVM/HVS will contact those people who will be appointed as Heads of LDCC Teams. The LDCC will develop to provide for the implementation of the necessary control measures.

INVOLVEMENT OF STAKEHOLDERS AND OPERATIONAL PARTNERS

1. 8.11 DVMs will engage with local operational partners and stakeholders as part of their routine emergency-preparedness arrangements and where possible include them in the planning and implementation of regular local exercises. It is important that LVIs should be fully engaged in developing these arrangements. DVMs must establish strong links with their local Police Force strategic (Gold) command as this is recognised by all key local agencies as the coordination point for emergency response. It is also essential that DVMs have established regular contact with their Local Authority Emergency Planning Officers, Trading Standards Officers, Environment Agency Emergency Planners, the Government Office Emergencies Team and the Health Protection Agency. All these agencies must know and understand the FMD contingency plans (including relevant sections of SVS Instructions and local office contingency plans) and the DVM must have established their capabilities, roles and responsibilities in the event of an outbreak.

2. 8.12 An outline of local stakeholder capabilities is at Annex Q.

3. 8.13 In an outbreak , RODs and DVMs will engage fully with operational partners and all those affected by the disease and its management and control including farmers’ organisations, rural businesses and local community organisations.

Battle Rhythm - Operational (LDCC) Level ANNEX A

Time	Event	Location	Attendees
0730 –	LDCC Birdtable	LDCC	Heads of Ops Teams
0800	Meeting
0800 –	Daily Management &	Conference	ROD, DVM, DOM
0830	Communications	Room LG20
	Meeting	Page Street
1130 -	Media Briefing	Nobel House	Defra Minister, CVO,
1200			Defra CSA,
1200 –	LDCC Birdtable	LDCC	Heads of Ops Teams
1230	Meeting
1430 –	Regional Operations	Page Street	Dir FMD Ops, RODs
1500	Directors’
	Teleconference
1800	ROD Sitreps due	Sent to NDCC
1900 -	LDCC Birdtable	LDCC	Heads of Ops Teams
1930

GENERAL LEGISLATION

Animal Health Act 1981

. • The Animal Health Act 1981 provides the powers for the control of Foot and Mouth Disease.

�.• The FMD Order 1983 (together with amendments), made under the Animal Health Act 1981 provides for the following measures:

. • entry to premises for the purpose of veterinary inquiry;

. • slaughter of affected, suspected or exposed animals;

. • seizure and control of affected carcases and things;

. • cleansing and disinfection of premises, vehicles and people;

. • movement controls on people, animals and vehicles;

. • slaughter (and payment of compensation) of animals on welfare grounds

arising as a result of movement controls;
• other controls in Infected, Restricted and Controlled areas.

Animal Health Act 2002

. • The Animal Health Act 2002 amended the Animal Health Act 1981 and supplemented the existing powers under the Animal Health Act 1981 by allowing animals to be slaughtered wherever this is necessary to prevent the spread of disease.

. • However, the 2002 Act amendments required the Secretary of State to publish the reasons for using this preventive slaughter power, prior to exercising it. Emergency vaccination would have to be considered prior to any preventive slaughter powers, and, if not used, the reasons would have to be published.

. • The 2002 Act amendments allow vaccinated animals to be slaughtered and requires compensation of market value for such animals to be paid. The Act now provides for the publication and annual review of this Contingency Plan and also requires the publication of Biosecurity guidance. It strengthens enforcement powers, including improved powers of entry to farms; requires reasonable assistance for the purposes of slaughter, vaccination and testing; and increases penalties.

EU Legislation

�.• In 2001, the legal basis for the control of FMD across the EU was Council Directive 85/511. However, this will shortly be replaced by Council Directive 2003/85/EC, which was adopted in September 2003. This Directive updates measures contained in previous Directives, taking into account scientific progress and experience gained in eradicating the disease in the EU in 2001. The Directive has to be transposed into domestic legislation in all EU Member States during 2004. It sets out minimum control measures Member States must take against FMD and allows stricter measures to be taken if the disease

�.situation requires it. It requires rapid action to be taken as soon as disease is suspected, including movement controls.

. • The ban on prophylactic (routine) vaccination, which has been in place across the EU since 1992, is maintained in the new Directive. Under both 85/511 and the new Directive, the required basic disease control policy is the slaughter of all susceptible animals on premises infected with FMD and those identified as “dangerous contacts”.

. • The new Directive gives greater prominence to the potential use of emergency vaccination in the event of an outbreak as an adjunct to this slaughter policy and requires Member States “to prepare all arrangements necessary for emergency vaccination in an area at least the size of the Surveillance Zone” as soon as the first case of FMD is confirmed.

�.• Other features of the new Directive include:

. • provision for the adoption of “special measures” (including possible emergency vaccination and derogation from slaughter of all susceptible animals on infected premises) to be applied in zoos, wildlife parks and to allow the conservation of “farm animal genetic resources”; and

. • details of the treatments for meat and meat products and milk and milk products from animals from the Protection, Surveillance and Vaccination Zones. Such treatments include heat treatment and deboning and maturation of meat and pasteurisation of milk.

ANNEX B VETERINARY GUIDANCE FOR INITIAL ACTION ON SUSPECT CASES

LEVEL OF SUSPICION	IMMEDIATE ACTION
Level 0 – disease not suspected	All restrictions on premises lifted, no
following veterinary inquiry.	further action.
Level 1 – lesions and clinical	Suspect animal(s) left alive and
disease not typical – but disease	observed. Samples taken for
cannot be ruled out entirely on	laboratory diagnosis. Form A
clinical grounds.	premises restrictions enforced. Form
	C area restrictions imposed.
Level 2 - lesions and clinical disease suggestive of FMD but not entirely convincing.	Suspect animal(s) showing lesions slaughtered on suspicion. Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis. Form A premises restrictions enforced. Form C area restrictions
	imposed.
Level 3 - veterinary staff on farm and at HQ believe from investigation on clinical grounds that disease exists.	All susceptible livestock on the premises slaughtered on suspicion. Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis. Form A premises restrictions enforced. Form C area
	restrictions imposed.
Level 4 - as at level 3 plus disease already confirmed in the country or substantial evidence that disease may have entered the country for example disease in imported animals originating from a region with confirmed FMD	Disease confirmed on clinical grounds only without awaiting laboratory results. Samples submitted for laboratory diagnosis. Form A premises restrictions enforced. Form C area restrictions imposed. All susceptible livestock on the premises slaughtered. Dangerous contacts traced and slaughtered depending on veterinary assessment.

ANNEX C

DECISION TREE FOR DISEASE CONTROL STRATEGIES
AGAINST FMD

DISEASE CONTROL STRATEGIES:
FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD DECISION TREE)

Introduction

1. 1. This paper outlines the measures that may be taken to slaughter or vaccinate animals in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease (FMD). It sets out the factors the Government will take into account in deciding which strategy to adopt in order to control and eradicate the disease in the future.

2. 2. The new EU Council Directive on FMD, requires slaughter of all susceptible animals on infected premises, and provides for culling of susceptible animals on epidemiologically linked holdings (known as dangerous contacts). This reflects the EU's policy of adopting "FMD free without vaccination" status for all Member States, and is provided for in Defra's FMD Contingency plan.

�.3. Beyond this basic strategy, which will apply in all cases, there are a range of additional options and strategies potentially available depending on the circumstances of a particular outbreak and on the scientific and veterinary advice. Section 14B of the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended) requires the Secretary of State to consider what is the most appropriate means of preventing the spread of disease, in particular the use of vaccination. The new FMD Directive has also moved emergency vaccination to the forefront of disease control strategies. The range of options includes: -

. • culling of other livestock exposed to the disease (e.g. premises under virus plumes, contiguous premises); and,

. • emergency vaccination (either to live or to kill; within an area or in a ring around an area);

. • pre-emptive or ‘firebreak’ culling of animals which are not on infected premises nor are dangerous contacts nor are necessarily exposed to the disease, in order to prevent the wider spread of the disease outwith an area.

�.4. Since each disease outbreak is different and each has to be tackled at speed and – inevitably – with imperfect information it is not possible to prescribe in detail which strategy will be followed in advance of knowing the circumstances of a particular outbreak. This calls for a flexible approach, which recognises that different approaches may be needed in different geographical areas or to deal with different species. Nevertheless, there is clear advantage in reaching a view on the likely options for response in advance. Accordingly, this paper and the enclosed “decision tree” seeks to set out:

. • The factors that would be taken into account in deciding whether to use emergency vaccination and if so whether to vaccinate to live or kill.

. • The factors that would be taken into account in deciding slaughter policy.

�.5. The Government’s objective in tackling any fresh outbreaks of FMD will be to eradicate the disease as quickly as possible and to maintain the UK’s disease-free status. In doing so, the Government will seek to select a control strategy which:

. • causes the least possible disruption to the food, farming and tourism industries, to visitors to the countryside, and to rural communities and the wider economy;

. • minimises the number of animals which need to be slaughtered, either to control the disease or on welfare grounds, and which keeps animal welfare problems to a minimum;

. • minimises damage to the environment and protects public health;

. • minimises the burden on taxpayers and the public at large.

VACCINATION POLICY

1. 6. In responding to the FMD Inquiries the Government has made clear that where measures additional to the culling of infected animals and dangerous contacts are needed, emergency vaccination will be considered as part of the control strategy. The Government also accepts that if emergency vaccination is used it should be on the basis of vaccinate-to-live wherever possible.

2. 7. EU legislation allows for the use of emergency vaccination in circumstances where an outbreak of FMD threatens to become extensive in the Member State concerned; where other Member States are at risk due to the geographical situation or prevailing meteorological conditions; where other Member States are at risk due to epidemiologically relevant contacts; and in Member States at risk due to geographical situation or meteorological conditions in a neighbouring third country. The new Directive also requires a Member State to prepare all arrangements deemed necessary for emergency vaccination in an area at least the size of the Surveillance Zone (10km centred on an outbreak) immediately the first outbreak is confirmed.

�.8. The decision to introduce emergency vaccination is normally taken by the European Commission in consultation with Member States in the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health, although Member States can vaccinate and then seek the EU’s agreement later. Two types of vaccination strategy are envisaged:

�.(i) "Protective Vaccination" (Vaccination to live)

�.(ii) "Suppressive Vaccination" (Vaccination to kill)

3. 9. The Inquiries investigated in detail the issues involved in employing emergency vaccination. Between them they highlighted a range of significant

questions that would need to be addressed, particularly as regards vaccination to live, but concluded that once these were resolved, the option of emergency vaccination to live should be the preferred approach. The Government is committed to tackling these issues in consultation with all interested parties so that it is in a position to trigger an emergency vaccination campaign should the need arise. As part of this process it is essential to have stakeholder support and the Government has engaged in dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders in order to achieve, so far as possible, a shared understanding in advance of an outbreak of the factors which influence the choice of control options. The Decision Tree is intended to assist this process.

Protective Vaccination (Vaccination to live)

10. This strategy would be considered:-

. • where veterinary and scientific advice is that an outbreak could not be contained by stamping out of Infected Premises and Dangerous Contacts alone;

. • where a defined category of animals could be identified for protection, either in geographical or species terms; this could include pet or sanctuary animals within a vaccination zone;

. • to protect, where appropriate, zoo animals and rare breeds collections as recommended by the Royal Society and provided for under the FMD Directive. The Directive also extends special measures to animals in wildlife parks and laboratories.

11. Section 8 of the Directive deals with the issue of emergency vaccination, including the factors to be considered and the conditions under which vaccination should be carried out. Criteria to be taken into account when a Member State is considering introducing protective vaccination and guidelines for emergency vaccination programmes are set out in Annex X of the Directive and include: population density of susceptible animals, predominant species clinically affected; predicted airborne spread of virus; availability of suitable vaccine; origin, incidence slope and distribution of outbreaks; public reaction to stamping out policy and acceptance of regionalisation after vaccination. The guidelines also indicate that emergency vaccination should be considered if it is foreseeable that the targets of culling infected animals within 24 hours of confirmation and dangerous contacts within 48 hours cannot be met for two consecutive days. However, such criteria can only ever be indicative rather than prescriptive. Veterinary/epidemiological judgement will remain a key factor in determining the most effective disease control policy in any set of circumstances.

Suppressive Vaccination (Vaccinate to kill)

12. This strategy could be considered where the number of animals to be culled is likely to exceed the available disposal capacity. In those instances, animals in defined areas would be vaccinated first and slaughtered only as disposal capacity became available. It could also be used where there is an urgent need to reduce the amount of virus circulating in an area and reduce the risk of spread beyond that area. The Directive requires that suppressive vaccination is only carried out within a Protection Zone, that is normally within 3km of an infected premises. This requirement does not mean that all vaccinated animals in a PZ will be slaughtered; it may only be some within this area.

STAMPING OUT POLICY

1. 13. The FMD Directive lays down the minimum measures Member States must take against FMD. The Directive requires slaughter of all susceptible animals on infected premises, and provides for culling of susceptible animals on epidemiologically linked holdings, as well as culling of susceptible animals on holdings where FMD is suspected.

�.14. Legislation in England and Wales allows for slaughter of:

. • Animals affected or suspected of being affected with FMD.

. • Animals in the same place or in contact with animals affected or suspected of being affected with FMD.

. • Animals which are believed to have been exposed to FMD infection.

. • Animals to prevent the spread of FMD e.g. a 'firebreak' cull.

Animals affected or suspected of being affected

1. 15. When the State Veterinary Service (SVS) is made aware of suspicion of foot and mouth disease in animals they will arrange for a veterinary investigation to be undertaken.

2. 16. The decision to slaughter will be based either on the results of laboratory tests carried out on samples arising from animals suspected of being affected with disease, or on clinical evidence of disease. In an area considered to be free of disease, except in exceptional circumstances, it is likely that disease will be confirmed on laboratory results. However, once disease has become established in an area it is likely that cases will be confirmed on clinical grounds alone in order to ensure animals are slaughtered quickly. However, samples will be taken to aid the epidemiological inquiries. All susceptible animals on an infected place will normally be slaughtered.

