US National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility - Concern at decision to move from Plum Island to Kansas

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October 9 2009 ~ Plum Island will be offered for sale in about six months, according to an official with the U.S. General Services Administration.

See libn.com "Congress last year approved a public sale of the 840-acre island, located about four miles northeast of Orient Point. Funds from selling the Plum property will go towards construction of a $500 million National Bio- and Agro-Defense lab in Manhattan, Kan., according to the Department of Homeland Security, which took control of the island in 2003. The Department of Agriculture built the animal disease center on the island in 1954 to create vaccines for foot-and-mouth disease, which affects livestock. Construction on the new complex in Kansas is expected to begin next year."

October 8 2009 ~ Biodefence centre in Kansas - no early construction money

The proposed new foot-and-mouth disease research lab in Kansas to take the place of that at Plum Island (New York) was to be given money to start construction work. Now, the money is being withheld because congressional negotiators want the Homeland Security Department to produce new studies to indicate whether the lab can operate safely. In its draft report in July, the US General Audit Office said that the Department of Homeland Security's review was too "limited" and "inadequate" to decide that any mainland labs were safe, adding that the agency's assessment of the risk of accidental release of toxins on mainland locations, including Kansas, was based on "unrepresentative accident scenarios," "outdated modeling" and "inadequate" information about the sites.
There has been opposition to moving foot-and-mouth research to the mainland from Plum Island - not least from farmers in Kansas who told this website that the real livestock producers of Kansas were never given much opportunity to make known their own concerns to the Governor's Task Force.
A detailed report about the compromise spending bill can be read at www.victoriaadvocate.com

September 18 2009 ~ Pre-construction work contract has already been awarded

The Department of Homeland Security announced on Friday that a contract for pre-construction work has been awarded for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility planned for Kansas. We read at www.nebraska.tv that "some in Congress don't want the money spent on the lab until the government finds out more about the risks of moving foot & mouth disease research from an island off New York to Manhattan, Kansas. The disease could wreak havoc on the domestic livestock industry if accidentally released." See also www.capitalpress.com Extract: "the GAO asserts Homeland Security "did not incorporate worst-case outbreak scenarios," including the effectiveness of a containment zone "to control the effects of a national export ban on the domestic livestock industry." ..."

September 3 2009 ~ recommendation to phase out Plum Island "essentially a rush job" says U.S. Rep. Tim Bishop (D-N.Y.)

Responding to GAO's report he wants DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano "to revisit the decision" as well as the decision to build the Kansas facility. "This (GAO) study underscores the validity of why Plum Island was originally chosen," Bishop says. "I'm sobered by this report. ... We still have time to correct this." But the DHS has defended its choice with a report of its own.
From http://veterinarynews.dvm360.com
"Despite a critical report from another agency and a fair amount of political pressure, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) remains committed to the Manhattan, Kan., site it chose for building a new national bio-defense research laboratory and says it won't re-open the site-selection process.
....a release of the FMD pathogen by a tornado, terrorist act or other means reportedly could have a much greater economic and disease impact than in offshore New York. Such an event on Plum island could have a $31 million economic impact, compared to a $1 billion impact in Kansas, the GAO report says, citing another study. "Given the significant limitations in DHS's analyses that we found, the conclusion that FMD work can be done as safely on the mainland as on Plum Island is not supported," the GAO report says.
But DHS shot back, in a 30-page response in July, that the GAO study didn't respond to what Congress asked. Instead of evaluating whether FMD research "can be done safely on the mainland," the GAO instead chose to evaluate whether the research "can be done as safely on the mainland as on Plum Island." DHS says its own environmental-impact study took into account the GAO's point that the water barrier around Plum Island would provide an extra layer of protection in the event of an accidental release of the FMD pathogen, but it called that scenario "extremely unlikely," adding that "while the study of contagious diseases anywhere is not without risk, modern bio-containment technology makes the likelihood of an accidental release of a pathogen extremely low, and ... has eliminated the need for locating animal-disease research on an island as was done decades ago." ..... A group of Texas business and bioscience experts sued DHS in a federal court over the decision to locate the NABF in Kansas, but a judge dismissed the suit in July, saying it was based on hypothetical claims and thus not "ripe" for judicial review, although the suit could be re-filed later. .."
Read in full