Animals which are believed to have been exposed to infection

1. 17. Animals may be slaughtered if they are believed to have been exposed to infection. In these cases, animals will be subject to a veterinary inquiry to determine if, in the opinion of the Veterinary Inspector, they have been exposed. In making this judgement the Veterinary Inspector may take account of national information from experts that animals in certain areas have been exposed.

2. 18. Animals that are believed to have been exposed to infection are known as Dangerous Contacts. This can include animals on contiguous premises. As virus can be excreted by such animals prior to the development of obvious and identifiable clinical signs, it is important that they are culled as soon as possible to stop virus production and hence spread of disease. A decision to slaughter will be taken by the veterinary inspector based on information gathered during the inquiry

(e.g. geographical, epidemiological) and account will be taken of levels of biosecurity. The action that we take will depend on a risk assessment. Where it is believed that the likelihood is that exposed animals are at a high risk of becoming diseased they will be slaughtered. Where that risk is lower and there are the resources to observe the animals, they will be restricted and observed. So our action depends not only on the degree of risk but our ability to mitigate the risk by having available the necessary resources to observe animals regularly and our ability to detect early disease in exposed animals and take immediate action should disease occur.

19. Animals can be exposed to infection by many routes. The following list is not exhaustive and the relative importance of each will depend on a number of factors:

�.a. Direct contact with infected animals

�.b. Airborne Spread

�.c. Movement of a live animal

�.d. Movement of a person

�.e. Movement of vehicles

�.f. Movement of equipment or other materials

�.g. Movement of animal products

�.h. Movement of feedstuffs or bedding

�.i. Movement by wildlife or non-susceptible vector

More details of relevant factors for each are given in Annex B.

To prevent the spread of disease

1. 20. A third type of slaughter policy is “to prevent the spread of disease”, e.g. to create a ‘firebreak’. Such a cull might be required in order to protect areas of high livestock density, either as an addition to emergency vaccination or, in some cases, instead of it. The species and geographical area of the cull would have to be carefully assessed. Use of this power is described by a Disease Control (Slaughter) Protocol as required by the Animal Health Act 1981 as amended. The Protocol identifies the criteria to be considered and procedures to be followed should it be considered necessary to call on this power.

2. 21. The Government intends to use the new slaughter powers only where this is justified by the level of risk of the disease spreading and on the basis of sound veterinary, epidemiological and scientific advice. Vaccination would have been considered first and if not used the reasons would be published.

3. 22. Any decision to use these wider powers of slaughter would be taken in the light of an overall assessment of the risks, costs and benefits in a given situation. This could include not only risks of transmission but also social and economic risks that would arise if effective and timely action were not taken. The Government would justify its decision to use the slaughter powers, explaining the veterinary, epidemiological and other relevant factors that had been taken into account.

DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN

DECISION TREE FOR CONTROL STRATEGIES FOR FMD
Note: Start at top left decision - diamond box number 1

FMD DECISION TREE - FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

Each decision on the tree is taken on the basis of a number of factors. The decision matrix has been based on a USDA paper but has been adapted to take account of the fact that any disease control strategy in the UK must take account of the relevant EU and domestic legal framework.

In using the decision tree, the following factors should be taken into account at each decision point. Modelling – economic & epidemiological – will be used to assist in identifying trigger points. The Government accepted the recommendation of the UK Lessons Learned Inquiry to undertake a cost-benefit analysis of different FMD control strategies. The results from this are due towards the end of 2004 and will help inform decisions concerning disease control strategies in a future outbreak.

At decision box 1: can disease be eradicated by stamping out alone (of Infected Premises and Dangerous Contacts)?

All outbreak and mitigation factors need to be considered at this point in deciding whether stamping out alone will eradicate the disease. However at the start of an outbreak information on many of these factors will be incomplete and this may not be available until well into the outbreak. Decisions may need to be revisited as more information becomes available.

1. Outbreak factors

. • Time from introduction of infection to detection (epidemiology);

. • Contact rate: type of farms; direct and indirect movement and distance of movement; efficacy of movement controls;

. • Host or species affected – the species affected and species at risk (manifestation of clinical signs leading to early recognition): domestic livestock only – whether disease is in pigs, cattle or sheep; game farms/zoos – how effective would isolation methods be; wildlife.

. • Status of outbreak – estimation of the extent of the geographical distribution of FMD and duration of epidemic: number of affected herds; number of foci of infection; rate of spread. Use of epidemiological models.

. • Environmental: livestock density and distribution; livestock management; standards of biosecurity; casual access – network of roads, etc; physical barriers.

. • Climate – does it favour airborne spread?

Mitigation factors:

. • Physical resources: slaughter capacity; transportation capacity; disposal capacity. Incineration - max 1500 tonnes per week. Rendering - max 15,000 tonnes per week (Combined weekly capacity before licensed landfill or on-farm disposal options would need to be considered is 16,500 tonnes which is equivalent to approximately 33,000 cattle, or 330,000 sheep or 165,000 pigs).

. • Human resources: emergency response system i.e. are there sufficiently trained staff for stamping out and to maintain movement controls; what are the epidemic projections? Defra’s Contingency Plan identifies the resources needed to deal with an outbreak of FMD.

. • Socio-political factors: The EU FMD Directive requires slaughter of all susceptible animals on Infected Premises and provides for culling of susceptible animals on epidemiologically linked holdings (known as Dangerous Contacts); public opinion; industry acceptance; other affected sectors e.g. tourism.

. • Economic considerations: compensation; value of exports and value of other affected sectors e.g. tourism.

Decision Box 2: is emergency vaccination possible?

2. Physical resources to be considered:

. • Vaccine strain availability – Is there a vaccine available? The UK has its own stocks of 8 different FMD antigen strains held, on its behalf, by a commercial supplier. In addition, the EU Vaccine Bank holds a range of antigens for emergency use.

. • Number of vaccine doses available – Doses available vary depending on the strains. (Defra is keeping the availability of strains and quantities under review).

. • Emergency vaccination strategy i.e. ring or firebreak vaccination – the strategy would depend on factors such as the virulence of the strain, number of foci of infection, density and species of livestock in likely vaccination zone, etc. Arrangements for a process of prior registration of zoos and rare breeds for possible emergency vaccination in a future outbreak are currently being developed.

. • Vaccination logistics – this will be covered by the SVS operational field instructions. To comply with the UK Marketing Authorisation for FMD vaccines, a second dose would be required 3-4 weeks after the first dose. However, the need for a second inoculation or a booster will depend on the length of time that active disease is present. Where the policy is vaccinate-to-slaughter a 1-dose strategy is more likely to be used. (In an emergency, Article 8 of Directive 2001/82 /EC would provisionally allow the use of FMD vaccines which do not have UK Marketing Authorisations (MAs) in the absence of a suitable medicinal product and after informing the Commission of the detailed conditions of use.)

. • Vaccine distribution – vaccine would be procured centrally and distributed to field vaccination teams via regional vaccination centres.

• Laboratory capacity/ability to distinguish vaccinates from infected – Laboratory capacity exists to undertake testing. However, there are currently no internationally recognised standards for NSP testing. There are a variety of NSP tests at differing levels of validation and a number of NSP tests are commercially available. These tests are being evaluated at IAH, Pirbright to inform the Government on best currently available NSP test to hold as a contingency reserve. The Government accepts that the validation of NSP (non-structural protein) tests is a key area. There are currently a number of research projects in the UK, Europe and America and many of the European groups are partners in a European Union Concerted Action project on FMD diagnosis. The main limiting factor for the validation of such tests is the availability of suitable panels of sera, especially from vaccinated and then challenged animals. Defra is supporting research into this area. In addition, the Government also accepts that there is a need to develop accepted strategies for surveillance after vaccination. This is something that the OIE has under consideration.

• Time – Whether there would be enough time for vaccination to be completed before spread of infection would depend on the epidemiological projections during the outbreak. Need for modelling input.

�.3. Human resources to be considered:

. • Emergency response system – need to have sufficient numbers of vaccinators available. At present there are 50 fully trained vaccination teams (each consisting of 1 vaccinator, 1 ear tag reader and 1 recorder) available and operationally capable of vaccinating on day 5 of an outbreak. Some 25 vets have also been recruited to support this initial response team. Current arrangements also provide for these numbers to be ramped up within 4/5 days of notification to meet the needs of any reasonable disease scenario. There are also human resource implications in carrying out NSP testing of all vaccinated herds/flocks and in the establishment of a vaccination surveillance area.

. • Movement controls are a recognised part of any UK control strategy. Specific restrictions will apply on movement of vaccinated animals and products from vaccinated animals within the vaccination zone as laid down by the EU Directive. There will be welfare considerations in establishing a vaccination zone. Need sufficient staff to monitor movement controls. There will also be a vaccination surveillance zone of at least 10km around a protective vaccination zone.

. • Epidemic projections – different for each outbreak.

�.4. Socio-political factors to be considered:

. • Stakeholders – a communications plan is in place. Active engagement with stakeholders has highlighted the role of the FSA advice on safety.

. • Available legislation – Powers to vaccinate against FMD are available. The AHA 1981 as amended by the AHA 2002 provides enhanced powers of entry for emergency vaccination of susceptible animals. Any decision to carry out emergency vaccination would have to be agreed by the EU. Parallel OIE rules need also to be considered.

. • Industry opinion – Stakeholders to be kept involved in developments connected with the issue of vaccination i.e. FMD Directive, changes to the OIE Code, implications for the resumption of trade. Stakeholder involvement (should be all-inclusive) and agreement would be important in any decision to vaccinate.

5. Economic considerations to be considered:

. • Cost of vaccination – as part of its contingency planning, against a future outbreak of FMD, the UK has purchased a range of antigens. Additional costs would be those of formulating the vaccine from the antigen, or of acquiring vaccine if the strain was not one held. The cost of vaccination equipment, training and employing staff as part of a vaccination campaign also needs to be costed into the equation.

. • Value of exports – the extended period in which exports would be restricted would need to be weighed against the benefit to wider rural economy and tourism from killing and disposing of fewer animals.

. • Regionalisation – would be required under the FMD Directive where the outbreak threatens to become extensive or if emergency vaccination is used. The Directive sets out the controls that would apply within a regionalised zone.

Decision Box 3: is the exit strategy “vaccinate to live”?

�.6. Physical resources to be considered:

. • Slaughter capacity – vaccinate to live is likely to reduce pressure on slaughter capacity whereas vaccinate to slaughter might lead to higher numbers for slaughter than a stamping out policy (the Dutch experience). Capacity would need to be able to cope with slaughter of vaccinates and slaughter of infected livestock in a vaccinate-to-slaughter scenario.

. • Disposal capacity – The higher numbers generated by a vaccinate to slaughter policy may result in disposal becoming a limiting factor. A vaccinate to live policy would help alleviate disposal problems.

. • Controls on products from vaccinated animals - Under EU rules, products from vaccinates would need to be kept separate from non-vaccinates. The FMD Directive sets out the post vaccination controls that would be required following emergency vaccination.

. • Time – If a vaccinate to slaughter policy was followed it would be more cost-effective to cull after the first inoculation. See Box 2 criteria on physical resources.

. • Identification: additional, permanent and indelible identification of vaccinated livestock is required under the new FMD Directive so that either one can ensure that products from vaccinates are correctly treated (in the case of a vaccinate-to-live policy) or all vaccinates are killed (in the event of a vaccinate to kill policy being implemented). Call-off contracts are being put in place to purchase plastic button ear tags to identify vaccinated animals.

2. 7. Human resources to be considered:

• Emergency response system – Current and future arrangements for delivery of a vaccination programme take account of the need to implement a vaccinate to live strategy which, by implication, may require 2 or more doses to be administered. For a vaccinate to

slaughter policy, we would need to consider whether we had the

necessary staff i.e. slaughtermen. Intensified surveillance will be

carried out in the 10km area (vaccination surveillance area)

surrounding the vaccination zone.

• Epidemic projections. As above.

�.8. Socio-political factors to be considered:

. • Available legislation – The AHA allows for emergency vaccination as does the FMD Directive. The AHA allows for the slaughter of vaccinates and for payment of compensation for vaccinated animals which are compulsorily slaughtered. The FMD Directive explicitly provides for the option of suppressive vaccination i.e. vaccination to kill, as well as protective vaccination i.e.. vaccination to live. The Government has made clear its preference for protective vaccination.

. • Public opinion – Public are likely to support a vaccinate to live policy and this would be in line with Follett and Anderson Inquiry recommendations. FSA advice is that labelling of vaccinated products would not be required.

. • Industry acceptance –possible pressure from trade, and other Member States, to slaughter vaccinates to regain FMD free status. Currently engaging with industry stakeholders.

�.9. Economic considerations to be considered:

. • Cost of vaccinate to slaughter – include the costs of vaccination (Box 4) plus the cost of slaughter and disposal of all vaccinates.

. • FMD free status – this can be regained 3 months earlier where suppressive vaccination is used. However, there are other economic considerations that will need to be taken into account in a full cost benefit analysis (see earlier decision boxes).

. • Compensation – Cost of compensation for slaughtered vaccinates would substantially increase overall costs of epidemic.

. • Value of exports versus benefit to wider rural economy.

. • Regionalisation – As for Box 2.

At decision box 4: are there additional culling strategies that are appropriate to the circumstances?

In some circumstances culling additional to DCs and IPs may be the optimal solution based on a risk assessment. This culling could take a number of forms – contiguous premises (where these are judged to have been exposed to infection) or preventive culling where scientific and veterinary advice is that this will prevent further spread of disease outwith the area. In choosing between these and other additional forms of culling a number of factors will need to be taken into account:

10. Socio-political factors to be considered:

. • Available legislation – The Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended) provides the necessary powers including the power to slaughter preemptively in order to stop the spread of the disease. The AHA places a duty on the Secretary of State to consider emergency vaccination before using the pre-emptive slaughter powers. The FMD Directive also provides for a preventive cull.

. • Public & industry opinion - contiguous and 3km culls were controversial aspects of FMD 2001.

11. Economic considerations to be considered:

. • compensation – additional culling may significantly increase the
amount paid in compensation.

. • value of exports & other economic costs particularly in the wider
countryside and for tourism. There are extra costs involved in
additional culling.

. • Regionalisation – this is provided for by the FMD Directive.

At decision box 5: are resources available for additional culling strategies?

A limiting factor is whether adequate resources exist to accommodate the anticipated number of additional livestock in addition to those slaughtered under stamping out.

12. Physical resources to be considered:

. • slaughter capacity – does the capacity exist to slaughter animals both under the stamping out policy and additional culling;

. • transportation capacity – does the transport capacity exist to remove animals from farm for disposal under an additional culling scenario;

. • disposal capacity - does the capacity exist to dispose of animals under the stamping out policy and additional culling in environmentally acceptable ways;

. • time i.e. are there sufficient resources to accommodate additional culling before such livestock develop FMD; identification of all premises included in an additional cull.

13. Human resources to be considered:

. • emergency response system i.e. are there sufficiently trained staff to carry out an additional culling policy without adversely impacting on other key control policies i.e. enforcing movement controls, etc;

. • what are the epidemic projections – epidemiological modelling of high risk groups.

. • Identification of all premises included in an additional cull.

SOME OF THE ROUTES BY WHICH ANIMALS CAN BE EXPOSED TO INFECTION

a. Direct contact with infected animals

1. Infection is rapidly and efficiently passed from an infected animal to an uninfected, susceptible animal by direct contact between the animals. When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following direct contact with an infected live animal, the following factors will be taken into account:

i. Physical nature of barrier between infected animal and susceptible uninfected animal.

ii. Distance between animals.

iii. Nature of the contact between animals.

iv. Amount of virus excretion.

b. Airborne Spread

2. Virus can be exhaled by an infected animal. The virus may be carried on air currents to susceptible, uninfected stock. The greatest risk of infection will be to stock on premises that are close to an IP though under certain circumstances more distant premises, possibly some distance away, may also be considered to have been exposed by such a route. (This is different to the culling to prevent the spread of disease that is covered in paragraph 25). When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following airborne spread of virus the following factors will be taken into account:

i. Species of infected animals.

ii. Species of uninfected, susceptible animals.

iii. Pathogenicity and virulence of the viral strain.

�.iv. Prevailing wind direction during the period when animals on the IP are considered to have been excreting virus in exhaled air.

�.v. Distance between the infected and uninfected animals.

vi. Environmental conditions that could contribute to virus survival,

e.g. temperature and humidity.

vii. Likelihood of release of airborne virus, e.g. nature of housing or measures to control air outlets from housed livestock.

viii. Likelihood of exposure to the airborne virus. e.g. nature of housing or measures to control air supply to livestock.

c. Movement of a live animal

1. 3. Before disease is suspected and subsequently confirmed on a premises it is possible that an animal could, quite legitimately, have moved off that premises. Although disease had not been suspected, it is possible that disease was present when that animal moved off the premises. If that animal was itself infected it could infect other susceptible livestock at any time after leaving the premises.

2. 4. When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following the movement of a live animal, the following factors will be taken into account:

i. Likelihood the animal could have taken infection from the IP.

ii. Nature of contact with susceptible uninfected animals. (See (a) above.)

d. Movement of a person

5. A person moving from a premises where infection was present could transmit infective material on their skin, hair, clothes or footwear. When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following the movement of a person, the following factors will be taken into account:

i. Likelihood that the person could have taken infection from the IP.

ii. Nature of biosecurity measures on leaving the IP and before any contact with susceptible uninfected animals.

iii. Likelihood the person could have introduced infection to susceptible uninfected animals.

e. Movement of vehicles

6. Vehicles could carry infection from a premises where infection was present to other premises where susceptible livestock are present. Such vehicles could include:

i. Livestock transports.

ii. Vehicle moving between livestock under the same ownership.

iii. Vehicles collecting agricultural products, e.g. milk, wool etc.

�.iv. Vehicle delivering agricultural products e.g. feed, fertiliser, fuel etc.

�.v. Vehicle delivering non-agricultural products, e.g. post.

vi. Vehicle bringing persons etc for working on the premises.

7. The infective material could be carried anywhere on or in the vehicle. When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following a vehicle movement, the following factors will be taken into account:

i. The nature of the contact with infected animals or materials from infected animals.

ii. Whether there was any cleansing and disinfection of the vehicle after contact with infected animals or materials and before contact with uninfected susceptible livestock.

iii. Whether the conditions during the journey would have rendered the virus non-viable.

iv. The nature of the contact with susceptible uninfected animals.

f. Movement of equipment or other materials

8. Equipment or other materials used on a premises where infection was present could carry infective material to susceptible, uninfected animals. Such equipment could range widely, from large feed mixers to thermometers. In establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following movement of equipment the following factors will be taken into account:

i. The nature of the contact between the item and infected animals.

ii. The nature of the contact between the item and susceptible, uninfected animals.

iii. Whether there was any cleansing and disinfection of the item.

g. Movement of animal products

9. Products from infected animals could contain viable virus that could infect susceptible, uninfected animals. Such products include milk, slurry, manure, meat, carcases (see also scavenging at (j) below). When establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following any movement of animal products the following factors will be taken into account:

i. Likelihood that the product contains viable virus.

ii. Effectiveness of any treatment undertaken before it leaves the IP or before it comes into contact with uninfected susceptible animals.

iii. Interval between removal of product and contact with the susceptible, uninfected animals.

h. Movement of feedstuffs or bedding

10. Products from infected animals could contaminate forages, feedstuffs and bedding materials with viable virus that could infect susceptible, uninfected animals. Such products include hay, silage, straw, materials used to contain or transport such products. In establishing if animals have been exposed to infection following movement of these products the following factors will be taken into account:

i. Likelihood that the product contains viable virus.

ii. Effectiveness of any treatment undertaken before it leaves the IP or comes into contact with uninfected susceptible animals.

iii. Interval between removal of product and contact with the susceptible, uninfected animals.

i. Movement by wildlife or non-susceptible vector

11. This is when a species of animal that is not susceptible to infection carries infective material from an IP either inadvertently or during scavenging.

It is difficult to prevent this though good husbandry should reduce the levels of vermin that are attracted to a premises. Once the animals are slaughtered, and if there is likely to be any delay in disposal, then measures, e.g. rodent control, covering and spraying carcases, etc will be taken by the National Wildlife Management Team, SVS and others to minimise this risk.

ANNEX D

DISEASE CONTROL (SLAUGHTER) PROTOCOL

Introduction

1. 1. The Lessons Learned Inquiry on the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak recommended that provision should be made for the possible application of pre-emptive culling policies, if justified by well-informed veterinary and scientific advice, and judged to be appropriate to the circumstances. Such powers for pre-emptive (or preventive or "firebreak") culling of animals not exposed to FMD infection are provided for by the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended). It adds to the armoury the Government has to fight FMD by getting ahead of the disease and stopping it spreading.

2. 2. Section 32B of the Animal Health Act 1981, as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002, requires the Secretary of State to have a disease control (slaughter) protocol for the use of the new slaughter power in the Act (Schedule 3, paragraph 3(c)) to prevent the spread of foot and mouth disease (FMD). This would be a pre-emptive or “firebreak” cull.

�.3. This power cannot be used unless the protocol has been published and vaccination has first been considered to prevent the spread of disease (Section 14 of the Animal Health Act 1981 as amended). The reasons for not using vaccination would be published. The factors to be considered in deciding on the measures to be used to tackle an outbreak of FMD are set out in a separate document - FMD Disease Control Strategies, referred to as the FMD Decision Tree. The purpose of this disease control (slaughter) protocol is to identify criteria to be considered and procedures to be followed should it be considered necessary to call on this new slaughter power.

�.Purpose for which the power would be used

�.4. This power would be used only where this is justified by the circumstances of the possibility of disease spreading and on the basis of sound veterinary, epidemiological and scientific advice. Emergency vaccination would have been considered first and if not used the reasons would be published.

�.The principal factors to be taken into account

3. 5. A major factor will be to get ahead of the disease. It could apply in particular to protect areas of dense livestock population. The cull would include those animals which, should they become affected, would present a significant risk to the farming and livestock community more generally by contributing to onward spread. It is in such circumstances that effective preventative action may be necessary to safeguard the wider public interest. Species, geographical area and, if appropriate, type of farming would be relevant. Any decision to use the wider powers of slaughter would be taken in the light of an overall assessment of the risks, costs and benefits in a given

situation. This could include not only risks of transmission but also social and economic risks that would arise if effective and timely action were not taken.

The procedure to be followed in reaching a decision

1. 6. Such a decision could not be made until the use of emergency vaccination had been considered and, if not used, the reasons published.

�.7. The steps to be taken would then comprise:

�.(a) the identification of a group of animals that are likely to contribute to spread of disease, based on epidemiological modelling, veterinary advice and local factors;

�.(b) the determination of which species are involved;

�.(c) consideration of exemptions on the basis of husbandry or other criteria, for example, rare breeds or genetic value;

�.(d) the determination of the geographical area involved;

�.(e) the determination of the rules for inclusion or exclusion of animals at the boundary of that area;

�.(f) analysis of risks, costs and benefits;

�.(g) the publication of an outline of the reasons why such a cull is needed.

The procedure by which animals on a premises will be deemed to be included in a slaughter

1. 8. Premises believed to contain animals to be slaughtered to prevent the spread of disease would be identified. A Veterinary Inspector would visit and ascertain if animals meet the criteria and are to be slaughtered.

�.9. The Veterinary Inspector would be required to explain the reasons to the owner and give him an opportunity to provide evidence if he believed the animals should be exempted. To ensure the reason for slaughter is clear to the owner a slaughter notice would be issued. The slaughter notice would state the powers under which slaughter is required and the reason why the owner's stock is included (with reference to the criteria for slaughter to prevent the spread of disease).

�.The means by which a particular decision to slaughter can be reviewed

2. 10. Both as part of the slaughter notice and during explanations the owner must be made aware that they can ask the DVM to review the decision that their stock meet the criteria for the cull and be advised how and by when this can be done.

�.11. The DVM, or a suitable alternative, must be available to hear such reviews. The following action would be taken:

�.(a) they will consider the views of the owner as to why they believe the decision is wrong;

�.(b) they must ensure that the veterinary inspector has carried out a full and fair inquiry to establish if the animals meet the appropriate criteria.

ANNEX E

EMERGENCY VACCINATION ARRANGEMENTS

1. Accommodation

A range of suitable sites which could be used as future vaccination centres are currently being investigated by Defra. In identifying vaccination centres consideration will be given to the following factors:

. • good road access to the target area(s) and to any satellite centres - where possible, within the target area;

. • appropriate security systems (day and night);

. • parking;
• office accommodation for management and administrative staff;

. • appropriate IT and telecoms facilities;

. • secure refrigerated storage facilities for vaccine;

. • storage facilities for equipment (vaccination kits, personal protection equipment, footbaths, buckets, brushes, tagging and inspection equipment etc.);

. • facilities for mixing, storage and safe disposal of disinfectant;

. • suitable area for plunge disinfection of PPE and subsequent drying;

. • suitable area for vaccination team dispatch.

Modular office accommodation will also be made available, depending in circumstances, on a call off basis for use as vaccination centres if required. It is envisaged that each vaccination centre will be accompanied by smaller satellite centres which will exist on a smaller scale.

Defra will also arrange for a appropriate IT computers and telephone lines (land and ISDN) to be installed at the vaccination centre. Defra will also consider providing an emergency generator for use in the case of temporary loss of electricity supply.

2. Equipment

Defra is currently responsible for the provision of equipment to supply the vaccination teams and vaccination centres. At present, there is enough equipment to supply 50 vaccination teams (each consisting of a 1 vaccinator, 1 ear tag reader/tagger and 1 ear tag recorder) - the initial number of teams required to be provided by the contractor under the terms of the present contract (there is also provision for this number to be ramped up depending on circumstances) - and this is stored equally between two sites. Call-off contracts are in place to obtain additional equipment (e.g. additional vaccine guns and needles), should this be required. This equipment will be subject to quality control checks in accordance with a quality management protocol by stores managers.

Defra are currently putting in place a call off contract for mobile cattle/sheep/pig handling facilities.

Upon the identification and establishment of vaccination centre(s) Defra will arrange for sufficient equipment to be dispatched to the vaccination centre for use by the vaccination contractor by the fourth day after the first case has been confirmed. In doing so, Defra will provide the vaccination contractor with a comprehensive inventory of equipment.

3. Personnel

The vaccination contractor is in a position of being operationally capable of vaccinating on day 5 of an outbreak. To arrive at this state of readiness sufficient vaccinators and support staff have been trained to provide 50 teams and some 25 vets have been recruited to support this first response team. Working under the overall control of the SVS, the role of these vets will be to conduct pre-vaccination farm visits, to check for any overt signs of disease, and also to be responsible for the veterinary direction of vaccination teams in the field. The vaccination contractor also has the capability to ramp up the number of vaccination teams to meet any reasonable disease scenario within 4/5 days of notification.

A Health and Safety Team will be established by the vaccination contractor as part of the management of operational aspects. This will consist of a Manager and 2 other trained H&S consultants. This team will produce risk assessments for pre-vaccination visits by vets, for farm vaccinators, on handling facilities and maintain the necessary documentation to accompany this. The vaccination contractor will comply with best practice and all relevant provisions, whether statutory or otherwise, relating to health and safety at work and shall ensure that employees and sub-contractors also comply and shall produce evidence of such compliance if asked to do so.