August 1 2009 ~ Homeland Security Secretary, Janet Napolitano, is urged to "revisit the decision to phase out Plum Island"

The GAO study says, "Given the significant limitations in DHS's analyses that we found, the conclusion that FMD (Foot and Mouth Disease) work can be done as safely on the mainland as on Plum Island is not supported." www.newsday.com quotes congressman Tim Bishop (D-Southampton) who has written to Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano: "This study underscores the validity of why Plum Island was originally chosen. I'm sobered by this report."
A Homeland Security spokesman did not return a call for comment. Read in full

July 27 2009 ~ The Department of Homeland Security "relied on a rushed, flawed study" to move FMD research from Plum Island to Kansas, says the GAO

The Washington Post today reveals that the Government Accountability Office's study says that the US Department of Homeland Security's analysis was not "scientifically defensible". In its draft report, the GAO, the congressional watchdog, says that the DHS's review was too "limited" and "inadequate" to decide that any mainland labs were safe, adding that the agency's assessment of the risk of accidental release of toxins on mainland locations, including Kansas, was based on "unrepresentative accident scenarios," "outdated modeling" and "inadequate" information about the sites. UPDATE A Kansas farmer writes to warmwell.com today that the real livestock producers of Kansas were never given much opportunity to make known their own concerns to the Governor's Task Force:"..in fact, they were purposefully omitted from that group..." (read in full)
July 28 2009 ~ Google news results for today's news items on this subject.

January 16 2009 ~ Concern at decision to move from Plum Island to Kansas

The Department of Homeland Security has given "final approval" to building the 450-million dollar US National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility in Kansas. Plum Island Animal Disease Center will close in 2015 -- unless, says www.newsday.com
"Long Island officials can persuade the Obama administration to overturn it... "
As we said in July, Plum Island has been successfully operational for fifty years, is protected by more than a mile of water, and the area is home to very few animals that could catch disease - the Homeland Security report acknowledged this. Kansas on the other hand is considered to rank third in economic importance to the U.S. live cattle industry.
The recent GAO report "GAO-08-821T High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories" ( warmwell's html version concluded that an island location can help prevent what happened in the UK in 2007: the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes (by vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, for example) and also perhaps airborne transmission..
"...A recent release from the Pirbright facility - located in a farming community on the mainland of the United Kingdom - highlights the risks of a release from a laboratory that is in close proximity to the susceptible animals....
• ....human error can never be completely eliminated ...accidents, while rare, still occur because of human or technical errors. Given the non-zero risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection. ...."
The report reveals too that the DHS had not conducted any studies to determine the wisdom of moving FMD activities away from Plum Island, using instead an existing study that does not clearly support such a move.
A press release from R-calf USA a national, non-profit organization, today expresses depp concern,
"What is disheartening about Monday's announcement is that the deadline for comments from the public on the Manhattan Campus Site's Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was midnight on (Monday) Jan. 12. This tells us in no uncertain terms that the bureaucrats already had made up their minds to approve the Kansas location and chose to blatantly disregard any concerns the public may have submitted in formal comments. Only time will tell what sort of political favors were involved in this unsuitable decision....."

6 August 2008 ~ Continuing deep concern about the siting of the US National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility on the mainland

US Congressman, Brad Miller, is quoted at www.indyweek.com:
".... sober, serious concerns about the facility that DHS (i.e. Department of Homeland Security) has not satisfied.
If democracy means anything, local elected officials speak for the people of their community, and local elected officials in Granville County now oppose bringing the facility to Butner. ...
I continue to believe that we must do the research that would be conducted at the proposed facility to protect public health and our food supply, whether at the current location at Plum Island or elsewhere, and that wherever the research is done it must be done safely."