All external contractors will be provided with, and will make themselves familiar with, Biosecurity Protocols.

To ensure that emergency vaccination could be implemented without delays in any future outbreak, Defra is currently making arrangements, subject to public consultation, for the use of lay vaccinators to be permitted by amending the Veterinary Surgeons Act 1966 and the Medicines Act 1968.

All local recruits to vaccination teams must meet specified criteria, including no contact with susceptible livestock for 3 days prior to starting the programme, during the programme and for 3 days after completion. They must sign to say that they comply.

Defra will convey the scope and policy of the project to the vaccination contractor, and confirm the approach to be taken. This will involve providing vaccine delivery arrangements. Defra will also keep the vaccination contractor informed of all suspect and confirmed cases as they occur and will keep the vaccination contractor informed of current policy and changes which may affect field operations.

4. Vaccine supplies and emergency vaccination arrangements

The UK has its own stocks of 8 different strains of FMD antigen held on its behalf by a commercial supplier. In addition, the EU Vaccine Bank holds a wide range of antigens for emergency use. The number of doses available and strains is kept under review, including taking advice from IAH Pirbright on those strains of FMD which present the greatest risk to the UK. As soon as the FMD strain responsible for the outbreak is identified and it has been confirmed that one of the antigens held in the UK bank will afford protection, the supplier will be instructed to formulate vaccine. Vaccine formulation by the designated external contractor takes 4 days.

A call-off contract is in place with the external contractor for the delivery of vaccine (stored at the correct temperature) to the vaccination centre.

When an emergency vaccination zone is set up, a vaccination surveillance area of at least 10 km width will be designated.

Upon establishment of the emergency vaccination zone, the vaccination contractor will then produce a complete list of holdings within selected parishes (or other agreed area to be targeted) in the Vaccination Control Zone and identify those with animals that require vaccination as advised by Defra. This information will be drawn together from the following sources, which Defra will provide access to, where appropriate:-

. • Defra Census Data;

. • The Rural Payments Agency (RPA);

. • Cattle Tracing System (CTS);

. • Integrated Administration and Control (IACS) data;

. • Defra’s Disease Control System (DCS) on Infected Premises and Dangerous Contacts;

. • Contextual datasets, such as Ordnance Survey (OS), Boundary Line (to produce parish and county boundaries), and OS raster map products.

. • List of holdings containing a breeding nucleus of animal genetic resources (rare breeds).

The vaccination contractor will then contact farmers to arrange visits (giving 3 days notice where possible) and check animal handling facilities.

Pre-vaccination visits by veterinary surgeons appointed by the vaccination contractor will be arranged to carry out inspections which will detect suspected FMD and to exclude these from the vaccination programme.

Teams will be withdrawn from farms where clinical signs of FMD have been discovered. In doing so, biosecurity protocols must be followed (i.e. remove traces of organic matter from clothing, equipment, disinfect and remove any protective clothing at gate, wash wellingtons, waterproofs and equipment (inc.

vehicles) with an approved disinfectant, and place all items for disposal into a clinical waste bag, which should then be sealed for disposal. Teams would be redeployed after suitable biosecurity protocols have been followed and a 72 hour break.

Where FMD is not found, vaccination teams will be deployed to carry out vaccination, record animal numbers, collect and return records. Vaccinated animals will be indelibly marked in a manner advised by Defra. For identification purposes, vaccinated animals will be ear tagged and their details recorded on a stand alone database which will link into DCS.

Under the current UK Marketing Authorisation conditions, FMD vaccine is authorised for use as a multi dose vaccine i.e. the initial vaccine is followed by a second 3-4 weeks later, and a further booster after six months (or every 4 weeks after the initial vaccine is administered in the case of pigs.)

The vaccination contractor will also provide progress reports and ad hoc management information to National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) Page Street by 18.00 hours daily.

ANNEX F DIAGRAM SHOWING PROTECTION ZONE AND SURVEILLANCE ZONE

These terms are in line with the new FMD Directive (Council Directive 2003/85/EC). The geographical delimitation of the Zones shall take account of administrative boundaries, natural boundaries, supervision facilities and technological progress which makes it possible to predict the probable dispersion of the foot and mouth virus by air or any other means. Article 21 of the FMD Directive refers.

ANNEX G

VETERINARY RISK ASSESSMENT AND PROTOCOL FOR RIGHTS OF WAY CLOSURE

Veterinary Risk Assessment

In the event of an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, what is the risk of causing further outbreaks of FMD if footpaths are open to the public?

1. Summary of Risk Assessment

Great Britain is classified as FMD free, in the event of a new introduction of disease, there is a risk that walkers using footpaths could cause further outbreaks. Infection may result from contaminated persons or accompanying animals arriving at the footpath and subsequently passing on infection to livestock or by persons or accompanying animals becoming contaminated while using the footpath and passing infection to livestock then or at a later time.

The factors considered to be most responsible for increasing this risk are:

. • contact with infected premises or premises where animals have been exposed to the risk of infection prior to arrival at footpaths

. • contact with livestock prior to arrival at footpaths

. • failure to disinfect footwear prior to arrival at footpaths

. • proximity of the footpath to livestock areas, including infected premises and premises where animals have been exposed to the risk of infection

. • presence of accompanying animals

. • failure to limit access for persons or accompanying animals from footpaths to livestock areas failure to limit access by livestock to footpaths, resulting in deposits of faeces, urine, milk etc.

. • contact with livestock while in locality of footpaths

. • contact with surroundings (including pasture and foliage) while in locality of footpath

. • meteorological and environment conditions which influence virus survival

. • failure to disinfect footwear after leaving locality of footpaths

. • contact with livestock after leaving locality of footpaths

. • contact with surroundings (including pasture and foliage) after leaving locality of footpath

Of these, the major factors are:

. • proximity of the footpath to livestock areas, including infected premises and premises where animals have been exposed to the risk of infection

. • contact with livestock prior to arrival at footpaths

. • contact with livestock while in locality of footpaths

. • contact with livestock after leaving locality of footpaths

. • failure to limit access for livestock to footpaths, resulting in deposits of faeces, urine, milk etc.

2. Summary of Risk Management options and rationale

This section identifies ways in which the risks which have been identified can be managed, taking no account of whether the management options are practical or proportionate to the level of risk. Theoretical risk management options include:-

i. Closing all footpaths over land which may be grazed by livestock, making public access a criminal offence.

ii. Closing footpaths only in areas where the risk of FMD virus being present is greatest

iii. Preventing or discouraging access by those who keep or handle susceptible livestock in the course of their work, and so are most likely to have been exposed to and contaminated by FMD virus.

iv. Permitting access but encouraging the public

. • to wear clean clothing and footwear so that they do not introduce infection to an area;

. • to avoid walking amongst livestock, and, in particular, NEVER to handle or touch animals, and

• to use any disinfectant footbaths or pads which the landowner may choose to provide.

Regulating access in accordance with the likelihood that infected animals or their products may be encountered. The risks are greatest on Form A and Form D premises, but entry and exit to and from these are already controlled by statute. Elsewhere the risk diminishes with distance as follows: -

. • within the protection zone, normally an area of 3km radius around an Infected Premises in an Infected Area

. • within an Infected Area outside any protection zone

. • within a Controlled Area

. • where no FMD controls are in force.

In addition to geographical factors, risk may diminish with time. Virus viability on pasture is limited and is dependent on meteorological conditions. Virus survival during the summer months is limited by warmer, drier weather. Meteorological conditions will be more favourable to virus survival on pasture during the winter months.

3. Recommended action

i. FMD virus may be introduced to previously uninfected premises in many ways: by airborne spread; by the movement of infected animals, feed or bedding; and by the movement of people, vehicles or equipment contaminated with the virus. Transmission by people has been recorded on many occasions, but those responsible have generally had close contact with animals on infected, and then on uninfected, premises. It is theoretically possible that walkers who had not had direct contact with infected animals could carry infection to previously uninfected animals, although there is no evidence that this has actually happened and the risk, if any, is small in comparison to other transmission risks.

ii. Even small risks can be further diminished by appropriate action, but the cost may outweigh the benefit. There is a balance to be struck between the need to control FMD and the damage that controls do to other important industries, such as tourism. Draconian action may be unnecessary and inappropriate, particularly if universally applied.

iii. There is no veterinary justification for closing all footpaths and preventing all public access to land. A more measured response, which takes account of both public perception and of the real risk, is required. The latter is the product of many factors, including the prevalence of infection in an area, the presence or absence of susceptible livestock, and the density of the livestock if present.

�.iv. Viable virus is most likely to be picked up on premises which have been recently infected or exposed to the risk of infection by human, animal, or animal product movement, or by proximity. Premises on which infection is suspected or has been confirmed, or on which animals have been exposed to the risk of infection, are subject to restrictions which prohibit entry or exit except under licence. Restrictions on individual premises may remain in force for many months, particularly on premises where full cleansing and disinfection is not carried out for any reason. The risk that walkers will come into contact with FMD virus on premises on which final cleansing and disinfection has been completed is very small, and even on premises where it has not, there is virtually no risk from walking on the land (as opposed to through yards or buildings) after a sufficient period of time has elapsed.

�.v. Even on premises which are not subject to Form A or Form D restrictions, infection may be present but unrecognised. The risk is greatest in premises situated in the Protection Zone of an Infected Area, less in Infected Areas outside Protection Zones, much less in Controlled Areas, and least where there are no restrictions or where restrictions have been lifted.

vi. Whatever the status of an area there is only a very small risk that walkers who have not recently handled or been in direct contact with susceptible livestock will introduce infection from elsewhere, or spread infection from one premises to another. The risk is greatest on land close to an Infected Premises on which FMD has recently been confirmed and diminishes with time. A high density of livestock increases the likelihood of contact between walkers and animals, and so increases any risk of transmission.

vii. The single most effective method of reducing any risk posed by walkers is to ensure that they have not handled or been in contact with susceptible livestock before or during their visit. Enforcement of such a condition is not practicable but it is reasonable to suppose that most walkers will respect the interests of the community at large by taking precautions which will minimise the risk of spreading FMD.

viii. It is extremely unlikely that walkers will come into contact with viable FMD virus. The risk of transmission by walkers from one farm to another is therefore very small. The following action can be justified:

. • Allow public access to all paths and rights of way, but publicise and seek the co-operation of walkers in observing the following precautions intended to protect the disease - free status of the area:

. • start your walk wearing clean footwear and clothing;

. • do not approach, touch or handle livestock;

. • keep dogs on a lead wherever there are livestock;

. • take any waste, including food, home; and

. • use any disinfectant footpads or baths which the landowner provides.

�.ix. Even when area restrictions are lifted, individual premises may remain under restriction for much longer than is necessary to control the risk that walkers and ramblers may come into contact with viable virus and carry infection to other premises. Virus survival on land at any time of the year is unlikely to extend beyond the date when final cleansing and disinfection of the premises is completed or more than three months from the date of preliminary cleansing and disinfection if this is sooner.

�.x. Entry to and exit from restricted premises is normally permissible only under licence but there is statutory provision for this requirement to be discontinued or modified. It is therefore feasible to allow footpaths on restricted premises to reopen whilst other restrictions (such as that which prevents restocking) remain in force.

xi. It is therefore recommended that:

. • In the event of an outbreak, footpaths and bridleways should be closed within the Protection Zone, normally the area within a 3km radius of an infected place. In exceptional circumstances, following a veterinary risk assessment, the area may be larger than this in order to control the spread of disease. Such circumstances might arise, for example, where it is believed that conditions have allowed windborne dissemination of virus in high concentration over a large area. Footpaths and bridleways should remain closed until the protection zone restrictions have been lifted. This will normally be when the Infected Area restrictions are lifted.

. • Footpaths and bridleways which only cross the land of restricted premises should be reopened as soon as the completion of final cleansing and disinfection has been certified. However, footpaths which pass through farmyards and buildings should be temporarily diverted, but if this cannot be done, they should remain closed until supervised restocking has been completed and restrictions lifted.

• If full cleansing and disinfection is being undertaken but has been delayed then footpaths and bridleways which cross the land only may be reopened

3 months after the preliminary cleansing and disinfection. However, footpaths which pass through farmyards and buildings should be temporarily diverted, but if this cannot be done, they should remain closed until supervised restocking has been completed and restrictions lifted.

. • If full cleansing and disinfection is not being undertaken at all then footpaths and bridleways which cross the land only may be opened 3 months after the preliminary cleansing and disinfection. However, footpaths which pass through farmyards and buildings should be temporarily diverted, but if this cannot be done, they should remain closed until the restrictions are lifted.

ANNEX H

Protocol for restrictions on public rights of way and access to open country, in the event of an outbreak of Foot and Mouth or similar animal diseases.

This document has recently been out for public consultation. All the comments received are being considered.

Revised guidance will be produced shortly and published on Defra’s website.

Preface

This protocol has been prepared for use in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth or similar animal disease. It aims to guide the exercise of powers to close land where the closure affects public rights of way or land over which the public have access.

The Foot and Mouth Disease Order 1983 (as amended) gives inspectors appointed under the Animal Health Act 1981 powers to prohibit entry on to land within designated areas in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth. The power incidentally enables the prohibition of entry on to any public right of way or land to which the public have access situated within the designated areas.

Summary of the Protocol

When the exercise of these powers would affect a public right of way or land to which the public have access, Inspectors:

. • should use their powers sparingly and only as far as is necessary to control the spread of the disease;

. • should prohibit entry to land within the protection zone (see paragraph 5 for definitions) only where this is justified on the basis of advice contained in the Government’s veterinary risk assessment (and not one commissioned by any other authority);

. • should prohibit entry to land that is within an infected area but outside the protection zone only when there is clear and specific written veterinary advice that not doing so would undermine other measures aimed at controlling the spread of disease;

• should keep prohibitions of entry under review and lift them as soon as there is no longer any justification for preventing public access on the

grounds of disease control; they must ensure that notices prohibiting entry to land are removed as soon as the prohibitions are lifted;

. • must only prohibit entry to land outside infected areas where they have the express written consent of the Secretary of State.

Local Highway Authorities:

• should use their powers in the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 to take action against anyone displaying notices that contain false or misleading statements likely to deter the public from using a public right of way.

Introduction

1. 1. This protocol contains Government guidance on the degree to which restrictions on public access to the countryside should be imposed in any future outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease, or other similar animal diseases. It has been prepared by the Government following advice and recommendations by both Lord Haskins and the Rural Task Force.

2. 2. The approach set out here is based on the lessons learnt from the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak. However, as the nature and circumstances of a future outbreak may differ from those of the 2001 outbreak this approach may need to be adapted to the type of outbreak then being faced. This protocol is therefore a starting point for an evidence-based approach and will be reviewed on a regular basis

3. 3. This protocol has been drawn up in relation to Foot and Mouth Disease. But it is intended that the protocol would form the basis for the Government’s approach to dealing with other similar diseases.

4. 4. As recommended by Lord Haskins and the Rural Task Force, the protocol is based on the clear principle that there should be a presumption in favour of maintaining public access. Thus, any decision to close land over which there is a public of right of way, or where there is public open space or access to open country, should be taken only when it is clearly necessary to do so and after having carefully considered:

. • the requirement for disease control, as informed by the Government’s veterinary risk assessment, which will include an assessment of any risk that rights of way users and other visitors to the countryside could spread disease; and

. • the recreational and economic value of the rights of way network and other countryside access and the likely impact of closure on the users of the network, visitors to the countryside and the businesses that depend on them.

5. The terms used in this protocol are defined as follows:

Infected Place – means premises where disease has been confirmed.

Protection Zone – means an area of at least 3 km radius around an infected place (beyond which the risk of infection is significantly diminished). The exact extent of the protection zone will depend on the Government’s veterinary risk assessment commissioned at the time.

Infected Area – means the area around an infected place in which foot and mouth disease controls will apply and within which a protection zone lies. The area is declared by order (article 17(1) of the Foot and Mouth Disease Order 1983). It normally consists of an area with a boundary not less than 10 km beyond the infected place, using as a boundary the next closest geographical feature beyond a 10 km radius, for example a road or river.

Controlled Area – means an area declared by order (article 30(1) of the Foot and Mouth Disease Order 1983), in which some foot and mouth disease controls may apply. These controls may be less strict than in infected areas. In the 2001 outbreak, for example, all of Great Britain was declared a controlled area.

Inspector – means a person appointed by the Secretary of State or by a local authority for the purposes of the Animal Health Acts or a veterinary inspector appointed by the Secretary of State. The Foot and Mouth Disease Order 1983 (as amended) gives an Inspector the power to prohibit the entry of any person onto any land (including land over which there is a public right of way or to which the public otherwise have lawful access) within an infected area (article 28). An Inspector has similar powers in relation to a controlled area, but these powers can only be exercised with the prior written consent of the Secretary of State (article 37A).

Veterinary advice

1. 6. This protocol is based on veterinary advice and the experience of the 2001 foot and mouth disease outbreak. Both the advice and the protocol will be kept under review and regularly updated in the light of any advance in knowledge.

2. 7. Current veterinary advice is that outside the protection zones, the risk of rights of way users and other visitors to the countryside spreading foot and mouth or similar disease is very small indeed. Consequently, although rights of way and other forms of public access within protection zones may need to be closed where the evidence justifies this, those outside protection zones may safely be kept open. Farmers and other people in contact with animals or areas where animals congregate pose a considerably greater risk of spreading disease than rights of way users. Such persons will be subject to more stringent biosecurity measures. Defra has published separate biosecurity guidance for consultation, as required by the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002).

Exercise of powers

1. 8. The power to prohibit entry by any person onto any land in the event of an outbreak of foot and mouth disease is contained in articles 28 and 37A of the Foot and Mouth Disease Order 1983 (as amended). Recognising that the unnecessary closure of public rights of way and other forms of public access is to be avoided, the power temporarily provided by Government to local authorities in 2001 to allow blanket closures will not be reinstated in the event of any future outbreak.

2. 9. The powers in articles 28 and 37A of the 1983 Order can be exercised by any inspector, whether appointed by a local authority or the Government. The Government’s policy, however, is that, in relation to an infected area the power is best exercised by local authorities. This is because local authorities are better informed about local circumstances and have, in any event, general responsibility for rights of way and other forms of public access. However Defra have the powers to lift entry prohibitions imposed by local authority Inspectors.

THE USE OF POWERS FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE ORDER 1983 (AS AMENDED) TO CLOSE RIGHTS OF WAY AND OTHER PUBLIC ACCESS

On Infected places

10. Entry to an infected place, including rights of way and other (otherwise lawful) public access will be prohibited by an Inspector. This is done by posting a notice to this effect at each entrance to the land in question.

Within infected areas

1. 11. Outside the protection zone, entry to rights of way and other (otherwise lawful) public access should be kept open unless there is clear and specific written veterinary advice that to do so would undermine other measures to control the spread of disease. Inspectors should keep prohibitions of entry under review and lift such prohibitions as soon as there is no longer any justification for denying public access on the grounds of disease control.

2. 12. Entry to rights of way and other land within the protection zone may be prohibited, where justified on the basis of advice in the Government’s veterinary risk assessment (not one commissioned by any other authority).

3. 13. Powers should be used sparingly and in such a way that when rights of way or other forms of access have to be closed, they are closed up to a junction with another right of way or highway, or in the case of open areas to a clearly definable physical feature, e.g. a road or river, rather than by reference to some point at an arbitrary distance from the infected place.

In controlled areas

14. Inspectors can only exercise the power to prohibit entry to land outside an infected area if that land has been declared a controlled area by order – and only then with the express written consent of the Secretary of State. This consent will only be given in exceptional circumstances and in response to a compelling written case for doing so.

Information

1. 15. The Government will ensure that guidance is made available to local authorities from the earliest possible stage of an outbreak and that this is backed by a current veterinary risk assessment. The Government will also give high priority to ensuring that up to date information is readily available to the public about which rights of way, and other areas normally open to public access, have been closed by establishing a formal communications structure as detailed in Defra’s Foot and Mouth Disease Contingency Plan.

2. 16. Attention will be given to improving the understanding of both farmers and visitors to the countryside of their roles and responsibilities in minimising the risk of spreading contagious animal disease. A careful evidence-based approach will be essential in the event of a future outbreak. Defra will publish its risk assessments to explain why some activities are higher risk than others.

Unjustified closure notices

1. 17. Inspectors should either deny access where this is necessary or, if not, allow it. Precautionary notices such as “This footpath is open, but please consider whether your walk is necessary” should neither be posted nor sanctioned by local authorities. Inspectors should ensure that notices prohibiting entry to land are removed as soon as the restrictions prohibiting entry can be lifted.

2. 18. Local authorities should use their powers under section 57 of the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949 to prosecute any person displaying a notice containing false or misleading statements likely to deter the public from using a right of way. If convicted under section 57 a person displaying such a notice may be ordered by the courts to remove it.

ANNEX I CONTACTS LIST The following lists key personnel who must be notified in the event of a

confirmed outbreak (i.e. Alert State: Red)
Stakeholders from within the wider rural community will be contacted as

soon as possible. Lists of these stakeholders are held by AHWD and DG
LURA.
IT IS EXPECTED THAT ALL DIRECTORS WILL CASCADE THE

INFORMATION TO THEIR MEMBERS OF STAFF For Notification by Head of AMED Policy Division:

All Defra Ministers and Special Advisers Defra Permanent Secretary Defra Director General: Operations and Service Delivery Defra Director: Legal Services A Defra Chief Scientific Adviser Defra Director General: Environmental Protection Defra Director General: Food, Farming and Fisheries Defra Director General: Land Use and Rural Affairs Defra Director: Finance, Planning and Resources Defra Director: Corporate Services Defra Director: Communications No. 10 - Secretariat (Senior Policy Adviser - Agriculture) Office of Science & Technology - Chief Scientific Adviser Cabinet Office - Permanent Secretary HM Treasury - EFRA SEERAD WAGAD DARDNI National Farmers Union Tenant Farmers Association Country Land and Business Association Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services Meat and Livestock Commission Food and Drink Federation Central Association of Agricultural Valuers Food Standards Agency The Countryside Agency English Nature

For Notification by DCVO (Policy)

European Commission Office International des Epizooties (OIE) Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons British Veterinary Association Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals

For Notification by CVO

Department of Health Health Protection Agency

For Notification by DG OSD

Head of Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat Ministry of Defence, Home and Special Forces Secretariat Regional Co-ordination Unit Directors of relevant Government Offices in the Regions

For Notification by Director General Land Use and Rural Affairs

Department for Culture, Media and Sport

For Notification by Head of SVS Contingency Planning Division:

HsVS and DVMs
Defra Director: Environment Quality & Waste
Defra Director: Rural Economies & Communities
Defra Director: e-Business
Defra Contingency Planning and Security Division – Contingencies Branch
Head of Procurement and Contracts Division
Rural Development Service (Head and Regional Managers)
Rural Payments Agency
Environment Agency
Government Offices in the Regions: Resilience Directors
Cabinet Office Economic and Domestic Affairs Secretariat
Cabinet Office European Secretariat
Home Office
Association of Chief Police Officers
Department for Transport
Department for Work and Pensions

(Jobcentre Plus - Operational Support Secretariat)
Local Government Association
Licensed Animal Slaughterers and Salvage Association (LASSA)
UK Renderers Association

Environmental Services Association Freight Transport Association Vaccination Contractor

ANNEX J

COMMUNICATIONS

ACTION BY COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE

- ON NOTIFICATION OF SUSPICION (Amber Alert)

CVO, or nominated representative, to alert Communications Division:

In office hours approach one of the following in this order:
Director of Communications, Head of News, Chief Press Officer (Food and
Farming), Animal Health Desk.

Out of hours (before 8.30am, after 18.30pm and weekends), one of the
following:

Duty Press Officer (via duty room on xxxxxx)

Director of Communications, Head of News, Chief Press Officer (Food and
Farming), Animal Health Desk (phone numbers via duty room).

Director of Communication and Chief Press Officer (F and F) to ensure:

- Immediate alert of various parts of CD command including website, helpline, publicity branch, briefing unit, library, Internal Communications Unit and Communications Planning Unit; then No 10 press office, Media Monitoring Unit, Strategic Communications Unit and the News Co-ordination Centre.

- Reference to Communications Protocol: Animal Disease and its procedures for transmitting information both internally and externally.

- Deployment of press officers in national press office to deal with influx of calls.

- Identification of press officer(s) to be sent to the region(s) to provide support additional to local Government News Network.

- Consideration with Ministers, officials and No 10 Press Office of the need for a press notice, Ministerial availability for interview; and possible requirement for briefing of media.

- If there is a 5 mile (8km) movement restriction zone around the suspicious case, Chief Press Officer (Food and Farming) to liaise with AHWD and Ministers the terms of a press notice to be issued nationally and locally as quickly as possible.

- News Co-ordination Centre to liaise with CD Briefing Unit on compiling inter-departmental briefing and ensure its dissemination. The NCC also to advise on co-ordination of Governmental websites, internal communications, publicity and helplines.

Chief Press Officer (Food and Farming) to ensure this release is put on the website, externally and internally, simultaneously. (Head of Internal Communications responsible for ensuring all Defra staff are kept fully informed of developments).

Director of Communications to identify broadcast spokesperson at national level and liaise with GNN spokesperson at local level.

Communication with Director of GNN Regional Network (as appropriate), GNN Defra lead Director and GNN office covering relevant areas.

Local Government News Network: GNN Regional Director to assist DVM with local media handling support, in liaison with Briefing Unit to prepare “holding” line to take for local media; consider need to hold briefing for local media. The GNN should organise and accompany the local spokesperson and provide a 24 hour contact point for local media.

Briefing Unit: In liaison with AHWD prepare “holding” lines to take for national media, Ministers, No 10 and for use with stakeholders; collate, revise and update existing data, lines to take, briefing and Q and A material. Prepare for the possible need to relocate staff to form nucleus of a communications hub in the NDCC, if set up.

Library: Chief Librarian to be alerted so that the Library service can support the press and briefing units with factual and contextual information to ensure information is being made available to other parts of the Department. The Library holds a wealth of information on previous outbreaks and inquiry reports etc. as well as access to a number of electronic current awareness services.

Website: Staff from CD New Media Team to liaise with AHWD website staff to prepare immediate public information for the website as appropriate and consider how a clearly labelled and sign-posted site could be ready for use immediately should FMD be confirmed.

Publicity Branch: Head of Publicity to ensure branch is standing by to update and prepare printed/audio visual material as appropriate.

Helpline: to prepare for intense public interest, identifying staff resources, supplementary helplines and briefing needs.

STAFFING ISSUES:

Chief Press Officer (Food and Farming)

Consider what resources could be made available to deal with a confirmed outbreak. These might involve extra press offices to run a 7 day a week shift system. Consider the accommodation implications of an increase in personnel.

Need to consider the clerical support arrangements and the possible need for agency staff to provide transcription services for media briefings, telephone answering and administrative assistance to relieve information professionals from routine tasks.

Consider the need for support at his level to help co-ordinate and run the office through 24/7.

ON NOTIFICATION OF CONFIRMATION

Director of Communications and Chief Press Officer (Food and Farming)

to liaise with Ministers, CVO, AHWD over the arrangements for early briefing of the press and issue of press notices nationally and locally.

Director of Communications to ensure:

- Directorate works closely with Private Offices, policy and operational colleagues, OGD, No 10 and Environment Agency press offices to ensure that stakeholders, the public, the media and other interested parties are kept informed of overall objectives, means and progress of action.