July 6 2008 ~ "Plum Island is the clear choice for the NBAF, and Homeland Security should opt to build it there."

Many thanks to FMD news for alerting us to a link on the subject of the proposed new high-security $451 million laboratory in the US that is to replace the world famous but ageing laboratory at Plum Island. www.onlineathens.com David Lee, University of Georgia's vice president for research is quoted as saying he favours ".. building the NBAF on Plum Island if that New York location is the safest place for it.
"If DHS believes Plum Island is truly going to be significantly safer, they should choose to build it there. I believe it would only be incrementally safer."
Plum Island is protected by more than a mile of water, and the area is home to few livestock that could catch the dreaded, highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease - facts noted in the Homeland Security report. "It would be irresponsible and basically abuse of trust in the government" to build it elsewhere, he said...." Read in full .

June 23 2008 ~ "if foot-and-mouth does get out, what does that mean to these sites?"

In the US, there are still 5 potential locations for the new high-security $451 million laboratory that is to replace the world famous laboratory at Plum Island. If the lab is built in the middle of land where susceptible animals are grazing, what happens in the event of a leak such as happened at Pirbright in 2007? The sixth option would be, of course, to build the new research lab on Plum Island itself.
According to the Associated Press on the subject of the 1,005-page Homeland Security Department report, it is calculated that
".... economic losses in an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease could surpass $4 billion if the lab were built near livestock herds in Kansas or Texas... That would be nearly $1 billion higher than the government's estimate of losses blamed on a hypothetical outbreak from its existing laboratory on Plum Island, N.Y.....The threat from fire and explosion would be diminished for the government's isolated laboratory on Plum Island "due to the low likelihood of any disease getting off of the island...."

Monday 8 June ~ "... if the lab comes to Kansas it will be surrounded by agricultural production.." says professor at Kansas State

Kansas State University (like Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and Texas) is still very keen to have the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, the $451 million lab that is to replace Plum Island. According to www.kansas.com a decision on the site is expected later this year, and the new lab could be operating by 2013. The head of the university's Political Science Department, is quoted: "... There are a few people with qualms about it."
Before it happened in 2007, few had any qualms about a possible virus escape at Pirbright - but the GAO report seems ready to learn the lessons of that traumatic episode - as see below.
". ... there will always be some risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection..."
It seems to many of us incredible, that the US, like the UK, seems unable to let go of the mindset of mass kill in the event of FMD. But a reluctance to use available technology to protect and prevent means that an escape from a mainland lab could, as at Pirbright, be disastrous for the animals and farmers in the vicinity and beyond. (More on FMD vaccination. More on rapid on-site diagnostic technology)

May 27 2008 ~ US Government Accounting Office report warns about what happened at Pirbright

The GAO report "GAO-08-821T High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories", should be read in full ( warmwell's html version here in new window) Its conclusions are particularly relevant to the hazards demonstrated by the Pirbright leak.
"...A recent release from the Pirbright facility - located in a farming community on the mainland of the United Kingdom - highlights the risks of a release from a laboratory that is in close proximity to the susceptible animals....
• ....human error can never be completely eliminated and since a lack of commitment to the proper maintenance of biocontainment facilities and their associated technology - as the Pirbright facility showed - can cause releases...
• ...The investigations determined that there had been a failure to properly maintain the site's infrastructure. In all, eight separate outbreaks occurred over a 2-month period.
• ... ...accidents, while rare, still occur because of human or technical errors. Given the non-zero risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection. ...."
The report reveals that the DHS had not conducted any studies to determine the wisdom of moving FMD activities away from Plum Island, using instead an existing study that does not clearly support such a move. The GAO concludes that an island location can help prevent what happened in Surrey: the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes (by vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, for example) and also perhaps airborne transmission. The report noted grimly how "recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have demonstrated its economic consequences."