- close working between the different CD workstreams, including press, publicity, website, briefing unit and helpline.

Chief Press Officer (Food and Farming)

- to re-deploy press officers to support animal health desk and take an overview of staffing needs (putting in an early bid for help from OGDs as appropriate).

- make arrangements to staff the office from 6am - 11.30pm including use of shift system (other Government departments can help staff from 6am - 9.30am and from 6pm - 11pm); prepare for weekend office cover, probably between 8am - 8pm.

- to confirm with GNN deployment of regional press office support, to allocate central press office support to region(s).

- ensure the transcription of press briefings and dissemination of interview transcripts.

Local Government News Network: GNN Regional Director to draft in extra press officers to work with LDCCs in regional “Communications Cells”, ensuring close liaison with the HQ Communications Hub and Defra HQ Press Office. Establish systematic briefing of local and regional media and contribute toward stakeholder communication efforts. Deal with media bids for interviews and prepare DVMs/RODs for interview.

Briefing and Knowledge Network Unit: Once the decision has been taken to set up the NDCC and LDCC(s), a ‘hub and spoke’ system of information exchange with a central hub at HQ and communications “cells” in the regions would be set up taking Briefing Unit staff as core staffing. This system would from then on handle the flow of guidance on policies, operational instructions and advice from the centre to the regions and the flow back to the centre of information on operations, local impacts etc. from the regional cells.

HQ Hub

Staff from the Briefing Unit will immediately form the core of a multidisciplinary “Communications Hub” co-located with the NDCC and would work closely with veterinary experts and others as appropriate.

LDCC communications “cells”

In conjunction with the Director of Communications and local GNN staff, DVMs/RODs will make arrangements within their LDCC for the establishment of a dedicated communications cell which would include local GNN staff relocating to the LDCC.

DOM to oversee the LDCC Communications cell which would be responsible for all internal, operational and external communications including local media handling and arrangements for local stakeholder briefings.

The regional communications cells would ensure that stakeholders, front line staff and the local media are kept fully informed and be the main information source for local technical headlines if set up. The cells would also feed back to the central hub, details of local activity and intelligence, taking a role in local stakeholder meetings and co-ordinating briefing information for local media interviews etc.

- Running daily meetings to brief and consult key stakeholders (NFU, LAs, EA) on developments (usually led by DVM or ROD)

- Handling all local media inquiries, dealing with interview “bids” (arranging media interviews with ROD or DVM)

- Equipping, staffing and briefing the local Animal Health Helpline

- Dealing with incoming correspondence from the public and MPs.

Two way communications

Information would travel between the HQ ‘hub’ and regional communications centres by a variety of means, including Defra’s Knowledge Network, email and the departmental intranet.

Library: Chief Librarian to ensure that information is made available to CD and wider Department as required.

Website: Webmaster to ensure 24/7 availability in conjunction with AHWD web co-ordinator; to consider increasing staffing levels and ensure that the design of web pages makes site accessible and easy to navigate.

Publicity Branch: Head of Publicity (in conjunction with the Communications Hub and Policy) to prepare and implement a paid publicity strategy for communication directly with stakeholders and interested parties.

Helpline: The general Helpline will set up a dedicated FMD (or animal disease) Helpline. This will be monitored over a 48 hour period.

News Co-ordination Centre: to continue to play a co-ordinating role across Government. As above, is ready to activate a central media operation.

Head of Defra’s Internal Communications Team:

�.- To ensure effective means of communicating with all Defra personnel (to ensure that those not directly involved are kept informed).

�.- To set up the necessary crisis communications systems for use by Communications Hubs and Regional Cells. These are expected to include the necessary infrastructure to facilitate mass text messaging (text blasting) and initiate telecoms contracts to provide recorded message updates.

�.- To oversee (in conjunction with personnel teams in NDCC and LDCCs) a crisis contacts database to include details of all those involved in dealing with the outbreak (including non-Defra staff; email details, mobile phone numbers, roles etc).

Media Monitoring Unit to play a full supporting role in conjunction with NCC.

Director of Communications and Head of News to ensure early daily assessment of likely media developments, briefing and activity needs.

STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT

Constant and timely involvement of stakeholders as an integral part of the communications picture. This must be pro-actively pursued at national and local level.

National

Key stakeholders will be invited to send a representative to the NDCC to participate in ‘birdtable’ meetings and provide input to policy, strategy and tactical development. Regular stakeholder meetings will be held, chaired by a senior official or minister.

Regional

DVM or ROD will usually lead stakeholder meetings, with briefing and coordination being handled by the LDCC Communications manager.

ANNEX K

DEFRA RELEASE OF PERSONAL DATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH DATA PROTECTION ACT

Releasing personal data

DEFRA's policy is to be as transparent as possible in the handling and release of information, whilst observing Data Protection Act (DPA) obligations in relation to personal data. Any release of an individual's personal data can only take place if such action does not breach any of the 8 data protection Principles listed in Schedule 1 of the DPA:

http://intranet/imd/access2info/principles.asp or http://www.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/80029--l.htm#sch1

Infected Premises

The addresses of infected premises will appear on the Defra website. Such disclosure will be necessary for the purposes of disease control, which is one of Defra's key functions. Also, publication of these details on the website is in the substantial public interest because of the effectiveness of the internet in making information widely available as rapidly as possible. Disclosure on the website alerts the public not to visit the infected areas unnecessarily. This therefore reduces the risk of further contamination and assists the authorities in combating the disease.

Dangerous Contact Premises and Slaughter on Suspicion Premises

Affected farms will have public notices placed at their gates, as a warning against transmission of the disease. There are insufficient disease control imperatives to justify widespread disclosure of this information. Publication on the website will not therefore be appropriate.

Defra will consider providing details of all premises where animals have been culled to organisations with a legitimate interest in disease control, safeguarding public health or co-ordination of rural recovery programmes. Therefore, release of any personal data concerning 'dangerous contact' premises and 'slaughter on suspicion' premises will only occur for purposes that are not incompatible with the purposes for which Defra obtained the data.

DEFRA’s FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE CONTINGENCY PLAN

STRUCTURE OF NATIONAL DISEASE CONTROL CENTRE

ANNEX L

y Liaison with NCC ^{y Vet Reports}y Liaison with Animal and GNN ^{y DCS}Health & Welfare y Briefing ^{y GIS}Directorate General

y Vet Resources y Finance Teams y Direction of RODs/DOMs y Specialists y Disposal _{y
Procurement}y Admin resources

^{y
Admin Support}y Direction of DVMs y General Admin Support
y [Epidemiology Team] y Statistics & Management Info.
y Veterinary instructions y Liaison/Cells- OGDs etc.

y Devolved administrations y Policy & Stakeholder Liaison y Legal

138

ANNEX M

FMD DAILY SITREP

1. 1. General comments on operation in LDCC Area (for completion by ROD).

2. 2. Issues for attention: a) Policy issues b) Operational issues e.g. vaccination, slaughter, disposal. c) Resource issues: Staff Accommodation Other resources d) Communications issues:

Internal
External

ANNEX N

HEALTH AND SAFETY PLAN

On suspicion of a FMD case (Amber Alert)

. • The Head of SVS Service Delivery Division must inform the Departmental Health and Safety Manager;

. • The Departmental Health and Safety Manager (DHSM) will notify:- 1) all competent safety professionals¹ working within Defra and its Agencies and 2) the Chief Welfare Officer, requesting that they are on standby.

On confirmation of FMD (Red Alert)

. • The Departmental Health and Safety Manager will allocate a safety professional(s) to be attached to each LDCC. The name of this person will be passed to the relevant ROD, as will the contact details of the local welfare officer;

. • DHSM will make contact with the NDCC and provide strategic safety advice and guidance to the Deputy Director of the NDCC;

. • The DHSM will inform the Chief Agricultural Inspector of the Health and Safety Executive of developments and will ensure liaison between Defra and HSE is undertaken at a national level;

. • Depending on the scale of the outbreak the DHSM will arrange for assistance from external health and safety providers (to be finalised);

. • The DHSM will ensure that relevant risk assessments and other documentation/arrangements necessary to comply with legislation are produced in relation to the work undertaken by Defra.

ROLE OF THE SAFETY PROFESSIONAL IN EACH LDCC

. • To act as Health and Safety Adviser at the LDCC advising and assisting NDCC Managers to fulfil their H&S responsibilities;

. • To provide a contact/liaison point for H&S issues between the local LDCC and national NDCC;

. • To liaise with the Departmental Health and Safety Manager and other safety professionals as necessary to ensure parity of approach for H&S issues across the Dept.

Job Functions of the Safety Adviser within the LDCC

The safety adviser attached to each LDCC will:-

. • ensure that health and safety office is established with all necessary facilities including telephone and PC Communications links, files, documentation and dedicated administrative support;

. • establish lines of communication with NDCC via head of DHSU (or other nominated safety professional in NDCC), with H&S professionals in other LDCCs, with local HSE, and with H&S persons in other organisations working with or under contract to Defra relevant to the locality of work;

. • establish a Health and Safety team within the locality, based on risk (numbers will depend on size of emergency within any particular LDCC) drawn from local staff with appropriate experience or from register of available persons with H&S expertise. Any shortfall in numbers of available staff will be identified by the safety professional, who will inform DHSU;

. • provide basic training to others to enable the health and safety team to function appropriate;

• undertake safety briefings for all staff from day one and ensure that these are done on a sufficiently regular basis so that all are briefed on health and safety issues, relevant to the risk, before starting work. Records must be kept of those staff attending briefings;

• organise and delivery under national guidelines (to be agreed via DHSU) more in depth training and safety briefings for managers and specialist groups locally e.g. Slaughter teams, C&D teams, Bleeding teams and if necessary outside bodies which may include contractors representatives and military personnel;

. • ensure that basis health and safety information packs and other local documentation are kept up to date and include centrally issued information and are available/issued to all staff that need them and as far as possible records are kept of those staff issued with the documents;

. • ensure that there is health and safety documentation relevant for each premises and that all safety reports, records and information are filed appropriately;

. • ensure visits to premises are undertaken by the local safety team to carry out preliminary inspections;

. • monitor compliance of health and safety procedures and assist and advise managers on appropriate safety requirements relevant to the risk;

. • attend management meetings/briefing and debriefing sessions and ensure that Centre Managers and NDCC (via DHSU) are kept informed and advised on current and anticipated H&S issues and problem areas;

. • monitor and assess the requirements for additional health & safety support as situations develop/risk increases and ensure NDCC (via DHSU) are kept appraised;

. • ensure that the Departmental system for reporting and recording accidents is in place and that all staff are aware of accident reporting procedures and accidents are reported appropriately (see HASAN 1);

. • Ensure that all RIDDOR accidents/incidents are reported to HSE in line with the requirements of the Regulations and Departmental policy (HASAN 1);

. • assist with investigation of accidents and incidents liaising with HSE and other outside bodies as necessary. Feed information back to NDCC via DHSU so that Risk Assessments and work practices can be reviewed and updated.

¹ those individuals who are employed by the Department as full time safety advisors and are members of the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH)

ANNEX O

WELFARE SERVICE PLAN

1. ON SUSPICION OF A FMD CASE (AMBER ALERT)

. • The Head of SVS Service Delivery Division must inform the Chief Welfare Officer (CWO) at the same stage as they notify the Departmental Health and Safety manager (DHSM);

. • The CWO will, in turn, notify all Welfare Officers (WOs) working within Defra and its Agencies requesting their availability on standby and, depending on the scale of the outbreak, the CWO will arrange for assistance from external Welfare Officers (through inter-Departmental networks and possibly Employee Assistance Programme (EAP) providers;

. • CWO will, from the outset, establish a clear line of communication to the DHSM to manage a joined-up approach in respect of H & S issues affecting staff.

2. ON CONFIRMATION OF FMD (RED ALERT)

. • The Chief Welfare Officer (CWO) will allocate a Welfare Officer (WO) to deliver the welfare service to each LDCC and HQ offices. The name(s) will be passed to the relevant ROD;

. • The Counselling Support Service will be available 24 hours daily (including weekends);

. • CWO will make contact with the NDCC and provide strategic welfare advice and guidance to the Deputy Director of the NDCC;

. • The CWO will ensure that relevant documentation/arrangements are properly communicated and made available to staff accordingly.

3. ROLE OF THE WELFARE OFFICER IN EACH LDCC

. • Having been introduced through local briefings, the Welfare Officer will act as a point of contact in respect of staff welfare at the LDCC (and HQ offices) giving guidance and assisting managers and staff in their support roles and to respond to staff needs for more personal support and advice accordingly;

. • To provide a contact/liaison point for Welfare issues between the local LDCC (HQ Offices) and national NDCC;

. • To liase with the Chief Welfare Officer and local H & S counterparts, as necessary to ensure parity of approach for welfare issues across the Department.

4. JOB FUNCTIONS OF THE WELFARE OFFICER THE LDCC

The Welfare Officer attached to each LDCC (and HQ offices) will :-

. • wherever practicably possible (with the assistance and support of the CWO) secure appropriate office space and ensure that their local office is established with all necessary facilities;

. • establish close working relationships with the HR team responsible for the LDCC (and HQ offices) identifying how best to deliver the services;

. • clearly and visibly promote the Welfare Service (names, contact numbers and arrangements) locally through publications, briefings and intentional contact with manager’s and staff within the LDCC;

. • ensure that basic welfare information packs and other local documentation are kept up to date and include centrally issued information and are available/issued to all staff that need them, Taking particular account of those staff who are working more remotely (on farms, etc) and not attending the LDCC as regularly as other staff;

. • establish lines of communication with NDCC via CWO and their management structures (or other nominated personnel in NDCC), with WOs in other LDCCs, and with persons in other organisations working with or under contract to Defra relevant to the locality of work;

. • attend management meetings/briefing and debriefing sessions and ensure that Centre Managers and NDCC (via CWO) are kept informed and advised on current and anticipated welfare issues and problem areas;

. • ensure presence at the LDCC is visible through the WOs undertaking regular walks around the Centre;

. • continually monitor and assess the requirements for additional welfare support as situations develop/risk increases and ensure NDCC (via CWO) are kept appraised;

5. ONGOING WELFARE SUPPORT POST- FMD

The Welfare Service is committed to maintaining an appropriate and specifically targeted level of support throughout the emergency situation and particularly recognises the ongoing needs and support required post-emergency. Resources and level of service will be assessed accordingly, to meet these increased needs and demands for as long as is considered necessary. The Welfare Service will support the process of re-integrating staff back into their normal jobs.

ANNEX P

BIOSECURITY ADVICE AND GUIDANCE

Biosecurity guidance to prevent the spread of animal diseases has been developed to reflect the provisions of the Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended by the Animal Health 2002). This guide, for anyone who comes into contact with animals, can be found on the Defra website at:

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/biosecurity/farmguidance/biosecurity_guidan ce.pdf

Further biosecurity information is available at:

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/biosecurity/farmguidance/index.htm

BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF ANIMAL DISEASES

BIOSECURITY GUIDANCE ON ENTERING OR LEAVING PLACES WHERE FARM ANIMALS ARE KEPT OR HAVE BEEN KEPT

This guidance applies to everyone who enters a farm or premises with farm animals, or enters land used for grazing or keeping farm animals. This includes:

. • Owners of farm animals;

. • those in charge of farm animals at any time, for example hauliers;

. • vets and others who provide animals services, including Artificial
Insemination technicians, foot trimmers, sheep dippers and scanner
operators;

. • government officials, including Local Government employees and staff
working for Non Departmental Public Bodies;

. • any contractor or other person acting for or on behalf of those already
mentioned;
• others who access agricultural land, whether for business or pleasure.

It deals with the precautions to be taken when entering or leaving any premises with farm animals in the absence of an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease; after confirmation of an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease; and to premises under specific animal disease restrictions.

The guidance is prepared under the Animal Health Act 1981, Section 6A (as amended by the Animal Health Act 2002, Section 16). It is not intended to interfere with sensible public access to land and enjoyment of the countryside.

The message is simple:

. • disease may not always be apparent, especially in its early stages;

. • be clean, particularly if handling animals or moving between different premises.

Index Page Introduction including definitions and risk Section 1. Visits to More Than One Premises with Farm Animals where

there is Direct Contact with Farm Animals

1. 1.1 In the Absence of an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

2. 1.2 During an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

3. 1.3 Premises under Specific Disease Control Restrictions

Section 2 Other Agricultural Related Visits To Premises with Farm Animals

1. 2.1 In the Absence of an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

2. 2.2 During an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

3. 2.3 Premises under Specific Restrictions

Section 3 Non-agricultural Related Visits to Premises with Farm Animals

1. 3.1 In the Absence of an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

2. 3.2 During an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

3. 3.3 Premises under Specific Restrictions

Section 4 Compulsory Biosecurity Measures Within Restricted Infected Areas

Annex (P) A. General Biosecurity Measures When In Direct Contact With Farm Animals

Annex (P) B. Additional Biosecurity Measures When Visiting Premises With Farm Animals During an Outbreak of An Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

Annex (P) C. Measures which must be observed for Visits to Premises Under Specific Restrictions

Introduction

1) Farm to farm movement of infected livestock is the most effective means by which animal diseases such as Foot and Mouth Disease can be spread. Contact with animals and with their excrement also pose significant risks. Clothes, boots, vehicles and equipment can become contaminated and can carry disease from one premises to another. Diseases can also be spread by other means, such as wildlife, air or other vectors. This Guidance describes measures which will minimise the spread of diseases between different premises via contaminated clothes, boots, vehicles and equipment.

2) Implementing biosecurity measures as standard practice helps ensure that all those working with farm animals or coming into contact with them do not spread disease when they enter or leave a premises. This is important whether or not any disease outbreaks have been reported. Some diseases are zoonotic - they can be transmitted between humans and animals - therefore there are good public and occupational health reasons for having biosecurity measures. Proper biosecurity which effectively reduces the incursion and spread of disease reduces disease control costs and helps prevent the spread of plant diseases too.

3) For the purposes of these Guidance Notes the following definitions apply:

a) 'Biosecurity' is the prevention of disease causing agents entering or leaving any place where farm animals are present (or have been present recently – see paragraph 6). It involves a number of measures and protocols designed to prevent disease causing agents from entering or leaving a property and being spread.

b) ‘person’ means anybody who enters or leaves a premises with farm animals;

c) ‘equipment’ means any thing which has been in contact with livestock or has been visibly contaminated with manure or other livestock products and is to be taken on to or off a premises with farm animals;

d) ‘premises with farm animals’ means any premises in which farm animals are present either as a commercial concern or as pets. It also includes farms, livestock markets, shows, slaughterhouses and other premises where farm animals have been present in the recent past or are to be introduced.

e) 'direct contact' means handling or intention to handle farm animals or working near farm animals where clothing may become contaminated, for example by saliva, excreta or milk.

f) 'disinfected' means use of a disinfectant approved under the Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectants) Order 1978 at the specified dilution rates and in compliance with the labelling instructions. Information on approved disinfectants can be found on the Defra website at: http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/diseases/control/testing_disinfectants.htm .

g) 'an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Disease' is where the Chief Veterinary Officer of Defra has confirmed the presence of such a disease, for example Foot and Mouth Disease, Classical Swine Fever, Avian Influenza, Newcastle Disease. In the event of an outbreak a Press Release would be issued immediately and details posted on the Defra website. Details of Exotic Notifiable Diseases can be found on the Defra website.

4) Disease is not always apparent, especially in its early stages. Any person visiting a premises with farm animals and not carrying out effective biosecurity measures on entry and on leaving a premises runs the risk of spreading diseases to or from that premises. It is important to apply biosecurity measures even when animals have been removed from the premises, as disease causing agents and their vectors can persist after the animals have left. The biosecurity measures taken should reflect the risk involved.

5) The most important biosecurity measures are:

a) To ensure that methods of working are designed to minimise where possible the movements of people, vehicles or equipment into areas where farm animals are kept, including fields, sheds, markets or other holding areas. This will minimise the potential contamination of people, vehicles and equipment with material that could carry diseases – manure, slurry and other products.

b) If direct contact with farm animals cannot be prevented then it is best practice to cleanse and disinfect protective clothing, footwear, equipment, vehicles etc. before and after the contact with the animals, or use disposable protective clothing.

6) In some premises farm animals are present for short periods of time e.g. showgrounds and markets. If these premises cannot be cleansed and disinfected then there is a legal requirement to rest them for 27 days. This rest period is critical for allowing the detection of some exotic notifiable diseases in animals that used the premises and, for most disease agents, reduces the risk to animals that subsequently use the land by allowing the infectious agent to decay naturally.

7) Common land. Common grazing provides an opportunity for the spread of disease. Owners and keepers need to follow these biosecurity guidelines every time they visit the common land in the same way as they would if they visited another premises with farm animals. The low stocking rates found on the large tracts of unenclosed rough grazing means that disease transmission by others, such as recreational users, is less likely.

8) The appropriate biosecurity measures depend on the risk associated with the visit. The risk of spreading disease varies with the degree of exposure to the animals and their products (e.g. manure, used bedding, milk etc) and the

likelihood of passing infection on to others. Factors that determine the risks
associated with visits include:

a) Type of premises – e.g. arable, livestock, mixed, horticultural;

b) Restrictions applied to the premises – e.g. animal disease control;

c) Restrictions applied on all premises in a defined area – e.g. Restricted
Infected Area / Infected Area;

d) Extent and reason for the visit – e.g. farm house, B&B, animal handling or
inspection, land inspection.
These are covered in more detail in the following Sections and Annexes.
Unnecessary contact with animals is best avoided.

Section 1 - Visits to More Than One Premises with Farm Animals where there is Direct Contact with Farm Animals

1.1 In the Absence of an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

1. 1.1.1 Persons entering premises with farm animals with the specific intention of handling animals (or their products) should wear protective clothing and footwear. The measures to be taken are at Annex (P) A. Such persons should ensure that any vehicles or equipment taken with them are clean on arrival, making use of any facilities available.

2. 1.2 During an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

1. 1.2.1 Visiting premises with susceptible animals in the event of a disease outbreak increases the risk that disease may be taken on to or off the premises as disease is not always apparent, especially in its early stages.

2. 1.2.2 Only essential visitors should visit any premises with farm animals within areas where restrictions have been imposed. The minimum biosecurity measures to be taken are in Annex (P) B.

3. 1.2.3 The risk of spreading diseases is minimised when appropriate biosecurity measures are observed. Non-essential visits to premises with farm animals should be suspended.

4. 1.3 Premises Under Specific Disease Control Restrictions

1. 1.3.1 Under these circumstances only essential visitors should visit any premises that are subject to any specific animal health disease restrictions. Such visits may need to be licensed and the licence conditions and requirements followed. This is required by law and a breach may result in a criminal penalty.

2. 1.3.2 Where a person needs to visit premises (e.g. statutory visit or inspection) on which animals have been or are about to be slaughtered for

disease control reasons, the visit will only be permitted provided appropriate biosecurity measures are taken. Visits will normally only be authorised after slaughter and preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the premises have been completed. Such visits can only be made with the permission of the Divisional Veterinary Manager who will issue a licence where necessary. The measures to be taken are in Annex (P) C.

1.3.3 In very exceptional circumstances a person may have to visit a premises before preliminary cleansing and disinfection has been completed. Such visits can only be made with the permission of the DVM and under the authority of a licence. The person may be accompanied by an officer from the Animal Health Divisional Office and must comply with the conditions in the schedule to the restrictions and any additional requirements of the licence. The person must follow the precautions in Annex (P) C, particularly any requirement for a quarantine period, which in the case of Foot and Mouth disease is 72 hours.

Section 2 – Other Agricultural Related Visits To Premises With Farm Animals

2.1 In the Absence of an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

1. 2.1.1 Persons entering a premises with farm animals should ensure their shoes or boots are clean when they enter and again when they leave. This applies even if they do not expect to come into contact with animals or their products. They should make use of any facilities provided and ensure, before and after the visit, that there is no manure or other animal product to be seen on their footwear, other clothing, vehicle or anything else taken with them.

2. 2.2 During an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

1. 2.2.1 The guidance in Section 1.2 above (paragraphs 1.2.1 - 1.2.3) applies.

2. 2.3 Premises Under Specific Restrictions

2.3.1 The guidance in Section 1.3 above (paragraphs 1.3.1 - 1.3.3) applies.

Section 3 - Non Agricultural Related Visits To Premises With Farm Animals

This section is aimed at recreational, social and non-farming visits, including visits by the public to Community Farms and access by power/water companies, for example.

3.1 In the Absence of an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Disease

3.1.1 Those who visit or have a right of access through premises with farm animals, for example on public footpaths or bridleways, should respect the legal boundaries and legal notices and use any facilities provided to clean mud/manure off footwear and vehicles (wheels, wheel arches etc). Direct contact with animals should be avoided. Where animals are handled or touched, hands should be washed as soon as practical.

3.2 During an Outbreak of an Exotic Notifiable Animal Disease

1. 3.2.1 Visiting premises with susceptible animals in the event of a disease outbreak increases the risk that the disease may be taken on to or off the livestock premises.

2. 3.2.2 Those who visit or have a right of access through premises with farm animals, for example on public footpaths or bridleways, should respect the legal boundaries and legal notices and use any disinfection facilities provided to clean mud/manure off footwear and vehicles (wheels, wheel arches etc). Direct contact with livestock should be avoided.

3. 3.2.3 'Official’ footpath closure signs may appear in an area around an Infected Premises within an Infected Area or a Restricted Infected Area. These must be respected.

4. 3.3 Premises Under Specific Restrictions

1. 3.3.1 The guidance in Section 1.3 above (paragraphs 1.3.1 - 1.3.3) applies. Section 4 - Compulsory Biosecurity Measures Within Restricted Infected Areas

2. 4.1 There are compulsory biosecurity measures that must be adopted when a Restricted Infected Area has been declared. These are required by law and their breach may result in a criminal penalty. They include:

a) Any vehicle or trailer entering or leaving a premises must be cleansed and disinfected on the outside and underside (and include the tyres (including the whole circumference of their treads), wheel arches, mudguards and mud flaps of the vehicle). Any parts of the vehicle or trailer where farm animals have been must also be cleansed and disinfected. All visible traces of mud, slurry, animal faeces, droppings or excretions or other similar matter must be removed, including any inside the vehicle. This must be done at the entrance and exit.

b) No person shall enter or leave any livestock premises wearing clothing or boots which are visibly contaminated with mud, slurry, animal faeces, droppings or excretions or any other similar matter or without cleansing and disinfecting the outer surfaces of their footwear on entering or leaving those premises.

c) Any person who tends any animal shall not leave the livestock premises on which the animal is kept wearing the outer clothing and footwear which they wore whilst tending the animal unless that clothing and footwear have been thoroughly cleansed and disinfected.

d) The owner or occupier of any premises where animals are kept shall maintain a footbath containing an approved disinfectant in some convenient place at every exit from those premises and renew the disinfectant as frequently as is necessary to maintain a clean solution and if so directed by an inspector.

Defra 1 July 2003 ANNEX P (A)

GENERAL BIOSECURITY MEASURES WHEN IN DIRECT CONTACT WITH FARM ANIMALS

1) Where appropriate the visit should be made with the agreement of the owner or premises manager and any reasonable requests for additional biosecurity measures should be observed, especially if you have visited another premises with farm animals in the previous 3 days.

2) Livestock vehicles or trailers must be cleansed and disinfected in accordance with current legislation.

3) If other vehicles are taken on to the premises they should, wherever possible, be parked on hard standing away from farm animals and must be visibly free of animal excreta, slurry etc. Vehicles or trailers should not normally be taken into areas where farm animals have access – these arrangements should be confirmed, where appropriate, with the owner or premises manager in advance of the visit. Before leaving the premises all visible contamination with manure, slurry or similar material must be removed (including where appropriate, cleaning of the inside of vehicles, especially foot wells and pedals). If this is not possible, vehicles and trailers must be cleaned before they are taken onto another premises with farm animals, either at the end of the day or before the next visit.

4) Owners or farm managers are recommended to have facilities available for disinfecting vehicles, footwear and clothing. If facilities are NOT available on farm cleansing and disinfection should be arranged as soon as possible and before the next visit to a premises with farm animals.

5) Suitable protective clothing and footwear must be worn on all premises where visits include entering areas where farm animals are present or to which they normally have access. The type of protective clothing and footwear required depends on the nature of the visit, e.g. the protection required for a visit to a dairy herd would differ from that required for a visit to an extensive premises on moorland. Contractors such as shearers should ensure clothing is changed and washed between visits to different premises.

6) The purpose of the protective clothing and footwear is to prevent any contamination being carried from premises to premises. Protective clothing and footwear may be disposable or re-usable. The following are examples of types of protective clothing:

a) Disposable boiler type suits. These can be used once and should be

discarded at the end of the visit to the premises. They can be left on

the premises with the owner's agreement or bagged and suitably

disposed of later, as can disposable overshoes for footwear.

b) Non-disposable protective clothing (e.g. cotton boiler suits or cotton

coats). These may be used once and should be laundered before

being re-used on any other livestock premises.

c) Waterproof protective clothing and waterproof boots. These should be cleansed and disinfected before entering the premises and again at the end of the visit just before leaving the premises.

7) All equipment used must be clean on arrival and on departure. Great care must be taken when cleaning electrical apparatus or tools. Where possible equipment should be protected from contamination e.g. using plastic bags. Health and Safety rules must be observed. Where equipment can be cleansed and disinfected this must be done before entry to the premises and again on departure.

8) For premises catering for Bed and Breakfast or farm tourism, it is advisable to keep visitors away from direct contact with farm animals and ensure as far as possible that they and their vehicles do not come into contact with animal excreta etc. Where there is contact with animals then hands should be washed and any contaminated clothing or shoes cleaned.

ANNEX P (B)

ADDITIONAL BIOSECURITY MEASURES WHEN VISITING PREMISES WITH FARM ANIMALS DURING AN OUTBREAK OF AN EXOTIC NOTIFIABLE DISEASE

The following measures must be observed:

1) The measures listed in Annex P (A)

2) It is recommended that either clean non-disposable protective clothing or waterproof protective clothing and waterproof boots are worn.

3) Sufficient water, disinfectant and disinfecting equipment should be taken on the visit, even if facilities for disinfecting clothes, footwear, equipment or vehicles are thought to be available on the premises.

Non-essential vehicles, e.g. cars/vans, should be parked outside the premises wherever practical.

ANNEX P (C)

MEASURES WHICH MUST BE OBSERVED FOR VISITS TO PREMISES UNDER SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS

The following measures must be observed:

1) The measures listed in Annex P (B)

2) A visit should be made only with the permission of the Divisional Veterinary Manager (DVM) who will issue a licence where necessary.

3) Waterproof protective clothing and waterproof boots should be worn at all times unless there is specific written dispensation from the DVM.

4) Any additional measures required by the licence. This may include a quarantine period. For example, in the case of Foot and Mouth Disease, Avian Influenza or Newcastle Disease any person who comes into direct contact with relevant susceptible animals or poultry, their manure, by-products or carcases either in the course of their work or as a consequence of residing on a premises on which such susceptible animals are kept should not visit another livestock premises for 72 hours unless authorised in writing by the DVM.

ANNEX Q

KEY STAKEHOLDERS - CAPABILITIES

An outline of key stakeholder capabilities follows:-

Local Authorities

Local Authorities manage emergencies under the principles of Integrated Emergency Management (more details can be found in the Cabinet Office guidance ‘Dealing with Disaster’). http://www.ukresilience.info/contingencies/dwd/index.htm

The roles of Local Authorities are similar and consistent nation-wide, however the execution of the functions may be carried out differently depending on local circumstances. Local Authorities are responsible for: Education, Personal Social Services, Environment and Planning, Environmental Health, Highways Operations and Maintenance, Waste Collection and Disposal, Trading Standards (including Animal Health), Fire and Rescue, Emergency Planning, and Housing. Local Authorities can fulfil a significant role in providing advice and education at a local level, a role which is already fundamental in their approach to enforcement of legislation.

Local Authorities can also assist Defra with the provision of resources such as staff, vehicles, equipment and buildings and perhaps most importantly local knowledge and information. The level of assistance will always depend on local circumstances and other pressures which arise from time to time.

Key Local Responders are:-

Emergency Planning Officers (EPOs)

. • managing an emergency and entry to emergency management coordination (in liaison with Police Gold Command);

. • provision of resources - manpower and other resources and;

. • identifying resources from all other parts of Local Authority.

Local Authority Animal Health Officers and Trading Standards Officers

(TSOs)

. • responsibility for the enforcement of most Animal Health legislation, including movement restrictions/licensing, enforcement of Surveillance Zones;

. • liase with EPOs for implementation of contingency plans, assistance with establishing disease outbreak “incident rooms”;

. • close/open rights of way;

. • respond to enquiries from farmers/industry/general public;

. • monitor livestock welfare esp. on transport and at markets;

. • assistance with cleansing and disinfection of infected premises;

. • Responsible for maintaining effective liaison with local Operational Partners;

. • Provide an appropriate representative to attend the Local Disease Control Centre;

. • Provide advice required on the enforcement perspective and Local Authority viewpoint;

. • Proactively disseminate advice and education to local communities through established communication channels;

. • Liase with LACORS to ensure an awareness of national guidance is maintained, and ensure major issues are reported and resolved at a national level;

. • Effectively contribute to disease control measures;

Environmental Health Officers

• Provide advice on public health implications - potential pollutants (e.g. disposal operations).

Police Forces

. • The Police will assist wherever possible in:

. • The enforcement of Surveillance Zones and movement controls;

. • General co-ordination of emergencies support, particularly in pursuing legal entry to premises;

. • Managing disturbances at disposal sites/preventing Breaches of the Peace;

. • Preventing public access to infected premises and closed rights of way/land;

. • Stopping and checking vehicles transporting animals.

LACORS (Local Authorities Co-ordinators of Regulatory Services)

. • confirm Defra/Government Department emergency contact points;

. • alert key LACORS staff - relevant policy officer/website officer;

• alert pre-arranged “ready reference” local authority contact group

- for use as immediate technical advisory point; and

- possible release of staff on secondment to LACORS.

. • brief all LACORS staff - advise on potential impact on work priorities;

. • issue advice to Local Authorities via LACORS website, particularly contact points;

. • set up relevant topic “hot button” on LACORS website.

Environment Agency

The Environment Agency is the leading public organisation for protecting and improving the environment in England and Wales. The Agency’s core role during the response to an animal disease outbreak is to respond to, and provide co-ordination and management of, the environmental consequences of the outbreak.

During an animal disease outbreak, the Agency will take action, where appropriate:

. • to assess the risk posed by the outbreak to the environment

. • to prevent or minimise the impact on the environment, human health and property

. • to consider what action to take in respect of the remedial measures required

. • to issue relevant permits before waste management/disposal activities commence (for example relating to landfills, incinerators, on farm burial sites, pyres)

. • to notify, warn or advise relevant stakeholders of potential or actual environmental risks

. • to work effectively with external partners

The Agency’s role does not include a significant lead involvement in air quality issues or health impacts on the wider population. Such matters are dealt with in partnership with local and health authorities.

Military Liaison - Military Joint Regional Liaison Officers attend Government Office Regional Resilience Fora and are an important link when considering the involvement of the Armed Forces under MACA arrangements.

Other Executive Non-Departmental Public Bodies - Rural Payments Agency, Countryside Agency, English Nature, Ordnance Survey

• resources especially specialist skilled staff and general administrators.

Health Protection Agency (as from 1.4.2003)

. • Prevent and control the input of pollutants into air, land and water;

. • Work in partnership with other key organisations to ensure that incidents are controlled and managed in an integrated fashion;

. • Agency responsibilities do not include a significant lead involvement in air quality issues or health impacts on the wider population. Such matters are dealt with in partnership with local and health authorities.

Government Offices for the Regions

. • Co-ordination and resilience of government at regional level, through Regional Resilience Teams;

. • GNN as providers of briefing/media expertise;

. • increasing role in co-ordinating regional response to emergencies, including establishing Regional Resilience Forums and Regional Civil Protection Committees;

. • key to identifying staff and other resources from Government departments at regional level.

Key Non-Government Stakeholders

Agricultural - NFU, RSPCA, Country Land and Business Association, Tenant Farmers Association, other farming organisations.

Veterinary - Local veterinary practices.

Agricultural Commercial - Auctioneers, Valuers, Markets and Management.

Rural & Rural Commercial – Rural Stress Action Plan Working Group, Rural Forums, National Parks Bodies, National Trust, small businesses organisations, tourist bodies.

ANNEX R

DEVOLVED ADMINISTRATIONS

Defra, the Welsh Assembly Government and the Scottish Executive have produced individual Contingency Plans outlining their responses to a disease outbreak. Whilst specific to their own institutional arrangements, the plans are mutually complementary. In the event of a suspected or confirmed case of disease, Defra, SEERAD, NAWAD and DARDNI will ensure close liaison in order to co-ordinate the emergency response process and news releases.

Scotland

Certain of the policies and procedures set out in this Contingency Plan will be different in Scotland. SEERAD have published their own draft Contingency Plan (http://www.scotland.gov.uk/consultations/agriculture/fmdcontingency.pdf) This sets out the precise arrangements which will apply in Scotland. However, this Plan will apply in Scotland except where the SEERAD Plan and any subsequent instructions determine otherwise. Any such Plan or instructions will be approved by the CVO (Scotland) and the Head of Food and Agriculture Group in SEERAD.

Action in relation to Scotland on any outbreak

When any outbreak of foot and mouth disease occurs anywhere in GB:

�.(i) the CVO (Scotland) and the Head of Animal Health Division in SEERAD should be notified immediately;

�.(ii) SEERAD will brief their own Ministers and will implement separately for Scotland any immediate legislation required (including movement controls and export controls): and

(iii) SEERAD will be invited to send a liaison officer to Page Street immediately the NDCC is established.

Action in the event of a Scottish outbreak

In the event of a Scottish outbreak SEERAD will immediately convene a Disease Strategy Group (DSG) which will be chaired by the Secretary of SEERAD or the Head of Food and Agriculture Group. Its members will include the CVO (Scotland), the Chief Agricultural Officer and (if and when the Army is involved) the relevant Army Brigade Commander. The DSG will supervise the handling of the Scottish outbreak and will ensure that Scottish Ministers, the Scottish Parliament and the media are appropriately briefed. Deployment of the Armed Forces depends upon authorisation by a MOD Minister, following a request by either the Scottish Executive or Defra.

In England, an NDCC would be set up in Page Street to co-ordinate GB disease control operations.

Wales

In Wales, though the key ingredients of this Contingency Plan will apply, a separate plan has been published for Wales by the Welsh Assembly Government, which will include the following:-

. • CVO (Wales), the Head of Common Agriculture Policy Management (Wales) and the Head of the Assembly Contingency Branch should be notified immediately of any outbreak of disease anywhere in GB;

. • activate the provisions of the Welsh Contingency Plan;

. • establish an Assembly Liaison Officer post in the NDCC, the Strategy Group, and secure Welsh Ministerial representation at the CCC;

. • ensure that Welsh Assembly Government Ministers are separately advised and can institute action in Wales relevant to local circumstances to manage the outbreak locally. Additional responsibilities will be applied to the Regional Operations Director role to reflect the central strategic role the Assembly will carry out under s41 of the Government in Wales Act 1998. His title will be Operations Director (Wales) (OD(W)).

• the OD(W) will operate under the direction of the NDCC with the advice of the Chief Veterinary Officer (Wales);

• on the first indication of disease the OD(W) will place the Welsh Coordination Centre in Cardiff on standby or establish it depending on the status of the suspicion case, which will provide strategic support;

. • provide the main source of communication between relevant agriculture departments and key stakeholders and media in Wales;

. • various Groups will be established within the Assembly to advise ministers on a variety of policy issues such as access, economic impact and human health;

. • recognise the Welsh Assembly Government’s responsibilities for secondary legislation.

ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ACVO	Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer
AHDO	Animal Health Divisional Office
AHO	Animal Health Officer
AHWD	Animal Health and Welfare Directorate
AMED	Animal Movements and Exotic Diseases Division
ASD	Accounting Services Division
CA	Countryside Agency
C&D	Cleansing and Disinfection
CCC	Civil Contingencies Committee
CCC(O)	Civil Contingencies Committee (Officials)
CCS	Civil Contingencies Secretariat (Cabinet Office)
CD	Communications Directorate
CMO	Chief Medical Officer
COBR	Cabinet Office Briefing Room
Comms	Communications
CP	Contiguous Premises
CSA	Chief Scientific Adviser (Defra)
CSD	Corporate Services Division
CVO	Chief Veterinary Officer
DARDNI	Department of Agriculture and Rural Development Northern
	Ireland
DC	Dangerous Contact – These are animals of susceptible species
	which are believed to have been exposed to infection.
DCMS	Department for Culture, Media and Sport
DCS	Disease Control System Database
DCVO	Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, Director Vet Policy
Defra	Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
DG	Director General
DGLS	Director General Legal Services (Defra)
DG LURA	Director General Land Use and Rural Affairs (Defra)
DG OSD	Director General Operations and Service Delivery (Defra)